


Marine Corps

ette

NOV 1956
FORTY CENTS



181st Anniversary

Marine Corps Gazette

NOVEMBER 1956
NUMBER 11
VOLUME 40

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THIS MONTH AND NEXT This month's cover is a painting by former GAZETTE artist TSgt S. E. Dunlap. Leaving the Marine Corps after 13 years' service, he is now a commercial artist employed by General Electric. The cover is dedicated to all Marines, who for 181 years have selflessly devoted their lives to the cause of their Corps and their Country, regardless of the hardships and vicissitudes that such service might have imposed upon them.

Next month the GAZETTE will include the second in a series of short episodic studies of WWII by B. H. Liddell Hart.

For those Association members who maintain a file of old issues of the GAZETTE in binders (see inside back cover), a consolidated index for 1956 is to be included.

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Membership in the Association is open to all members and honorably discharged former members of the Armed Forces of the US. Dues in the Association are \$4.00 per year and members receive the journal of the Association the MARINE CORPS GAZETTE monthly. The MARINE CORPS GAZETTE, copyright 1956 by the Marine Corps Association, Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Va. is entered as second-class mail, privileges authorized at Quantico, Va., and Baltimore, Md. Editorial, Business offices: Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Va. Editorial telephone—4780; Business—5750; Bookshop—4749. Subscription rate, \$4.00 per year; single copy, 40 cents. Articles, photographs, book reviews and letters of professional interest are invited. If accepted, these are paid for at prevailing space rates. It is requested manuscripts for articles be submitted in triplicate, double spaced, with ample margins. Material may not be reproduced without permission. Picture credits: all pictures official Department of Defense photos unless otherwise credited.

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COMMANDANT GENERAL, ROYAL MARINES

Lieutenant General Campbell R. Hardy, CB, CBE, DSO



IN continuing the close relationship and fellowship that has existed throughout the years between the Royal Marines and our own Corps, Gen Randolph McC. Pate has extended an invitation to LtGen Campbell R. Hardy, CB, CBE, DSO, to be guest of honor at the Marine Corps Birthday Ball this month in Washington, DC. Commandant and Mrs. Hardy will arrive in the US on November 5 and will tour Marine Corps installations in this country in addition to attending the Birthday Ball.

General Hardy became Commandant of the Royal Marines in 1955 after 31 years of illustrious service. During WW II, as a lieutenant colonel, he commanded 46 Commando in the Normandy landings and the advances through Belgium. He was wounded during operations in Northwestern Europe and was awarded the Distinguished Service Order (DSO) and Bar for his services there.

In September 1944 he was promoted to acting brigadier and took over the 3d Commando Brigade which was serving in Burma. After the operations at Myebon and Kangaw he was engaged in planning the Brigade's role for a landing in Malaya when the war ended.

After the war he was in charge of the training branch of the Royal Marines and was largely responsible for their postwar training. In 1948 he returned to the command of the 3d Brigade (then in Malta), and moved it to Hong Kong in 1949 and then to Malaya in 1950. After 9 months of operations there he was decorated by being made Commander of the British Empire (CBE) and returned to England.

On his return, he took over the Recruit Depot at Deal and after being promoted to major general in 1952 he became chief of staff to the Commandant General. In 1954 he was made a Companion of the Order of the Bath (CB).

General Hardy will be accompanied by Mrs. Hardy and Col N. H. D. McGill, R.M., in his tour of the United States. Their itinerary will be:

5 Nov	MB, 8th & Eye	13 Nov	Camp Pendleton, Calif
6 Nov	HQMC	14 Nov	Los Angeles, Calif
7 Nov	MCRD, PI, SC	15 Nov	San Francisco, Calif
8 Nov	MCAB, Cherry Pt, NC	16 Nov	MARPAC
9 Nov	MCS, Quantico, Va	18 Nov	MARTCom, Glenview, Ill
10 Nov	Washington, DC	19 Nov	New York, NY
12 Nov	MCRD, San Diego, Calif	20 Nov	Washington, DC

message center

On the National Matches

... Congratulations to the Marine shooters who represented us at the Camp Perry matches. I thought it significant that Marine representation was not extended into the air in the Thompson Trophy Race. Next year, let's put a team in the air as well as on the firing line and score another clean sweep—ground and air!

CAPT J. W. HARRIS

1stANGLCO

ED: For more on the National Matches, see pages 56 and 57.

Rocket Reaction

... Two recent articles on proposed developments for the 3.5-inch rocket launcher prompted this letter.

While I was an ATA platoon commander, I found that it was very difficult to interest rifle company and platoon commanders in the employment of the rocket launchers. If there was a simulated fortified position to be attacked or "enemy" armor around there were calls enough. Otherwise we were often left to guard the CP or split up to outpost crags and ridges where no tank could ever climb.

Even with current rounds the rocket launcher is an extremely effective weapon against point targets such as crew

served weapons. The present HEAT round has a fragmentation effect "slightly greater than the 81mm mortar HE shell" according to FM 23-32. The blast is tremendous, capable of blowing a tank hatch cover several hundred feet. At ranges from 200 to 300 yards, our gunners consistently hit 55-gallon oil drums, a target scarcely wider than a man.

Add to these capabilities canister and/or a round giving effective air bursts and I am certain that the call "Rocket Launchers up" would be heard more frequently.

1ST J. L. OWENS

USS Saint Paul

Sound First Call

... "Excellent to outstanding" is Lt Lowe's suggestion (Sept. GAZETTE) to enhance the *esprit de corps* at different Marine Corps bases by installing sufficient loudspeakers to cover the area with martial music.

I think that more exposure to bugle calls can do much to instill into young Marines a sense of pride and a desire to really belong to the elite of fighting organizations.

The communicators can install loudspeakers at strategic locations. This doesn't have to be done outside of train-

ing hours; such work can definitely be included in the training schedule as on-the-job training. The S3 can make arrangements to play records of all bugle calls at the proper times. In between bugle calls, when such will not interfere with normal activities, records of John Philip Sousa and other masters can be played. During actual meal periods I propose soft dinner music; however, this is not desired, then play martial music. Martial music is certainly more beneficial and properly soul-stirring than the mutilated stomach groans of certain "crooners" and similar tunes now played in some mess halls.

Therefore, Marines, let's return once again to Col Prickett's "Old Corps" and start regulating our activities by the clarion call of the bugle. Let the clear, sweet, powerful notes of the ancient wind instrument send us charging about in the performance of our duties, ever mindful of the fact that we must prepare for war to preserve the peace.

MAJ N. W. HICKS
Camp Pendleton, Cal.


Gone and Lost Forever

... What is the latest news on the Sam Browne Belt? Since reading about it last year I have heard nothing. Surely it won't take 2 years to approve such a desirable article.

Think of the prestige it would add to officers, especially those of us in constant contact with the public!

MAJ M. F. BRUMFIELD
New Orleans, La.

ED: The Marine Corps Uniform Board has recently concluded a study of the Sam Browne belt which has resulted in a decision NOT to readopt it.



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
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Reserve Training

... Capt Singer's analysis of the fallacies in the present Reserve Program presented in the September issue was most accurate. I would however, differ slightly with his solution. I am in the somewhat unique position of being the Inspector-Instructor of both a special infantry company and a motor transport company (economy of manpower, no matter what the cost). As such, I have been able to observe first hand the problems inherent in both specialist and general type units, and have concluded that the training of a specialist unit is about as feasible as teaching a third grader integral calculus.

An alternative to Capt Singer's solution would be to establish all Reserve units as special infantry companies or rifle companies. All home armory training would be conducted in basic and advanced infantry subjects, since even specialists need training in the infantry field if they are to be real Marines. For annual field training, 2-week courses could be established for the various specialists, conducted by Regular Marines familiar with the latest developments in the particular fields. Members of Reserve units with specialist MOSs could attend these courses in lieu of attending annual field training with the unit. Men without prior active duty could enter one of the specialty fields, when and if they ever qualified as basic Marines, though in my opinion it would take 4 years in the Reserve to give the same training he receives in Boot Camp and in the basic individual combat course. Where the majority of the NCOs of a unit are specialists, naturally some might have to attend annual field training with the unit. This loss of training in the specialist field would be nothing, however, compared to the loss incurred in the present specialist unit, where, to a great degree the blind are leading the blind.

To add one last comment, I observed this year an attempt to adapt the 2 week amphibious training period at Little Creek to the needs of specialist units. In no way do I blame the Landing Force Training Unit, but without doubt the specialist units would have gained much more had their training not been modified, making obscure the basic infantry concept of an amphibious assault.

The Reserve Program is here to stay, and rightly so, but training concepts must be revised if it is to accomplish its mission.

CAPT T. C. FIELDS

Port Newark, NJ

Marine Corps Gazette • November 1956

MARINES' NEWEST...

U. S. Marines are now operating their newest type helicopter, the Kaman HOK-1. These twin rotor helicopters are used for cargo carrying, medical evacuation, personnel transport, observation, and search and rescue. These fine ships are the latest product of Kaman's ten years' development and production of helicopters for military and civilian use. Kaman is proud of the part it is playing in the furtherance of our National Defense effort.



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
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
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Uniform Quiz

The answers to this quiz may be found on page 12.

1. When winter service is the prescribed uniform, the winter service jacket may be worn:
 - a) On liberty
 - b) At social functions during working hours
 - c) At social functions outside of working hours
 - d) On duty
2. When the winter service jacket is worn as the outer garment, the following decorations, medals, and the badges to which the wearer is entitled *must* be worn:
 - a) Ribbons denoting area campaigns if entitled to personal decorations.
 - b) Ribbons denoting personal decoration
 - c) Expert rifle badge
 - d) Ribbons denoting unit citations.
3. A Marine is entitled to only the following medals: National Defense Service Medal, Korean Service Medal, and United Nations Service Medal. When tropical summer service uniform (without coat) is the prescribed uniform, this Marine is required to wear the ribbons denoting these three medals on his shirt.
 - a) True
 - b) False
4. Which of the following would be properly called decorations:
 - a) Silver Star Medal
 - c) WWII Victory Medal
 - b) Presidential Unit Citation
 - d) Korean Service Medal
5. You are inspecting a man in winter service uniform. You notice that the cuffs of his shirt extend about $\frac{1}{8}$ inch below the cuff of his coat. Presuming that the length of his coat sleeve is correct:
 - a) His shirt sleeve is $\frac{7}{8}$ inch too short.
 - b) His shirt sleeve is the correct length.
 - c) His shirt sleeve is $\frac{3}{8}$ inch too long.
 - d) None of the answers are correct.
6. In uniforms for officers, a horizontal slit on the left side for a sword is required in the:
 - a) Jacket, winter service
 - c) Coat, summer service
 - b) Coat, winter service
 - d) Raincoat
7. The tropical garrison shirt will not be worn as a part of the winter service uniform.
 - a) True
 - b) False
8. When the officers insignia of rank are worn on the shirt collar, the small insignia are used. They are centered on each side of the collar:
 - a) $\frac{1}{2}$ inch from the front edge.
 - b) $\frac{3}{4}$ inch from the front edge.
 - c) 1 inch from the front edge.
 - d) $1\frac{1}{4}$ inches from the front edge.
9. Personnel detailed as pallbearers shall wear the mourning band on the right arm of the outer garment, midway between the shoulder and elbow.
 - a) True
 - b) False
10. With the winter service or blue uniform, creases in the skirt of the coat in back are prohibited.
 - a) True
 - b) False
11. The standard bronze Marine Corps tie clasp must be worn by male personnel with the service necktie when the service uniform is worn:
 - a) On leave.
 - c) In offices.
 - b) In troop formations.
 - d) On liberty.
12. The metal chevrons will be worn by enlisted men on the camouflage helmet cover on the front center directly below the stenciled Marine Corps ornament, single point of the chevron up.
 - a) True
 - b) False
13. Male enlisted personnel may purchase certain items of uniforms and accessories from the sources other than the Marine Corps supply system, provided they bear approval, identification and meet Marine Corps standards. Some of these items are:
 - a) Blue Trousers
 - c) Shirt, cotton, khaki
 - b) Trouser, tropical garrison
 - d) Shirt, tropical garrison
14. The tropical garrison shirt, when worn as an outer garment, will be pressed with military creases.
 - a) True
 - b) False
15. Certain parts of the uniform may be worn with civilian clothes. Some of these items are:
 - a) Raincoats without chevrons or insignia
 - b) Summer service trousers
 - c) Shirts without chevrons or insignia
 - d) Winter service trousers
16. You have been transferred to the Marine Barracks, Panama Canal Zone, on permanent change of station orders. Which of the following uniforms are you *required* to take?
 - a) Jacket, summer service
 - c) Raincoat with liner
 - b) Coat, summer service
 - d) Coat, winter service
17. The garrison cap will be:
 - a) Made of the same fabric as the shirt and trousers when worn as a part of the summer service uniform.
 - b) Worn squarely on the head.
 - c) Worn cocked over to the right side.
 - d) Worn with the top tucked down in front and back.
18. You have decided to take a 30-day leave and visit Mexico City. Regulations permit you to make this visit.
 - a) Only in civilian clothing.
 - b) Only in uniform.
 - c) In either uniform or civilian clothing.
 - d) None of the above answers are correct since there is no such regulation.
19. In fitting the coat, man's green or blue, the length of the sleeves should be such that the bottom of the sleeve is:
 - a) 4 inches above the second joint of the thumb.
 - b) 3 inches above the second joint of the thumb.
 - c) 2 inches above the second joint of the thumb.
 - d) 1 inch above the second joint of the thumb.
20. Regulations require enlisted men to mark their name on uniform clothing in certain prescribed places. Which of the following are marked in the correct place:
 - a) A belt marked in the center of underside of belt, parallel to the top, 8 inches from the buckle.
 - b) A utility shirt marked in the center on the inside of the neckband.
 - c) Gloves marked inside the wrists, parallel to the edge.
 - d) Trousers marked inside the right waistband.
21. The utility uniform may be worn:
 - a) On working parties.
 - b) At a class on Military Justice.
 - c) While cleaning weapons.
 - d) By personnel working in offices.
22. Ribbon bars may be sewn on the coat or jacket with sufficient stiffening to prevent wrinkling.
 - a) True
 - b) False
23. One of your men is being transferred to the Marine Detachment, USS *Intrepid*. You should advise him to send his civilian clothing home since he is not permitted to have civilian clothing in his possession aboard ship.
 - a) True
 - b) False
24. The garrison cap may be worn on liberty.
 - a) True
 - b) False
25. When the Expert Rifle Badge and the Basic Badge are worn, the Expert Rifle Badge would be to the right of the Basic Badge (right refers to the wearer's right.)
 - a) True
 - b) False


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
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Originally, the trophy event involved a race around pylons with high performance piston-engine aircraft, but its character gradually changed with the advent of jets.

Today's supersonic speeds have ruled out closed course racing. A straightaway race against time has taken its place.

The first jet race was held in 1946, with the winning plane recording 516 miles an hour.

Now, ten years later, Chance Vought's Crusader — first plane ever entered in the event by the Navy — nearly doubled that speed when it became the first trophy winner to exceed 1,000 miles an hour.

F8U-1 Streaks over Thompson Trophy course at 1015.428 mph!

A standard production model Chance Vought F8U-1 Crusader — averaging a blazing 1,015.428 miles an hour — has set a U. S. speed record and captured the coveted Thompson Trophy for the Navy in that service's first entry in this historic aviation event.

The former official record, set last year, was 822 miles an hour.

Commander Duke Windsor, USN, crack Navy test pilot, streaked over California's Mojave Desert at an altitude of 40,000 feet in setting the record. He made two runs over a precisely measured 15.1 kilometer (9.3 miles) course, trailing a sonic boom across the desert in his wake.

Significantly, the triumph was achieved with a stock, combat fighter, identical with Crusaders soon to be delivered to the U. S. Fleet. It carried a full complement of cannon, and ballast equal to a full ammunition load.


The Crusader's U. S. record — first to top 1,000 miles an hour — marked the third time Chance Vought-designed aircraft have captured the Thompson Trophy. Commander Cook Cleland, USNR, flying as a civilian, piloted Corsair fighters to new records in 1947 and 1949.

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One, the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line, will flash the *first* warning of an enemy approaching from the north. It is America's latest answer to the challenge of maintaining world peace.

The other, Alaska Integrated Communications Exchange (White Alice), is a vital network including "over-the-horizon" and "line-of-sight" microwave links connecting isolated communities and defense installations across Alaska, as well as existing telephone and telegraph services.

Manpower of the highest order in skills, stamina and intelligence is imperative. The U. S. Air Force has selected Federal Electric Corporation, a subsidiary of International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation, to operate and maintain both these far-flung installations.

Federal Electric Corporation's experience on military assignments in the Arctic . . . in the maintenance of specialized navigational equipment for the Air Force . . . as a field service and maintenance organization for IT&T's laboratories and factories . . . coupled with the world-wide experience of IT&T, make this an ideal partnership for so broad and technical an undertaking.



INTERNATIONAL TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH CORPORATION, 67 Broad Street, New York 4, N. Y.

Pistol Shooting

... After being successfully defended for the rifle in these pages, target shooting positions have also come under fire for the pistol. Both the weapon and the technique have been unjustly labeled impractical.

Before you run, you must learn to walk. Shooting with both hands or prone is merely fudging for score to eliminate the need for practice and mastery of the weapon. An expert pistol shot can fire effectively in any position. But would the "combat" shooter be able to hit anything if he had to stand and fire with one hand? The diversity of

battle situations makes no guarantee against such a possibility. If these people will accept the T/O weapon until changed and learn to use the pistol as taught, they will acquire a familiarity and confidence with which they can fire in any position.

Perhaps we do need a new handgun but we also need the old zeal to gain 100 percent efficiency with the equipment on hand. There is no substitute for conscientious application and practice in any phase of military training. We must take the initiative and time to master the difficult.

CPL E. E. DIXON

USS Rochester

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Answers to questions on page 8


1. d) On duty—49450.1 MCM
2. b) Ribbons denoting personal decorations
d) Ribbons denoting unit citations—49250.5 MCM
3. a) True—49250.5 MCM
4. a) Silver Star Medal
b) Presidential Unit Citation—49251.1 MCM
5. b) His shirt sleeve is the correct length—49069.1 MCM
6. b) Coat, winter service
c) Coat, service summer—49056 MCM
7. b) False—49069.1 MCM
8. c) One inch from the front edge—49165.4 MCM
9. b) False—49051.1 MCM
10. a) True—49056.1 MCM
11. a) On leave
b) In troop formations
c) In offices
d) On liberty—MC Memo 49-55
12. a) True—49157.5 MCM
13. b) Trousers, tropical garrison
d) Shirt, tropical garrison—49008.3 MCM
14. a) True—49069.1 MCM
15. a) Raincoats without chevrons or insignia
c) Shirts without chevrons or insignia—49003.2 MCM
16. Officers:
b) Coat, summer service
c) Raincoat with liner
d) Coat, winter service
Enlisted:
c) and d)—49009.1 MCM
17. a) Made of the same fabric as the shirt and the trousers when worn as a part of the summer service uniform
b) Worn squarely on the head—49054.1 MCM
18. a) Only in civilian clothing—49003.1 MCM
19. d) One inch above the second joint of the thumb—49056.1 MCM
20. c) Gloves marked inside the wrists, parallel to the edge
d) Trousers marked inside the right waistband—49501.1 MCM
21. a) On working parties
c) While cleaning weapons—49450.1 MCM
22. a) True—49257.5 MCM
23. a) True—49003.3 MCM
24. b) False—MC Memo 49-55
25. a) True—49254.1 MCM

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
6313 MC Dark brown mahogany
6312 MC Black
6313 CMC Cordovan



9747 White Nubuck



6318 MC Dark brown mahogany



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


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
THE STORY BEHIND THE STORY





1. SURFACE-TO-SURFACE missile—Chance Vought's Regulus—can be launched from ship or submarine to destroy distant shore target. A Sperry stabilization system provides the electronic brain which holds Regulus on its course with a vise-like grip.



2. AIR-TO-AIR missile—Sperry Sparrow I—gives carrier-based interceptors deadly weapon against enemy jets. Developed by Sperry for the Bureau of Aeronautics, Sparrow I, a rocket-powered, supersonic weapon, is in production for fleet use.




3. SURFACE-TO-AIR missile—Convair's Terrier—travels a precise radar beam to destroy enemy aircraft. Produced for the Bureau of Ordnance, Sperry designed and built radars are used to control Terrier's flight and to make possible the deadly accuracy of this missile.



NEW NAVY MIGHT EMPLOYS MISSILES OF ALL TYPES

The U. S. Navy has come a long way from the world's first missile, shown at right, to the missiles employed in the fleet today. Our modern Navy, with its modern weapons, has new tactical power to strengthen our nation's defenses. Sperry, too, has come a long way since its pioneering work in gyroscopics and missiles. Today Sperry is putting its many capabilities to work in seven major missile systems—of all types—ranging from complete systems' cognizance to major sub-system responsibility.



In 1916 Sperry produced the first guided missile, a pilotless aerial torpedo for the Navy.

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PROGRESS NEEDS PROTECTION



The mighty Forrestal can protect a center of progress like New York City while oceans away. The threat of retaliation from this swift, roving airbase is another powerful deterrent to any country's thought of aggression. For the deck of this super-carrier can launch a hundred jets to strike with sudden devastation. The Forrestal is, with the atomic submarine, an example of U. S. Naval progress in protection. So, too, are the Grumman Cougars on the Forrestal flight deck. Cougars, like all Grumman airplanes, were ready in quantity when needed.



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Wallaby

with a

WALLOP!

a salute to the officers and men of U.S.S. Canberra

Proudly named after Her Majesty's Australian Ship Canberra lost early in World War II, and the only ship in our navy named after a foreign capital, the U.S.S. Canberra has recently been recommissioned as the world's second guided missile ship. It was formerly a heavy cruiser.

In every sense, the U.S.S. Canberra belongs to the electronic age. Its electrical system could supply a city of 50,000 people. Its electronically guided missiles, known as TERRIERS, are among the world's most lethal anti-aircraft weapons. These are designed to intercept aircraft at ranges and altitudes far beyond those of conventional anti-aircraft guns.

The Canberra's crew of 76 officers and 1,241 enlisted men are trained and inspired to make the ship a tremendous fighting unit as well as a historic departure in naval operations.

RCA is proud to have had a part in equipping this great ship, by providing electronic equipment and systems that represent the most advanced thinking in navigation, communications and fire control.

AMONG THE ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT AND SYSTEMS SUPPLIED BY RCA FOR U.S.S. CANBERRA ARE...

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INTERESTING FACTS ABOUT U.S.S. CANBERRA

The engines, developing more than 200,000 horsepower, can drive ship at speeds in excess of 30 knots.

Automatic dial exchange serves 210 telephones. In addition, 1,000 sound-powered phones are used.

Electronics switchboards are made up of 100,000 contacts and employ 23,000 vacuum tubes (many of them supplied by RCA).



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


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EXCERPTS...

FROM A GENERAL'S LETTER

ED: The comments below were taken from a letter which MajGen Riseley prepared and sent to all the new officers who reported to the 3d Mar Div while he was in command of that Division. The letter was sent to us by one of the officers who received it during his tour there. It has been edited so that its pertinent portions apply to the officers of the Corps in general.

THE PURPOSE OF THIS LETTER IS to acquaint you with my views and policies on matters which will first require your attention: Those which concern you yourself and those which concern the handling and training of your men, which is the most important responsibility and, incidentally, the most satisfying task that you will have.

The first and most important requirement is that you set the example of being military in all your tasks. Your command will not be military unless you yourself are. You can only insist that others have required and proper fitting clothing or keep equipment clean and operative when you do it yourself first. This idea is applicable equally to all commanders, officers and NCOs. A sloppy commander runs a sloppy outfit and a sloppy sergeant can expect his squad to be exactly the same.

In regard to the important custom of saluting: Pay particular attention that you always return a salute, and return each one with precision. Make it your best military "45," and the salutee will next time try to go yours one better. Always reprimand a man who fails to salute or who salutes improperly. ("Improper" means anything short of absolutely correct.) And finally, insist that the salute be accompanied by an appropriate greeting, with the SIR added—"Good morning, Sir."

There are many other things about you that will reflect your military attitude. The two I've mentioned above are only the most obvious. Be military in all ways—all the time.

Next, I'd like to discuss the backbone of every Marine organization; namely, the noncommissioned officers. Once the noncommissioned officers assume their responsibilities, their commander is assured of a good outfit. When each sergeant commands his squad with authority and accepts responsibility for the clothing, arms, equipment, squad training and recreation of his men, you will have an organization that is hard to beat.

From the squad leader, the chain of responsibility goes to the lieutenant through the staff, technical or master sergeant in the platoon. Keep your NCOs in that chain! Give them authority that is rightly theirs. Let them exercise it and get accustomed to issuing orders and making sure their orders are carried out, and back up your NCOs to the maximum extent. Equally important, make certain the men obey the orders of their noncommissioned officers. Never should a lieutenant dismiss his platoon—he should always call the platoon sergeant to relay his order. This seems a small matter, but the idea will permeate the outfit. When you see a sergeant give a corporal or private "hell" for not saluting an officer, you've "got it made." You can consider the same to be true when the first lieutenants command the respect of second lieutenants. Each man should know which noncommissioned officer is responsible for his training and for inspection of his clothing and equipment. He should know his chain of command up to the organizational commander.

Another important task is that of "moral leadership." This is more

than just a phrase. As you know, most of the men we take into the Marine Corps today are in their late 'teens or very early twenties. Their personalities are for the most part already formed by previous environment of the home, school and community. The young man at this time of life is, however, in the early stages of adulthood, and by his own thinking and determination will develop attitudes that can bring changes in his personality. Whether such change is to be for the better or worse depends upon the specific attitudes developed. It is the responsibility of every officer to insure that proper attitudes are adopted by the young Marine. A moral code of conduct should be developed in each man that will make him a better Marine and a better citizen. This development will be successful in direct proportion to the moral leadership provided by you.

Proper moral leadership requires that you, your officers and noncommissioned officers set the example for your men. Go to church and encourage your men to do likewise. Do not leave this important function to the Chaplain alone. Afford time in your training schedule for the "Padre" to give all men the spiritual guidance they need.

An extensive and continuous recreation program is a must. Athletics, conducted tours and other organized recreation activity should be afforded the men during their off-duty hours. Encourage spectators at all athletic contests and show the way by attending yourself. Make every effort to provide your men the opportunity of swimming, bowling, hiking and other individual recreational activities. Do it yourself.

Music is essential to our way of life and it should be a part of any well-balanced recreation program. Many men get much enjoyment from making music either by singing or playing instruments. The expenditure of recreation funds for music and musical instruments is a sound investment for development of better Marines and better citizens. Singing while marching is a fine way to bolster morale and develop esprit; encourage it, lead it.

Give those men who want to study and further their education every

opportunity to do so in their off-duty hours. The Marine Corps Institute (MCI) offers many correspondence courses in a variety of subjects. It offers fine schooling opportunities to men desiring to learn. Support it and encourage enrollment in correspondence courses. Make yourself and your NCOs available to assist men in their study and give them a suitable place to study.

Like all other services in the Armed Forces, the Marine Corps has its own professional magazine. This publication is the MARINE CORPS GAZETTE. It deals directly with your stock in trade as a Marine Corp officer. Support it by subscribing, and encourage your officers and senior NCOs to do likewise. Make it available to your men, use it for reference and background material in training and lectures. When you have worthwhile ideas contribute them to the GAZETTE in the form of an article. This is, incidentally, a good way to pick up a little extra cash.

Marksmanship will always be emphasized by me. The development of a qualified rifleman is the foundation of the training of the individual Marine. To succeed in battle we must have men who can hit what they aim at. Given a little motivation any Marine can learn to shoot well. It is your responsibility to provide this motivation. Develop competition within your organization and units in order to stimulate interest and enthusiasm for the

marksmanship program. Get out there and shoot with them.

Essential to the well-being of men is good physical condition. No training will be successful unless the personnel are physically ready to engage in it. Most of our training is vigorous and requires fine physical tone. When men are conditioned first, they not only gain the maximum benefit from training, but actually enjoy participating; whereas a man who is in poor shape will not be able to keep up, and will be discouraged if not disgruntled. It is important to new arrivals and those changing duty, that a program of physical conditioning be set up and completed before the man goes into more strenuous field and amphibious training. Organized athletics should be used insofar as possible to accomplish a good part of this.

I cannot emphasize too strongly the importance of being interested in your men. Let them know you are their leader and make your interest in them known. One of the best ways to get to know your men is to maintain a notebook in which each man's name, rank and MOS is tabulated. Devote a page to each man and jot down all the facts you can accumulate on him. Such items as his age, marital status, hobbies, former education, civilian occupation, religion, assigned duties, preference for duty and future plans, will give you a good insight into the man's background, habits and problems. It will better enable you to assist him and develop a real Marine.

Be a 24 hour-a-day officer, 7 days

a week. This does not mean that you must always be at your desk or in the field with your men. However, it does mean that you must take yourself available to your men at all times; that you interest yourself in them during their off-duty hours as well as during training and normal working hours. Your guidance and interest in their off-duty time will pay tremendous dividends during the working day and when it becomes necessary to function as a team in combat. Such interest and attention will permit you to know and understand your men. It will let them know you and cause them to have trust and faith in your leadership. Don't let them down. Given proper treatment they will not let you down. Remember, in your ultimate task—combat—you are responsible for the lives of your men. No greater responsibility exists.

And finally—have the desire to excel. If you are a company commander or a platoon commander, try to be the best in your battalion or regiment. Make your outfit the same. That extra effort is important. A lecture, or even a board of survey, can't be prepared at the last minute. Check your training schedules in advance. Use your Field Manual references to brush up on the particular phases of training before your unit goes through them. *Never be satisfied.* Improve your outfit and yourself every day. When every man in your unit is honestly convinced that his outfit is the best, then you are beginning to succeed.

USMC



Authorized Absence

UPON DISSOLUTION of the US Navy Special Service Squadron in late 1941 at Balboa, CZ, the size of the Marine Detachment, USS *Erie* (former Squadron Flagship) was increased to 5 officers and 150 Marines. To effect this augmentation, 88 Marines were moved by ship from the States to Panama.

This group debarked at Coco Solo and was immediately ordered to fall in on the dock by the NCO-in-Charge who reported the unit for duty to the Executive Officer of the *Erie* Marine Detachment. The Executive Officer noted that the group totalled only 87 and inquired of the Gunnery Sergeant about the apparent absentee. His explanation was vehement and, edited for publication, ran something like this:

"Captain, the sonofabitch is in the brig. The night before we sailed from Norfolk, I gave these yahoos liberty until 2230. This clown came back after dark 'all gowed up.' He came over the gangway and started across the main deck. About half way across, he heard a voice from the wing of the bridge call out—and Captain, it was the ship's Executive Officer—'You on the main deck!! You're walking in the fresh paint!'"

"This yahoo just turned his head and yelled back: 'That's OK, I got on my old shoes.'"

Col J. P. Sayers

(The GAZETTE will pay \$10.00 for each anecdote published. Submissions should be short and pointed.)

HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF CLOSE AIR SUPPORT



By Maj W. E. Sullivan, Jr.

✿ FROM THE TROPICAL HILLS OF Haiti in 1927 to the icy mountainous wastes of the Chosin Reservoir in 1951 the development of Marine close air support has been the story of trial and error, of perseverance in the face of failure. In time its reluctant acceptance by the ground forces became a welcoming embrace as air support joined the arsenal of the troop commander.

The first close air support may be said to be the bombing of the Sandinistas who attacked the 37-man Marine garrison at Ocotal, Nicaragua. With the bandit fighting going on in Nicaragua, there was ample opportunity realized for the support operations. There grew from these actions a mutual understanding of each other's problems, an appreciation for each other's strength.

In 1939 the mission of Marine Aviation, as dictated by the Navy General Board was:

Marine Aviation is to be equipped, organized and trained primarily for the support of the Fleet Marine Force in landing operations and in

the support of troop activities in the field; and secondarily as replacement squadrons of carrier based naval aircraft.

The maneuvers of 1940 and 1941 revealed the necessity for further co-ordination of the air-ground team, the requirement for a tactical air co-ordinator, and the urgency for better radio communications. When the war started there was no doctrine for close air support in existence. Meanwhile, German Gen Udet, having recognized the value of this support while observing Marines dive bombing at the air show in Cleveland, had evolved the feared team of Stuka, tank and infantryman. He tried them out in Spain in the '30s, then used them with devastating results in other countries.

In 1940 while the Stuka was knocking out the targets for the infantry, the Marine Corps Schools described the use of the air arm in support missions as a striking power to be used:

1) Only against those targets which cannot be reached by the ground weapons.

2) Only when sufficient artillery

cannot be assembled in time.

3) On targets for which ground weapons are unsuitable.

4) When such absence of artillery may involve failure of the campaign as a whole.

This was the doctrine of the Marines' close air support.

On 6 December 1941 the Marines had 206 aircraft. A day later they had 145 aircraft and they were in the war.

Lessons of the Solomons

Close air support at Guadalcanal was rendered by Navy carrier planes supporting the landing. Later, Army and Marine pilots operating from Henderson Field gave support to the troops. The basic troubles included lack of communications between the front lines and the support aircraft. The line of communications extended from the front line to the division at Henderson Field to the aircraft. Pilots were given the target before takeoff. In many cases they walked up to the front lines and visually checked the target. The idea evolved into what was called the Air Liaison Party. This was a

The "seat of the pants" school of flying in Nicaragua was the beginning of the finest air-ground team in the world

forerunner to the Tactical Air Control Party consisting of a Marine aviator and communications personnel.

At New Georgia the preplanned mission eliminated some of the excessive on-the-spot communication. However, when the troops exceeded their expected advance over a given period of time they had to concern themselves with friendly aircraft coming in to hit the pre-briefed target they were now occupying. Advances in the jungle were slow. Frequently the enemy would be so close as to necessitate the temporary withdrawal of our own troops during an air strike. During these withdrawals the enemy moved up and presented more problems. Also posing a problem were the inadequate gridded aerial mosaics which showed no detail other than the coastline. Frequently, troops couldn't locate their own positions much less that of the enemy. Targets were selected that were well clear of the friendly forces. Targets such as enemy supply dumps, bivouac areas and artillery positions were hit by the support aircraft.

The beginning of close air support as we know it today began with the planning for the landing on Bougainville. In planning to utilize close air support more efficiently a school was conducted on the capabilities, use and limitations, as well as the procedure for requesting air support. An operations officer from every battalion and regiment involved in the forthcoming landing attended the school. It was

easy to understand why the faith of the ground officers in close air support was shaken. Many had been nearly bombed by their own planes. The school was invaluable in restoring confidence and mutual understanding of the problems. The lessons were remembered after the landing as TBFs came in at tree-top level with delayed fuzing and obliterated target areas 75 yards in front of the troops. This was termed "the first successful close air support mission beyond the scope of artillery."

Close air support paid off greater dividends as the island hopping program went on but there remained the inherent danger: bombing friendly. The Operations Officer, 3d Mar Div stated, "... pilot error, resulting in strafing and bombing of our own troops, did not improve the troops confidence in close air support."

The decision to employ close air support while recognizing the calculated risk rests with the commander of the troop unit concerned.

On the other hand, the attitude of the Army Air Corps towards this support is revealed in the FM 100-20 during the early part of the war.

"In the zone of contact, missions against hostile units are most difficult to control, are most expensive, and are, in general, least effective. Targets are small, well dispersed and difficult to locate. In addition, there is always a considerable chance of striking forces . . . Only at critical times are contact zone missions profitable."



While the Marine divisions were island hopping from one beachhead to another, the Marine air arm was relegated to bombing strikes and fighter sweeps up "the Slot" to Rabaul or hitting bypassed islands in the Central Pacific.


On the Move

Marine aviation languished in the back areas until September 1944 when the 1st Mar Div seized the airfield after their landing at Peleliu in the Palaus.

At this time they were given ample opportunity to prove their ability at close air support. The proximity of the close air support targets obviated the pilots picking up their landing gear. It was a 15 second flight after takeoff. This proximity to the enemy may have been a further incentive to complete accomplishment of the mission. It was a unique battle where a pilot was wounded standing in the chow line! After the enemy had retreated to the Umurbrogol mountain system of defense, particularly "Bloody Nose Ridge," the Marine pilots were most effective with napalm. Maj Gen Rupertus, in describing the close air support at Peleliu, stated it was "executed in a manner leaving little to be desired."

Meanwhile, down south in Bougainville, the Marine pilots had been given a mission to furnish close support to Army troops in the Philippines. They had 3 months to prepare for their support with the Army troops. A school was organized and lectures were given by the ALP (air





Okinawa—doubts of friendly accuracy cleared

liaison party men), the Army ground officers of the 37th Inf and Americal Divs (scheduled to go to the Philippines) and experienced pilots of support missions. One important point was resolved. To quote Robert Sherrod: "... the Marine aviators adopted a principle which both Army and Navy had been reluctant to concede: 'close support aviation is only an additional weapon to be employed at the discretion of the ground commander'."

The support work given the Army by the Marine pilots during the Philippine campaigns was certainly the most interesting work the Marines had done; and certainly the most rewarding from the viewpoint of the man on the ground. One soldier defined "close-in" support work by declaring, "Close air support means that those bombs are so close that if you don't get in a hole or down as flat as you can, you're mighty likely to get a backside full of arrows."

The Marine aviators furnished their own ALPs. It was determined that the policy would be control of the aircraft by the front line ALP on his own front by direct communication. In this way the ALP talked

the support pilots to the target without going through a distant controller. The types of targets on a limited front such as was experienced by the Army units made this system ideal. This front line control would not have been accepted by the Army commanders in the Philippines had it not been for "an old school tie and superior salesmanship."

On 19 February 1945 the Marines hit the beaches of Iwo Jima. At the same time, carrier based Marines and Navy pilots dropped napalm, fired rockets and strafed the beaches as the landing craft approached the beach. This was one of the few cases of Marine pilots supporting a landing from a carrier. The most



should realize that our close air support didn't just get that way from behind some desk in Washington."

Maj Sullivan is presently serving as Training Officer, Aviation Reserve Branch, Division of Reserve, HQMC.

Maj W. E. Sullivan, Jr., holder of the Distinguished Flying Cross and 13 Air Medals, was commissioned in 1943 after completing Naval Aviation Cadet training. He has since filled a variety of aviation billets, all of which have contributed to making him qualified to write on close air support. Maj Sullivan's personal knowledge includes the experience gained through the island war of WWII and the mountain-like war in Korea. In answering the question as to why he wrote the article, he replied, "Young officers

salient advance in the doctrine of close air support was embodied in the FSCC—the Fire Support Control Center. This resulted in the coordination of the 3 supporting arms: naval gunfire, artillery and air support. The reduction of communications troubles can be credited to the work of the Joint Assault Signal Companies.

Okie: A Mass Effort

Okinawa, a study in clever camouflage, concealed caves and reverse slope targets, was subjected to more bombing, strafing, rocketry and napalm runs on close air support than any other island in the Pacific. Marine aviation contributed about one tenth of its total personnel strength, and a total of about 700 aircraft to the Okinawa campaign after the first 7 days. To support the operations of the 4 divisions on the front lines a tremendous number of aircraft was necessary. The control of these aircraft was vested in the Tactical Air Controller who exercised control through 2 Landing Force Air Support Control Units (LFASCU). Each of these LFASCU controlled the support for a corps. Located adjacent to corps headquarters, they were connected directly by land wire to all major troop units and to the corps target information center. When a troop commander needed air support the Forward Air Controller (FAC) or Air Liaison Officer (ALO), would request a close air support mission by calling the regimental ALO. He would relay the request by radio. The division indicated its approval by monitoring in silence. An overload of these requests would result in an excessive delay in getting aircraft. To reduce these delays and the number of requests for priority missions, pre-planned missions were scheduled. When an outfit was planning a



Korea—a new ball game

divisions fighting abreast was infeasible. Close control through a control agency "was necessary to avoid or reduce the danger of one unit dropping their bombs within the lines of other adjacent units." Proper co-ordination of air support was necessary with the tremendous amount of artillery and naval gunfire.

By the end of the war a system of control evolved which attempted to incorporate the flexibility of the Philippine system with the co-ordination of the Okinawa system. The request for air support would go direct to the tactical air direction center but intermediate echelons would monitor it, indicating their approval by silence. The Fire Support Co-ordination Center would check the target for possible utilization of artillery or naval gunfire. When air support was approved, it would be controlled by the FAC whenever the tactical situation permitted. This introduced the flexibility of the Philippines system without sacrifice of safety to the ground troops or interference with the overall tactical situation.

Close Air Support: Its Functions, Control and Employment

The uses of close air support as visualized by the Marine Corps Schools in 1940 were given in the opening paragraphs. Six years later the following definition of close air support was given in the Marine Corps Landing Force Manual No. 8:

"Close air support is air action against hostile surface targets which are so close to friendly forces as to require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces."

In 1946 the lessons of World War II, the results of air operations, particularly close air support were studied and a doctrine was evolved. The actual employment has changed little since then. There were pertinent changes in the organization of the battalion, regiment and division. These related to the inclusion of Tactical Air Control Parties. These changes, along with the basic principles, limitations and capabilities of close air support will be discussed below. The TACP, assigned to each battalion, regiment and division, consisted of one or two aviators and communications personnel. These

pilots worked and walked with the infantry units on their day to day problems, took part in all the maneuvers. This was instrumental in their understanding the strengths, weaknesses and limitations of each other's specialty. The troop commander came to appreciate the variety of attacks close air support offered. He saw napalm burn off camouflage, knew from experience what the airborne flamethrower could do. He saw the rockets (his airborne bazooka), smash mobile tanks and pinpoint targets. He saw machine guns in action—on the ground and in the air. And when the bomb blast cleared, his doubts of friendly bombing accuracy cleared with it. He recognized that "every enemy installation is a potential target for air support."

The years leading to Korea were not replete with changes in close air support doctrine but they were profitably employed in indoctrinating young Marine pilots and Marine troop commanders in the methods and employment of close air support. The following limitations were recognized.

1) The inflexible radius of action of an aircraft with full ordnance load.

2) The dependence on reliable radio communications.

3) The space-time factor. (The space over a target area is limited where there are many units working close together. Certain delays are acceptable.)

4) The weather in the target area, particularly ceiling and visibility. The basic principles state that close air support should be requested when:

1) Other means are unavailable or less suitable than air for accomplishing the desired results.

2) Other means are incapable of hitting the target, i.e., defilade, range or hitting power.

3) A critical situation demands all supporting arms be brought to bear.

Korea: The Brush Fire

At the outset of this limited "police action" many Marines and soldiers almost got their feet wet—backing up at Pusan. One of the biggest deterrents to the push into the sea was close air support. Many adulatory remarks concerning the efficacy of air support were made by

"push" the troop commanders and ALOs would confer with the air support commanders and estimate the number and location of strikes which would assist in the accomplishment of the troop commander's mission. Of all close air support missions on Okinawa, 35 percent were requested by the lower echelons. The remainder were pre-planned missions. A pre-planned mission offers the pilots more time for a thorough briefing, reduces the communications required, permits the most suitable type of armament to be carried and insures detailed co-ordination of a mission. This type may be contrasted to the on-call mission where there is little or no delay with the planes or an air-alert or ground-alert, but there is also no choice of ordnance nor any reduction in radio traffic. The highly flexible, speedy system of close air support in the Philippines, with its FAC talking the pilots in—and leaving several links in the chain of command out—contrasts sharply with the co-ordination and centralization of Okinawa.

In the Philippines this was possible because the air units were supporting no more than one division at a time and the ground troops were making rapid movement forward. On Okinawa such decentralization on its more static front of 4

both the Army and Marine troop commanders. This highly flexible form of air support, reminiscent of the Philippines, was to prove itself the guardian angel of the Chosin Reservoir.

In the meantime the ebb tide turned to a flood tide when the Marines hit the beach at Inchon. It was a new ball game. Many of the assists for the "putouts" on the successful landing went to the ubiquitous Marine air arm.

It was only a few months after Inchon that the Marines engaged the Chinese Communists north of Hagaru on the Chosin Reservoir. Here 2 Chinese Corps with 6 divisions began the attack against 2 Marine regiments. In the sub-zero weather of the "Frozen Chosin" the forward air

controllers called some of the closest strikes in history against the hordes of Chinese which poured over the hills like the multitudes of Mongolians led by Genghis Khan. Marine and Navy pilots struck enemy troops within 20 yards of the FAC. Empty shells falling on the friendlies was a common occurrence. There were 8 to 16 aircraft on station during daylight hours throughout the entire period.

The long snail of a convoy, loaded with wounded and frozen Marines, savagely fought the enemy and the elements. As the convoy slowly progressed southward the FACs called in strikes on targets bearing from 45 degrees ahead to 45 degrees aft of their position in the convoy. The FAC up forward in the point of the

convoy called in support missions against roadblocks or troop concentrations which might be opposing the advance.

The success of the retreat might best be examined in this light: (Karig's *Battle Report: War in Korea*)

"The two regiments reached Hagaru on December 3 with all their wounded: 1,500 men, 600 of them on stretchers. They brought with them all their equipment, with the exception of one jeep and four 155mm howitzers that had slid off the icy mountain road."


The Korean front stalemated itself along the 38th parallel. At this time the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing was operationally under the control of the Fifth Air Force. To maintain the air-ground integrity of the Marines, the Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, concurred in the request of the CG, 1stMAW, that the Marine Division would have priority on the use of Marine aircraft for close air support. It was further agreed that a Marine liaison team would write that portion of the daily "Frag Order" which concerned the Marine Air Wing. This would be in co-ordination with the overall effort. This co-ordination was achieved to the mutual satisfaction of the Marines and the Air Force to the end of the war.

Summary

If the Korean War was a victory, it was a Pyrrhic victory at best. The progress made in close air support stems from the failures in the Solomons of the communications systems, the co-ordination between ground and air, and an understanding of each other's problems. In the Palaus came the extensive use of napalm for the Marines, in the Philippines the highly flexible system of control with the pilots out front with the division calling the shots. This was contrasted to the more static front of the Okinawa campaign with the 4 divisions abreast, and the tremendous number of aircraft involved. Korea saw the advantages of these systems parlayed into a winning team.

Progress must continue. The danger lies in any sense of complacency which might crystalize the "technique into dogma and from dogma into holy writ." USMC

Marine Corps Gazette • November 1956



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
By Maj W. G. Timme

AFTER FINISHING A FIELD EXERCISE have you ever asked yourself these questions? What did the troops get out of the problem? How realistic was it, and what can I do to improve it or any field exercise?

Realism is the keynote. If your problems are realistic, the chances are the troops got a lot out of it and it was a success. In creating our realism we should strive to make the conditions as close to combat as possible. We should let our troops know the effects of the added confusion created by combat conditions; that control is not quite as simple as they originally thought; that it's a little harder to give and receive commands under combat conditions.

How can we accomplish this? Demolitions effectively placed and controlled is not the complete answer but it's an excellent place to begin. Demolitions can be used to simulate both enemy and friendly fire. They are easy to install and, most important, give a touch of realism.

Our first problem is to find quali-



- To test whip use a galvanometer instead of a battery. Complete circuit with striker wire. Reading on galvanometer indicates individual connections are complete.
- A Both wires of common return to one terminal on battery.
 - B Pairs of wire from points 1-10 to comm reel.
 - C Wire ends stripped, wrapped around tack and driven flush.
 - D 2x4 bolted to comm reel.
 - E Striker wire to fire charge.

fied demolition personnel. Check around your outfit and you'll probably find many of your NCOs have handled demolitions and are well checked out on their use. If you are still not satisfied, give the Engineers a ring for an instructor for a day or so for a refresher course or to break in new men.

Now we are ready to rig up a control for our demolitions for this realism. The following control is called a "whip" and is prepared by the NCOs for many of the field problems at Basic School. It is simple to make, gives positive control of the charges, is easily portable, can be hooked up in 10 to 15 minutes, and is very easy to check out or test. The "Whip" shown is for 20 shots; however, "whips" as large as 50 shots may be constructed if the small comm wire can be salvaged. All materials needed are readily available in the field.

In firing demolitions electrically it is necessary that we complete an electrical circuit attached to the charge as shown. This can be accomplished by running a wire from a source of power (battery) to the charge. To save on materials and installation time for a group of charges, installing other wiring in the form of a "whip" is desirable. The "whip" utilizes one pair of wires called a common return to connect all charges to the source of power. Another pair of wires is laid out to handle each 2 charges of the "whip," one wire to each charge. Notice that the "whip" grows in size as it reaches the control point.

After the "whip" has been used to fire the charges it is rolled up on the comm reel for future use.

If the "whip" is going to be used near moving personnel it should be marked to keep personnel out of the immediate area. The demolitionist controlling the charges should so place himself that he has observation of the moving personnel and the emplaced charges. It is also advisable to dig a hole about the size of a steel helmet and place the charges in it to prevent flying debris. In dry weather all combustionable material within one foot of the charge should be removed.

Listed below are the materials and equipment for a 20-shot "whip."

- 1 Comm reel (salvaged)
- 1 2x4 (2 feet long)
- 2 Bolts w/nuts
- 20 Roofing tacks
- 2 Friction tape (rolls)
- 827 feet Comm Wire (salvaged)
- 10 TNT (1 lb. blocks)
- 20 Caps, blasting, elec.
- 1 Hammer
- 1 TL 13
- 1 Brace and bit
- 1 Galvanometer
- 1 Battery

THIS IS ONLY ONE WAY that demolitions may be used on field exercises to increase the realism. Other methods such as making a dummy satchel charge with a foot of time fuze extended to ignite and explode a previously emplaced charge in a bunker will greatly add to the problem. Placing a charge near a machine gun firing blanks remotely controlled by means of a string, then letting the attacking troops knock out the gun by exploding the charge, also shows the unlimited use of demolitions as an aid to create realism.

Because of the low cost of TNT we not only get our money's worth in realism, but also make our training as close to combat conditions as possible.

USMC

- 1) Lay out common return wire (shown in solid line)
- 2) Strip both ends of the common return and at 3 yard intervals beginning at point #1.
- 3) Cut 9 one-foot lengths of wire to splice to common return at points 2-10. (None needed at point #1 since there are 2 separate ends of the comm wire). The common return will have one cap wire from each charge.
- 4) Lay out another wire from point #1 to the comm reel and strip ends. One of the ends goes to the other cap wire on charge 1L and the other to 1R.
- 5) Move back to point #2 and lay a wire back to comm reel. Repeat for points 3-10.
- 6) Wires to comm reel go inside reel, out center hole, and attached to tacks forming terminals.
- 7) Hold whip together by taking together at 2 yard intervals.

A PRINCIPLE IN

By BrigGen V. H. Krulak

RECENT EVENTS GIVE RISE TO THE apprehension that we in the Marine Corps are suffering from an attack of a common, but dangerous, military ailment—atrophy of command authority.

Beginning with the onset of World War II, the US military found it prudent—for reasons now quite hard to discern—to follow the lead of an earlier American political era where, as each new problem arose, an alphabetical agency was created to solve it. The virus ran rampant through our armed forces during the war years. Undefinable agencies, and new and vague terms were created in profusion—all inspired by the mistaken impression that existing staff and command principles were not adequate for solving the current military problems. More serious still was the fact that all of these agencies revolved, perhaps unconsciously, around the thesis that the commander was no longer capable himself of directing his troops, ministering to them and guiding them, but that what he needed was a corps of new agencies and superspecialists to handle matters for him—matters which had allegedly become so complex as to transcend his own general military capability.

The Marine Corps was able to keep pretty much aloof from this wicked trend which opened the gate for circumscribing and diluting the command function. Now, however, there are symptoms to indicate that the debilitating disease has taken hold within our own organizational structure and, more seriously, within our minds.

Thus it is that we need but look around us to find a multiplicity of activities which have been created with the avowed purpose of relieving the commander of burdensome operational details but which, in

fact, tend to relieve him of his command authority.


We have operations centers and administrative centers; we have fire support co-ordination centers and supporting arms centers; we have tactical-logistical control groups and liaison centers;—all created out of the whole cloth of existing staffs. They are intended, ostensibly, to help the commander to fight his battles, but, by their very existence, they lay the groundwork for dispersal of his command authority.

At the same time we have personal affairs experts and information and education experts; we have food experts, re-enlistment experts, special services experts, legal experts and others. Their purpose, allegedly, is to help the commander take care of his troops, but they, in fact, tend to insulate him from them and to invade and complicate his existing staff and command arrangements.


I do not say that all these agencies and military excrescences are bad per se. Indeed, they may every one be very good and most necessary. I only say that they must all be looked upon initially with deep suspicion, and each must be made, on its own merits, to justify its existence in terms of practical military need. If they do, well and good, but I doubt if this has been done.

Our military language, likewise, has suffered as a part of the same trend. Today, we talk too little of commanding, and too much of "supervising," "monitoring" and "directing;" of "guiding," "co-ordinating" and "controlling;" of "representing," "integrating" and "managing;" and of many more acts which, while in themselves quite indefinable, still all reflect a trend toward the dilution of command authority.

"Managing" is particularly odious. Its dictionary definition would ap-



JEOPARDY



appear to have little genuine connection with the solution of military problems, yet we find the word used on all sides. There is even a magazine devoted to the subject. It speaks freely in its pages of many things which the straightforward military mind recognizes at once as elements and incidents of command. These actions, however, are identified as forms of "management" — without any substantive indication of what "management" is, where "management" begins and ends, or how it is identifiable with or compatible with the function of "command." From a military point of view "management" is a bad word. It has no place in our lexicon.

It may be said that the commander need not allow these trends to develop in an unfavorable direction; that he need not permit "supervision," "integration" and "management" to invade the sacred precincts of his command authority; that the spate of "centers" and "groups" need not be allowed to diminish or impede his authoritative direction of operations; that the various experts can readily be confined to their proper advice and recommendation niche as staff officers. This is all quite true, but to keep these things in proper perspective places an increased and often unnecessary burden on an already busy commander.

There is no question but that so long as there is a personal affairs expert around, the Marine will be encouraged to turn to him with his problems, rather than to his platoon or section leader.


Likewise, so long as there is a so-called "center" for co-ordinating this, or for directing that, the tendency will exist for someone ultimately to acquire the authoritative position of "co-ordinator" or "director;" and with the latter step goes

a piece of the commander's authority.

So it goes, and the simple fact is this; the cumulative tendency of all such agencies — whatever their avowed purpose — is to diminish the strength and substance of the military monolith called "command" and leave it so weakened as to be little more than "military responsibility." In order to combat this tendency the commander must be eternally and often unproductively vigilant.


Whether we fight our battles in an all-out nuclear war or in some remote jungle, the basic principles

under which we operate are immutable and cardinal among them is the *Principle of Command*. You cannot fight wars with a socialized military structure — even the Russians have found that out. **USMC**



BrigGen V. H. Krulak is the Asst Division Commander of the 3d Mar Div. Being graduated from the Naval Academy in 1934, he saw service at sea and in China and with the 6th Marines at San Diego before joining the 1st MarBrig at Guantanamo in 1940. During WWII the General won the Navy Cross as CO, 2d Prcht Bn, at Choiseul. Later he became G3, 6th Mar Div for the Okinawa campaign. After WWII and prior to Korea he served at Quantico, commanded the 5th Marines and then became G3, FMF Pac. In 1951 he became Chief of Staff, 1st Mar Div in Korea. Returning to the US, he became Secretary of the General Staff, HQMC. After his tour in Washington he was ordered to FMF Pac as Chief of Staff. Gen Krulak remained there until he assumed his present duties.

SPECIAL TRUST AND CONFIDENCE



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Foreword

In reprinting Special Trust and Confidence, the GAZETTE presents an article which has gained wide notice throughout the nation.

To quote the Naval Institute Proceedings, where it originally appeared, the article "evoked more comment and interest than any article Proceedings has published within the memory of the present editorial staff."

Scripps-Howard newspapers praised it in a nationally syndicated column. Service journals have supported it. Arthur Godfrey recommended it on TV.

The author to date has received nearly 200 letters, and the Proceedings, at least as many. Of this bulk, only one letter has been unfavorable. They are still coming in.

The Commandant of the Marine Corps has already circulated copies of Special Trust and Confidence to every general officer, while Marine Corps Order 1600.1, recently promulgated, has launched a Corps-wide drive to correct situations and procedures which derogate the status of officers, or restrict the proper latitude of commanding officers in the exercise of command.

Some reforms urged by this article are thus already afoot. Others promise to be, as the Marine Corps Order is implemented. Meanwhile, the Commandant's programs affords every CO, and the whole officer corps, continuing leverage and an opportunity to restore to its past luster the "special trust and confidence" which is (or should be) the unique charge of every commissioned officer.

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♣ IN A LOWER-DECK POKER GAME ABOARD SHIP, runs an old Navy story, which probably antedates the *Tuscarora* with her 5 decks and a glass bottom, a sailor had his hand called, announced that he had a winning hand, and threw in his cards, faces down. One of his mates remonstrated, "Let me see those cards."

Replied the first sailor, "In the wardroom the officers don't look at each other's hands."

"Sure," came the answer, "but them sonsabitches is gentlemen!"

♣ THE OPENING WORDS in your commission as an officer in the armed forces avow that the President of the United States, no less, reposes "special trust and confidence" in you.

Today, however, that special trust and confidence in you as a commissioned officer is seemingly confined to the President alone.

In the 18th Century, pontificated Samuel Johnson, "An officer is much more respected than any other man who makes as little money." Today, if we are to believe a public opinion survey conducted by the Gallup organization for the Department of Defense, (In findings announced by the Department of Defense early this year, the Gallup organization discovered that the public at large ranks officers seventh, as an occu-

pational group, among 19 representative walks of life. Callings which the average civilian rates higher—physician, scientist, lawyer, college professor, or clergyman.) an officer may well be *less* respected than other men who make as little money.

While the Gallup poll certainly documents the point, the fact of diminishing prestige and waning trust and confidence has not gone unnoticed among the general body of commissioned officers. Furthermore, as seen through the eyes of the individual officer, a great deal of the tangible evidence of this derogation comes from within the Department of Defense—from policies and attitudes at least partially of our own making.

With this generalization, as with Mr. Gallup's findings, there will be little disagreement. In the following pages, however, I am about to proceed from the general to the very particular by reciting a series of seemingly diverse, sometimes trivial-appearing facts or situations. All of these have to do with the way officers are treated and dealt with in and by the services today. Your first reaction, as you read this bill of particulars, may be to dismiss it as a bunch of gripes, as carping. (Because what I am writing about is pervasive, not local, I have not identified offending stations or organizations. If anybody wants to know who they are, I will furnish chapter and verse on request. Every horrible example described in this essay has happened to, or in personal knowledge of, the writer.)

Keep your eye on the ball, however. Read the next few pages not as complaints but as a pragmatic marshalling of evidential symptoms, as an attempt to chart a dangerous shoal by the eddies which ruffle the surface at low water.

If you do agree, by then, that something must be wrong, we shall try to get to the roots of our trouble and, finally, suggest what ought to be done about it.

But without further parley, here are a few examples of what I have in mind.

On board ships of the Military Sea Transportation Service, your personal check—the check signed by one in whom the President reposes special trust and confidence—will neither be cashed nor accepted in payment of charges. On at least one large MSTS transport, the disbursing office even refuses to accept Travelers' Cheques unless fingerprinted by the individual presenting them. Most civilian hotels will take their chances on an officer, and without benefit of fingerprints. Does MSTS know better?

At a major Marine Corps base, when you apply for post tags for your car, it's not enough that you certify, as an officer, that you are insured. Instead you must produce your policy itself, which is then inspected—to verify your word—by an enlisted man in the Provost Marshal's office. As for that convenient pocket card from your insurance company, certifying that you hold the specified policy, regulations at that base expressly rule it out. The company's card isn't any better than your unsupported word. Let's see that policy, Bud!

When you and your wife ("your lady," officers' wives were once styled, just as you often used to be described as "an officer and a gentleman") enter any post ex-

change in the Army's European Command, an enlisted sentry or a civilian attendant makes your wife show written identification to prove she is your wife. This goes even when she is with you, and you protest that you're married. Does your word as an officer cut any ice with that enlisted sentry or that civilian attendant who sometimes can hardly speak English? Not in the least. No matter what *you* say, (This regulation was so affrontingly enforced at 2 large exchanges in the EUCOM that the writer originated an official protest against the policy, to make certain that these orders meant what they implied—that an officer's statement that a lady accompanying him was his wife wasn't good enough for the Army. The official reply, a fine commentary on the state of affairs, said just that.) the Army's Exchange Regulations require that your wife prove it in writing.

The same objectionable regulation is enforced with equally objectionable heavy-handedness by the Navy in its large Exchanges in the European (NELM) area.

If you want to cash a personal check at the Officers' Mess maintained by one of our largest overseas Air Forces, you first complete a 10-line written certificate which begins with the fateful words (in LARGE CAPITALS):

"I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SUFFICIENT FUNDS IN (bank) ON WHICH THIS CHECK IS DRAWN, I FULLY UNDERSTAND THAT IF THE STATEMENT MADE ABOVE IS NOT TRUE AND CORRECT, I SHALL BE SUBJECT TO ACTION THROUGH MILITARY CHANNELS AND POSSIBLY DISCIPLINARY ACTION."

After that, you give them 10 lines of autobiography which includes everything but the results of a blood test. And then, if the enlisted attendant is satisfied, the Air Force cashes your check.

Just to show that this sort of thing isn't confined to the Air Force, one of the Army's European area-commands only a few months ago prohibited commissary patrons from making purchases with personal checks. This ukase extended to officers and their families and, as the buying group most apt to have checking accounts, was principally aimed at them. There is hardly a supermarket in the United States that won't honor a customer's personal check providing he identifies himself reasonably (no problem for an officer or his lady). But not "X" Area Command!

When an officer on temporary additional duty requires Defense Department transportation in Washington, DC, that car is not allowed to pick him up at (or deliver him to) any private residence. If he

happens to be staying at a private address instead of a hotel, that makes no never-mind; he takes a taxi to the nearest hotel and waits for his staff car there. Why? "To prevent misuse of Government vehicles" was the only answer I could get. More bluntly, I think, you can paraphrase that to mean, they don't trust you. No telling what kind of private residence an officer may be at. Sure, you can trust him with a 17,000-ton cruiser or a million-dollar airplane, but not with a staff car.

Making an allotment of pay to a bank for a savings account seems like a pretty straightforward transaction, but even here the Navy's otherwise admirable disbursing system manages to create a situation in which an officer has to get someone else (a civilian) to prove that his word is good. Before you can register such an allotment to a bank, you must satisfy the paymaster with written evidence from the bank that it will accept your allotment. In other words, even though you may certify that all arrangements are in order, you are still a liar as far as the disbursing officer is concerned, until you prove the truth of your statement by a letter from the bank. Then, and then only, will your allotment be registered.

What happens first thing when you check in at a BOQ? You pay a deposit.

That deposit, which is refunded when you leave, is to make sure you don't run off with the towels and sheets or tumblers. You are posting bond, in other words, that you won't pilfer. In the officers' messes of most foreign countries, such a requirement would be considered a dishonorable affront. Here it's a routine formality—like getting fingerprinted.

Until well into World War II, a commissioned officer could pay for food, drink, or tobacco at almost any establishment in the Navy or Marine Corps by the simple act of signing his name and rank on a chit. The chit system, which has all but vanished under our eyes, was an everyday reminder to the service that an officer's word is (was, I mean) his bond. The chit system was a perfect example of *privilege* wedded to *responsibility*. Today you pay cash on the barrelhead.

By way of comparison, it may well be worthy of note that an officer in the British forces signs chits for food, drink, cash or whatever, at virtually any mess under the Union Jack, goes on his way, and finds the charges reflected by mail on his next mess bill at home. He would be affronted at not being allowed to sign a chit, let alone being asked to pay up before departure.

If, for reasons which seem good, a Navy officer wants the temporary use of a self-driven vehicle, even



Entering the Marine Corps from Yale University and the NROTC, **Col Heinl** fought at Pearl Harbor and served in the south and central Pacific, including Iwo Jima and the occupation of Japan. He was successively naval gunfire officer of the 3d MarDiv, the V Amphibious Corps, and finally of the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. In Korea he commanded the UN-held East Coast Islands, as "Mayor of Wonsan," and was subsequently executive officer of a Marine regiment. Col Heinl returned from duty with the Amphibious Warfare Center, North Devon, England, last spring, and is currently on duty at Marine Corps Headquarters, Washington, DC.

for a single run, he must fill in a long form (NAV-Docks 1057, revised 5-52). This preposterous multiplication of paperwork entails 14 separate entries and 2 signatures other than that of the officer who wants the car. It demands certification "that the vehicle requested is to be used for official business," thus clearly implying that officers are not above diverting Government transportation to illegal use. Then, when you get down to "Purpose of Trip," comes a final affront: "'Official business' is not an adequate answer." Any officer who works his way through this form might find it difficult to escape the conclusion that, as far as BuDocks is concerned, the general run of officers are potential liars.

To twist this particular sword in a wound already raw, one of the largest shore-based headquarters in the Navy requires that each single-trip request for transportation, even with an official driver, be submitted in writing on this abominable piece of paper. What this does to the efficiency of the command, through constraining transportation and multiplying paperwork, might well interest the Inspector General. What, by implication, it suggests about the officers in this important headquarters should alarm anyone.

In 1950, a major Marine Corps post, without warning and for no stated cause, shut down service of drinks in the officers' mess at noontime—a privilege which had existed for more than a decade. The reason given unofficially for this abolition of privilege was that "some people are taking advantage of it"—in other words, that a few individuals wouldn't or couldn't govern their lunch-hour drinking. Similar noon blue laws now cast arid shadows over a large percentage of the officers' messes of all services. And the US Navy, alone among the major naval forces of the world, is not allowed to trust its commissioned officers to the extent of permitting controlled ship-board consumption of alcohol (even by cabin passengers on an MSTs transport!). Must we conclude—and does the management really mean to infer—that every officer of the Navy and Marine Corps is a potential alcoholic if allowed a drink between noon and one o'clock when ashore, or at any time when aboard ship, even alongside a dock?

A fine vote of confidence.

ALMOST ANYBODY who reads the foregoing examples (and they are by no means all that can be adduced) will agree, "Yes, it certainly is a shame officers don't seem to get credit any longer for being gentlemen. But,"—he may add—"don't they bring it on themselves?"

Wouldn't MSTs (or "X" Area Command) cash your checks without hesitation, if all of them were good? Ditto the Air Force, where you sign away your life before they accept a 5-dollar check?

Wouldn't the Marine Corps base register your car without question if sad experience hadn't shown that a few officers said they had insurance, and then really didn't?

Couldn't you escort your wife into any Post Exchange without question if some individuals hadn't slipped by with ladies whose relationship was somewhat less binding?

Would the Defense Department restrict its cars to picking up people at hotels only, if some runs to other addresses hadn't resulted in real abuse? And why, unless somebody had overstepped, would BuDocks be asking for 14 entries and 3 signatures in return for a drive across the base?

Why should the paymaster want to see a letter from your bank if he hadn't experienced the bother and snafu of untangling an allotment to a bank that didn't want the account, though the grantor said it did?

Don't BOQs require that deposit because officers do run off with towels and keys?

If every officer took care to hold his liquor before lunch, and could be trusted to drink with discretion aboard ship, would existing "blue law" regulations continue in force?

And isn't it one of the main causes for the demise of the chit system that too many chits come back signed "John Paul Jones," "W. T. Door," or "U. S. Marr?"

The answer to all the foregoing questions unfortunately, is "yes."

But surely, readers may interject, what if the answers are "yes?" Aren't all these matters quite trivial? Who worries if it's a little harder to cash a check? And what's so terrible about somebody's borrowing a towel from the BOQ? As for that BuDocks form, everyone knows that there's been more paperwork since unification, anyway.

Admittedly, any of these things is, in itself, small—just like the cloud that was no bigger than a man's hand. Or like the above-water fraction of an iceberg. But as long as things like this go on at all, we have a problem on our hands.

The crux of this problem involves much more than towels, post exchanges and motor transport. It is simply this: an alarming erosion of the status, privilege and confidence heretofore reposed in the officer corps has taken place under our very eyes. This erosion has awakened widespread complaint, frustration, and even bitterness, among officers who have served any length of time. It has unquestionably discouraged likely young men of high caliber from becoming Regular officers. By levelling out distinctions between officers and enlisted men, it has imposed serious handicaps on leadership of the most effective quality.

The Roots of the Problem

Much of the blame for this soured climate of attitude toward and among the officer corps can be attributed to a half dozen principal causes. These are:

- 1) Egalitarianism on the national scene.
- 2) Continuing large size of the Armed Forces.
- 3) Lower caliber and easygoing indoctrination of young officers.
- 4) Tendency of administrative thickheadedness to override individual discretion and ordinary common sense.
- 5) Side effects of the Universal Code of Military Justice.
- 6) General relaxation of officer discipline and officer self-discipline.

Egalitarianism.—A pervasive spirit of egalitarianism, abroad throughout the world, is nowhere stronger than here at home.

At naked fundamentals, egalitarianism and the concept of an officer corps are irreconcilable. Egalitarianism attacks all distinctions, particularly distinctions of rank. Egalitarianism attempts to deny the underlying superior individual qualities of which rank is, or should be, the earned reward. Egalitarianism is the enemy of the special responsibilities and, even more so, of the special privileges of leaderships.

A military example of egalitarianism at work was the Army's Doolittle Board of 1946, which, however well intended, spearheaded a grossly misdirected drive to commingle officers, on a footing of indistinguishable equality, with the men they were supposed to lead. The Russians, who had long since realized the folly of egalitarianism in a military organization, laughed at the Doolittle Board (and undoubtedly did everything in their power to egg it on).

Egalitarianism shows itself on the military scene by such symptoms as:

Proposals that officer and NCO insignia of rank be made small and inconspicuous, and that officer uniforms be of identical design and cut with enlisted men's (or vice versa—like the recent suggestion that Navy enlisted men have gold buttons on their pea-coats).

Commingle of officers' and enlisted families in military housing projects; similar commingling of officers and enlisted passengers and their dependents on board MSTs ships.

Application to officers of Civil Service and Veterans' Administration regulations, precedents and procedures (particularly in the field of retirement, leave and compensation)—as if officers were just another category of Government clerk.

The requirement that officers in Government quarters cut lawns and rake leaves; until a decade ago this was unheard of—a salutary chore for prisoners and PALs. Now it's up to the colonels and the colonels' ladies.

Failure to provide separate and adequate dining facilities for officers—a lapse of which the Navy Department (but not the Pentagon) is guilty in its two principal Washington headquarters buildings, where officers up to the rank of commander have the choice of queueing up and sharing tables with their subordinate clerks and enlisted men, or of eating lunch out of brown paper bags.

Those are only examples. It requires no legendary powers of observation to discern a host of similar instances wherever you look. The main theme seems to be—just because he's an officer, why treat him differently from anybody else? Why does he rate this or that? The seaman or the private doesn't.

Continuing Large Size of the Armed Forces.—The late Justice Brandeis knew what he was talking about when he inveighed against "the curse of Bigness." One direct result of sheer size in today's armed forces is that we are no longer "a band of brothers;" this of course stunts the mutual growth of "special trust and confidence" among officers, particularly so between

the higher administrative headquarters and the officers they administer. Few strangers instinctively trust other strangers. *And today more commissioned officers are on active duty in the 4 services than the total strength of the armed forces 20 years ago.*

As long as we stay this large, maintenance of an elite officer corps, with corresponding status, effectiveness and mutual confidence, will be difficult.

Lower Caliber and Easygoing Indoctrination of Young Officers.—A direct product of our having an officer corps which is about the size of the entire British Army is that the large annual intake of new officers must represent, statistically, a diminution of caliber and quality. We read in the press, and know too well from observation that—as Mr. Gallup says—a career as a Regular officer is not as attractive today to most young men as it was before WW II. One reason for this phenomenon is that the services as a whole demand more new Regular officers per year than there are (or, probably ever have been) thoroughly motivated, high-caliber candidates who really want to become professional officers, as distinct from mere jobholders.

This requirement for officer quantity at the expense of officer quality can only result in lower standards throughout the officer corps. And officers with lower professional and individual standards receive—and what is much worse, accept—treatment unheard of in the service 20 years ago.

Furthermore, this submergence of officers into a sea of quantitative mediocrity is made all the worse through necessarily hasty, mass-production methods employed to indoctrinate new officers and candidates. Such mass methods work hand in hand with egalitarianism. Easy-going, sometimes misdirected or undirected indoctrination of new officers perpetuates individual mediocrity and breeds a group (not a corps) of officers who are prepared to accept diminished standards and status as the norm.

Administrative Thickheadedness vs. Individual Discretion.—One hallmark of a truly professional corps of officers is wide individual discretion to decide and act, on the basis of sound principles and common sense. In other words, the assumption that it doesn't require a large, highly codified body of regulations to enable a trusted executive to recognize and do what is right.

This assumption, once fundamental in the service, now seems to go not only unheeded, but is ground underfoot in the mass of petty regulations which emanate from high levels and low. Hand in hand with this torrent of prescriptive procedures goes dangerous inflexibility. For example:

In the Post Exchange of "Y" Area Command, European Theater, a captain stands watch daily to supervise what is in fact a large business enterprise. Yet when confronted with the simple decision of whether to accord purchasing privileges to a transient, but fully identified Regular officer, that captain was so circumscribed by over-explicit, trust-nobody regulations that this weighty dilemma had to be referred for ultimate decision not one but 2 echelons up the chain of command! This unfortunate officer was permitted

less discretion in doing a heavy job than the average sentinel walking post. A floorwalker at Gimbel's enjoys 10 times the latitude and power of decision.

Another example: did you know that the Department of Defense, no less, prescribes by written regulation the number of times a week garbage is to be collected from public quarters?

The weight of monolithic, impersonal, over-detailed regulations, written and enforced by career administrators, does more to crush the exercise of individual discretion than any other factor in today's armed services. Individual latitude to do what seems right is the hallmark of "special trust and confidence." Thus administrative trends throughout the Department of Defense (often those imposed by that Department) wittingly or unwittingly are among the worst enemies of "special trust and confidence."

Uniform Code of Military Justice.—UCMJ (correctly) has been damned right and damned left by almost everyone who has had to exercise command since the sad day when Articles for the Government of the Navy went down into history. It is not a purpose of this essay to level further general criticism, however merited, against UCMJ.

UCMJ, however, has greatly furthered the diminution of "special trust and confidence" in 4 respects, all serious:

- 1) UCMJ has fostered and even demanded a horde of specific regulations which paralyze initiative and deny individual discretion.
- 2) UCMJ has deprived individual commanding officers of considerable customary latitude in disciplining officer subordinates.
- 3) UCMJ equates commissioned officers and enlisted men wherever possible (example: allowing enlisted members on courts martial).
- 4) The underlying premise of UCMJ—as is clearly evident from the hearings which preceded its adoption—is mistrust of the discretionary exercise of authority by commanding officers, or "command interference," as UCMJ's lawyer (and sea lawyer) proponents repeatedly styled it. The Uniform Code of Military Justice is an embodied renunciation of "special trust and confidence."

Officer Self Discipline and Discipline.—Destructive of "special trust and confidence" as are the foregoing 5 factors, one remains which is far more fundamental. That factor is the capability and willingness of the officer corps to discipline itself.

In other words, to live up to the principle of *noblesse oblige*.

Application of *noblesse oblige* to the behavior of commissioned officers has 2 prongs.

One prong is self discipline. Self discipline should apply to everybody, but as we can all see, doesn't always. Simple lack of self-discipline on the part of a given number of individual officers can be found at or near the bottom of many of the restrictions—insulting by implication—which I have recited.

In other words, almost every galling, often insulting denial of "special trust and confidence" can be traced back to some failure, at some place, at some point of time, to keep our own house in order.

The second prong of *noblesse oblige* is discipline—in this context, the willingness of officers to apply discipline to other officers who transgress the standards of their corps.

Discipline takes one of two forms. Either you apply mass restrictions and punishments against a group which contains some offenders (a weak, evasive "remedy" which is no remedy). Or you single out offenders, deal with them according to their deserts, and leave the unoffending majority undisturbed.

Every one of the deplorable citations with which this essay begins is an example of penalizing many for derelictions of the few. Most of these embarrassing restrictions would be unthinkable if commanding officers always exercised the moral courage to punish the minority of individuals who have brought down upon the vast unoffending majority the shotgun restraints I described.

If, for example, you pay your mess bills with checks which repeatedly bounce, why shouldn't you get 10 days under hack, or a court martial?

If you say you have insurance, and then don't, why shouldn't the commanding general recommend you for a general court martial?

It is well remembered by those of us with service before WW II that such misbehavior by officers did bring down severe individual retribution. Also that such misbehavior was infrequent to the point of rarity. Also that in those pre-War days officers enjoyed many more privileges (including unquestioned acceptance of their word).

Today, sad to tell, official retribution for unofficer-like and ungentlemanly offenses seems to have declined. To cite only one example—a *reductio ad absurdum*, maybe, but it really did happen—

The officers' club at an East Coast naval air station had so many long standing delinquent accounts in 1948 that the president of the mess (an officer of command rank) promulgated a circular letter to all members, warning, that those who failed to pay up within a generous deadline would . . .

Be subject to prompt disciplinary action for disregard of their obligations as officers and gentlemen? Not at all.

What the Mess threatened, believe it or not, was that delinquent accounts would be turned over to a civilian bill-collecting agency.

One general court martial would have collected every outstanding bill.

How to Restore Special Trust and Confidence

"Special trust and confidence," unfortunately, is the easiest thing in the world to tear down. Building it up is something else again.

However difficult the job may prove, it must be done. The respect and high regard which until recently were accorded officers as a matter of course must be restored and stabilized. The alternative is retrogression of the officer corps to a collection of high-paid clerks and mediocre straw-bosses—men lacking status, motivation, assurance and habit of authority, unschooled in self-discipline and leadership. It could happen. In fact, it is happening.

To regain and hold "special trust and confidence"

will be an all-hands evolution — an evolution in some senses against the climate of the times. Nor will this counter-revolution be accomplished from outside the service through "fringe benefits," pay raises, and such, while individual officers carry on as if nothing were really happening.

What is required can be summed up under 8 headings. Action in response to those headings will be required not only from every individual officer who respects his profession and status, but particularly from:

Top civilian and military policy-makers in the Department of Defense and the military departments.

Commanding officers, high and low.

Officer-training establishments.

Staff officers charged with formulation of policy.

Here, then, are my 8 points:

Point 1: Overhaul existing law and regulations to eliminate every provision which tends to reflect against or demean the status of commissioned officers.

Anybody who doubts the dimensions of the effort I propose should try to visualize the 5,000-foot bookshelf of laws and regulations which now weigh down the Armed Forces. Every single one of those laws and regulations deserves a curry-combing to determine whether or not, overtly or by implication, it tends to diminish or asperse the "special trust and confidence" which the Government — it says here — reposes in a commissioned officer.

At department level, the three Judges Advocate General of the military departments could well convene *ad hoc* review panels to go through the mass of military and naval laws which have only recently been recodified. Such panels should not only review the letter but particularly the implications and even the phrasing of existing law. Where amendment or repeal of legislation seems desirable, they should so recommend, and a Department of Defense legislative "package" should be evolved and presented to the Congress.

Admitting, even as I propose it, the difficulties and obstacles which would beset what I have just suggested, I believe that such a comprehensive review of legislation would generate a by-product with great value for the future: a code of "don'ts" for legislative draftsmen who wish to protect the status of command and authority throughout the services. Such canons could then be used by the Judges Advocate General in reviewing proposed legislation, and by the staffs of the respective Armed Services Committees.

A particular objective in this review might be to check or reverse today's deplorable trend to apply to officers legislative precedents and legislation dealing with the mass of Government employees and with veterans as a class.

Overhauling regulations will be even more work than reviewing law, at least as far as the rank and file are concerned, but because a bad regulation — unlike a bad law — can be cured by a stroke of the pen, will pay greater immediate dividends.

Starting right in with the Department of Defense itself, carrying on in the military departments, and penetrating down into every command big enough to have a typewriter, every single regulation ought to be reviewed to determine whether, by direct effect, implication, or phrasing, it tends to reflect upon or asperse the prestige, status or authority of officers, or question the word of an officer. Such a review was, in fact, initiated last year by a large Air Force base. The commanding general deserves a medal.

To insure that such a review would be truly effective, the Secretary of the Navy could issue basic instructions advertising his policy. At Washington level, Navy Regulations, the Marine Corps Manual and the bureau manuals should be scanned. So also should the mass of general orders, SecNav and OpNav instructions, and the like. At each turn the reviewers should ask, "Does this regulation or procedure support, or does it undermine 'special trust and confidence'?" Any item in the latter category should be ruthlessly axed. And the same overhaul should proceed concurrently in every command which issues ship's regulations, base regulations, exchange regulations, and so on.

Moreover, there is no need for commanding officers to wait for the starting gun from Washington. This is something you can begin tomorrow morning; better still, today.

Point 2: Restore officer initiative and discretion to act.

As part of the grand review and sifting of law and regulation just proposed, we should consider another aspect of the problem: the increasing tendency of service regulations and administration to curb exercise of individual initiative by officers, commanding officers in particular.

A thoughtful Marine general officer, now retired, used to observe that a philosophic difference between Army/Air Force administration and Navy/Marine administration is this: in the Army and the Air Force, you can't do it unless the book says you can, and you can prove it; whereas the Department of the Navy, within limits of propriety and common sense, permitted commanding officers to do anything not specifically prohibited. This generalization may have been unfair to the Army and Air Force, but it certainly underscored what ought to be the governing principle of military command.

Right and left in this over-regulated profession of ours, we find attempts as repeated as they are doomed to perpetual failure, to substitute regulations and procedures for common sense, judgment, discretion and inherent sense of propriety.

Certainly and admittedly, very few regulations are written — like the trajectory we all studied in Ordnance — "*in vacuo*." That is, almost every regulation, especially if prohibitive, springs from some mistake or malfeasance which actually happened.

But you cannot legislate against damn foolishness, human aberration, or individual wickedness. What we can do, and ought to do, is to devote less effort to composing and enforcing shotgun procedures and prohibitions, and commensurately more effort to obtain, train and retain a corps of officers blessed with

the qualities which would obviate such regulatory harassment.

Restoration of wide discretion to act, and confidence that such action — when manifestly sensible in the premises — would be sustained regardless of whether it could pass through the “no-go” gauge of set procedure, would be a shot of adrenalin to every CO in the armed forces.

“I’m sorry, but my hands are tied by regulations,” are the saddest words ever spoken by military tongue or pen.

Point 3: Officers must be indoctrinated with the officer spirit.

This sounds like a ringing denunciation of sin, or a plea for improved weather.

If you think it over, however, you will realize that basic officer training today tends to concentrate on technique and skimp on attitude. But any psychologist will assure you that an individual learns, unlearns and relearns techniques all his life, while only once — and early — does he acquire his fundamental attitudes.

I say that our officer-molding institutions — the service academies, Marine Corps Basic School and, in their degree, NROTC and ROTC — should concentrate above all on producing the officer attitude. Once we create that, the rest is easy.

To create officer attitude —

Officer students must be schooled in conduct and behavior. This schooling must extend beyond working hours so that it conditions an officer’s social reactions as well as his professional ones.

The high traditions and history of the profession of arms must be brought home to every new officer. These traditions must be preached as living codes, not as historical curiosities or statistics. The fledgling officer must take his first steps in an atmosphere permeated by tradition and regulated by the officer’s code.

Corps, unit and service folkways must be underscored. Inter-service distinctions, where not positively harmful, should be proudly fostered and encouraged. The young officer should never be mongrelized into an amorphous, faceless being with no spiritual roots save in what former Asst Sec Nav John Nicholas Brown once deplored as “the vast complex of the Defense Department.” He should be trained to be proud of his outfit, that outfit should be unique, and he should be proud of that, too.

Above all, young officers should be taught that true dignity that goes with the high responsibilities they inherit. If *noblesse oblige* is a good motto for officers, they must not only learn well their obligations but also a little of the *noblesse*.

Point 4: Officer discipline must be unsparing.

Officers who transgress the code of their profession must be punished. In most cases they should be gotten rid of. Misguided reluctance on the part of commanding officers to do individual hurt must give way to realization that the price we pay for “special trust and confidence” is unsparing personal accountability.

If the individual failings which have given rise to blanket restrictions and erosion of officer status had

been dealt with individually, the horrible examples with which this essay commences need never have existed.

Furthermore, unsparing officer discipline oughtn’t to start with the cases on the critical list — that is, at the general court martial stage. Commanding officers must discover the moral courage — and be fully supported by higher commanders — to correct and bring to notice officers whose habits and qualities are in the least below par.

An administrative reform which would greatly facilitate such corrective action would be a more realistic philosophy of fitness reporting so that individuals could be routinely appraised in their defects as well as in their virtues.

But commanding officers are not the only ones concerned with officer discipline. Every officer must be jealous of the special trust and confidence reposed in the whole officer corps.

Point 5: Give privilege with responsibility.

It used to be unquestioned in the service scheme of things that officer privileges were the earned reward of heavy responsibility. Today responsibilities are heavier than ever, but precious few privileges remain.

This is no plea for “fringe benefits.” It is rather a plea for confidence, for latitude of action, and for intentional gradations of privilege between executives, junior executives, foremen, and the shop force — if we may couch this in the language of industry.

Open the officers’ mess bar at noon, detail prisoners to cut lawns, establish a section in the Navy Department cafeterias for officers only, let officers sign chits and cash checks without question, let a Defense Department sedan go to an officer’s front door, stop charging deposits for towels in the BOQ, stop the PXs from treating officers and their wives as potential chiselers.

And be quite open about it.

As long as we take the attitude that it is reprehensible to receive privilege as such, exercise of that privilege, however well earned, will be subject to logical question. What we should instead be concerned about is the exercise of privilege not well earned.

Point 6: Enlisted men must be kept out of positions which require them to supervise officers.

“Enlisted men supervise officers? — Nonsense! That never happens.” Doesn’t it, though? An example: Only a few months ago, one service had military policemen roving the Pentagon with the express purpose of jacking up officers on their appearance and uniforms — and this in public, too.

So it does happen, and is happening more and more throughout the service. Every time an enlisted man is so placed that he has discretion to do anything but comply with the proper request or instructions of an officer, he is in reality supervising that officer. Every time your personal check is initialled by a ship’s service attendant, he is in reality vouching for you. If an officer has to produce any sort of proof to support his word or certification (like the proof of liability insurance I mentioned earlier), this should never be re-

quired in the presence of, let alone by, an enlisted man.

One sector of service life which requires special attention to prevent enlisted men sitting in judgment of commissioned officers is personnel administration. We are all too familiar with the almighty, all wise perennially seated, self-satisfied career administrators: complacent yeomen, bloated master sergeants and their snide, imitative clerks.

What gives rise to this paperwork empire, where being tied by regulations is a virtue not a tragedy, is largely today's plethora of written regulations, procedures and prohibitions. In our review of these regulations, we should eliminate every provision which calls into issue, before enlisted men, the word or good faith of a commissioned officer.

Point 7: Unsnarl the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

Here is one area in which the military departments are already fighting manfully. Let us applaud and support the efforts of our Judges Advocate General to secure amelioration of some of the wearying burdens with which UCMJ has saddled the services. While they are at it, let us hope they will seek every opportunity to:

Eliminate the existing legal requirements for today's plethora of regulations;

Restore latitude and discretion to COs in the exercise of disciplinary powers;

Take enlisted members off courts martial.

It is too much to hope for restoration of John Adams's oak-ribbed, brass-bound *Articles for the Government of the Navy*, with their fine antique ring, but the more nearly we can bring the cross-fertilized, artificially inseminated UCMJ to resemble its grand ancestor, the better. "Special trust and confidence" pervaded every line of AGN, which is more than can be said for UCMJ.

Point 8: Officers must insist on being treated like officers.

It is small wonder, in a service environment already too little hospitable to "special trust and confidence," that officers today often fail to receive former deference, perquisites and, above all, the unquestioning respect of their subordinates.

Admitting this to be so, and why, it nevertheless still lies in the power of almost any individual officer — you, or you, or you, gentlemen — to obtain, to exact if need be, much of the treatment and status which were once bestowed automatically.

Obviously the first step, the foundation, is that officers behave, dress and comport themselves like officers,

both on duty and off. This is fundamental, if "special trust and confidence" is ever again to be restored.

When an officer so behaving, dressed as he should be, and engaged "on his lawful occasions," encounters any failure to accord him the status or deference which the situation reasonably demands, he should say and do something about it forthwith.

This doesn't mean that officers should spend their time and energy preening themselves to be affronted.

It does mean that when you encounter the kind of demeaning situations detailed at the outset of this essay, you should do everything in your power, by proper official complaint, by reiterated suggestion, by written report, and by refusal to be pushed about by those of lower rank and status, to eliminate the cause. It does mean that you must know your rights and proper privileges, and you must be quick to defend them.

In other words, you must insist on being treated like an officer. Do so habitually and firmly, and you will find yourself being more nearly so treated.

ANYONE WHO DOUBTS the effects of diminished "special trust and confidence," or who doubts that the services face a real problem in the crumbling prestige of the officer corps, would do well to see how many young men are now choosing careers as professional officers. And how many, sad to relate, are resigning.

In 1955, less than 4 percent of those eligible in the Navy for integration as Regular officers chose to integrate. And this, mark you, was about half as many, percentage-wise, from the same group, as chose to accept Regular commissions only 2 years earlier.

From distinguished graduates of the Army's ROTC and OCS, there were in 1954 some 60 percent fewer applications for Regular commissions than in 1949. Over the same period, the number of Regular Army Officer resignations quadrupled.

Air Force officer resignations in 1954 were 5 times those in 1949.

Only in the Marine Corps was the situation relatively satisfactory.

Alarming as they are, the foregoing statistics fail to reveal how many officers chose not to become Regulars, or how many Regulars quit, simply on account of waning "special trust and confidence." Nor do available statistics tell how many of those who did become Regular officers were the mediocre and the less qualified — those to whom "special trust and confidence" means least.

But of this we may be sure — the officers who by their "... Patriotism, Valor, Fidelity, and Abilities" most deserve the special trust and confidence of their country are those who feel its loss soonest and most keenly.

USMC



... a touch of tradition

Text and illustrations

By LtCol J. H. Magruder III

he wrote, "and then only laid it aside because it was out of fashion, not that it was any the worse for the wear."

The stock remained in effect through the uniform changes of 1833, 1839 and 1859. It was not until 1875, that the dress coat collar itself was finally considered sufficient to induce a stiff, military bearing and the stock dropped as an article of Marine uniform.

Gen George F. Elliott claimed to have been among the last Marines to be subjected to this unique instrument of torture. Recalling his experiences as a young lieutenant he wrote:

"I took out the last Marine guard that wore the leather stock with their full dress uniform. This was the Marine guard of the USS *Monongahela* that went to the South Atlantic in 1872. This stock was made of black, glazed leather on the outside (but not what we know as patent leather), and was about three or three and one-half inches high. The effect of the stock when buckled around a man's neck was to hold his head high in the air, like geese looking for rain, and it was impossible when wearing it for the man, in an aiming position, to get his head down so that his cheek rested against the rifle. This stock was lined inside with thin, yellow leather and fastened by 2 small buckles in the back.



Original leatherneck of the Revolutionary War period, on display at the Marine Exhibit Smithsonian Institute



"LEATHER-NECK' (leth'er-nek'), n. A marine;—from the leather stock once a part of his uniform. Slang"—Webster.

A LEATHER STOCK, FROM WHICH they gained their now famous nickname, was worn around the neck by Marines until as late as 1875. Made of tough, unyielding leather, the stock was designed primarily to insure a military appearance, for once encased in this harness, the wearer had no alternative but to carry his chin held high.

Considerable legend has attached itself to this article of clothing, the most oft-repeated anecdote assigning to the leather stock the dubious properties of armor plating intended to ward off enemy swords. However, uniform regulations only called for the wearing of the stock with full dress and its design was such as to make it very difficult, if not impossible, to aim a musket while worn, since it very effectively resisted any effort to bend the neck—a necessary movement in sighting along a barrel. Thus, it is improbable that it was ever worn in battle.

In 1798, "one stock of black leather and clasp" was issued to each Marine annually, but in 1811, Maj Daniel Carmick proposed to the Commandant that as an economy measure no more than 2 stocks be issued during each 5-year enlistment. "I wore one myself 9 years,"



In order to put it on, it was necessary to buckle it in front and then turn the whole stock around until the buckles were in back. The collar of the uniform then worn was quite high and with the stock inside all that showed was an edging of black, glazed leather and, in front, a "V" shape where the collar opened.

"Fortunately for us all, the rats on board the *Monongahela* got into these stocks and chewed them up, so damaging them that they had to be surveyed and thrown overboard. We had no replacements for them but found it very easy to teach the men to keep their chins up without the stock. They had always been worn on the theory that a man looked more soldierly and could not keep his chin up unless it was propped."

"I returned from this cruise in 1876, and it was during my absence from the United States that the stock was officially abolished."

While the stock has been eliminated from the Quartermaster's Supply Room, the nickname lives on. It all goes back to the early days of our Navy when Jack Tar was an easy-going mortal not particularly susceptible to self-discipline. The Marine Guard was expected to give a man-of-war her military character and to the seamen the leather stock seemed to typify the essential qualities of the Marine, hence the familiar sobriquet: "Leatherneck."

US MC

THE EVOLUTION OF AMPHIBIOUS COMMUNICATIONS

After a long and tortuous period of development, our communications system has a doctrine and the equipment to firmly link together the ground, sea and air elements of the landing force

By Maj J. J. Reber

THE STORY OF AMPHIBIOUS COMMUNICATIONS is, of course, based upon the evolution of amphibious doctrine. For this reason I have taken the liberty of refreshing the reader's memory with a brief review of the development of amphibious warfare as we know it today.

Prior to 1920, amphibious training in the Marine Corps was concentrated on the defense of a naval base against possible attack from the sea, rather than an amphibious assault over defended beaches. However, along about this time many Marine Corps officers were becoming convinced that the Corps' primary role should include the broader aspects of amphibious warfare. Not much progress was made in implementing this conviction prior to 1933 because; 1) the Corps was busily engaged in China and Nicaragua from 1924 through 1932; 2) we were operating on a depression budget; and 3) the Navy was busy with its own training for surface fleet actions.

Regardless of these obstacles, the Fleet Marine Force, an expeditionary force capable of seizing and defending advanced bases, was estab-

lished as an integral part of the United States Fleet on 8 December 1933. By 1935 the FMF at Quantico was a skeletonized force consisting of a Brigade Headquarters, 5th Marines, 10th Marines, and 4 aircraft squadrons.

After establishment of the FMF, the next logical step was to prepare as detailed instructions as possible for conducting amphibious operations. On 14 November 1933 classes at the MCS, Quantico were discontinued and both students and staff started preparing a manual for landing operations. With only a few historical examples to go on—mainly the Gallipoli fiasco—and rather sketchy personal experience, this group produced the *Tentative Manual for Landing Operations* in 1934. The first records of communications to support modern amphibious operations are found in this manual.

We had the troops and doctrine. The next step was training. During the period 1935 through 1940 the FMF participated in Fleet Landing Exercises 1 through 6 which were held either at Culebra or San Clemente islands, and it was during this period that the communications sys-

tems necessary to support our present amphibious operations began to take shape.

The communications system for the ship to shore movement as established in the *Tentative Manual* is illustrated in Figure 1. Rifle companies had no electrical communications but would use pyrotechnic signals to indicate a successful landing. When battalions landed, they established radio communications with their regimental commanders afloat. Likewise, when the regiments landed they used radio to contact the brigade headquarters afloat. After all troops were ashore the communications system illustrated in Figure 2 was established.

The Regulating Party's communication role was essentially that of relaying messages between ships and units ashore. For example, if the Naval Fire Control Party could not establish radio communications with the firing ships, it would send the fire mission via wire to the Regulating Party. The Regulating Party would then relay the message to the ship by visual means. At the time, this system may have appeared to be satisfactory for several reasons.




Figure 1—Communications during the ship-to-shore movement as established by the Tentative Manual. In addition, there were also visual signals, messenger boats and aircraft available

First, prior to the Roi-Namur operation NGF was employed to neutralize rather than to destroy enemy defenses, and our present rapid communication system needed for the destruction of targets of opportunity was not required. Second, shore bombardment was not exercised sufficiently during this period for a true evaluation of the communication system.

T/Os and T/Es of the late '30s did not support the communication system as set forth in the *Tentative Manual*. For example, the infantry unit's tables did not provide for wire to the NFGPs and Shore Parties. Nor were there provisions for shore and beach party communication personnel or equipment. Communica-

tions for these functions were improvised from any available source.

We were just as badly off equipmentwise. None of our equipment was waterproofed, or even water resistant. Field telephones were of WWI vintage mounted in heavy wooden boxes. Radio sets were large and bulky, and required an extremely patient and skillful operator to establish communications. In order to meet communication requirements, radio sets were borrowed from the Army and Forestry Service.

The tight reign on personnel and equipment continued until FLEX 6 in 1940 when the war in Europe finally jarred our Congressmen into reality, and more money was appropriated for the services.

Even though they lacked adequate personnel and equipment, communicators of the late '30s were not only making many worthwhile recommendations, but were putting their recommendations into practice in so far as practical. An improvised wire reel and axle allowed one man to lay wire between battalion and companies during FLEX 2 in 1936. Until this time messengers were the primary means of communications at this level.

During FLEX 3 in 1937 at San Clemente, Capt (now MajGen) E. W. Snedeker, communication officer of the 2d Marine Brigade, recommended that during ship-to-shore movement aircraft transmit intelligence data to the ships for relay to

troop units embarked in boats. This was the beginning of the present Tactical Air Observation net. He also joined in the plea for more communicators and equipment, pointing out that the T/Os and T/Es did not allow for CP displacement.

FLEX 4 saw the innovation and "benefit of lateral communications between adjacent units when the 5th Marines and the 18th Infantry coordinated their departure from the first objective by that means." During the same exercise wire was first employed between the 81mm mortars and the mortar OPs. A recommendation from this 1938 exercise, and adopted a few years later, was the paralleling of naval ship-to-shore radio with troop radio.

In the 1939 report of FLEX 5, Lt-Col Shepherd (who later became Commandant) stated, "A more satisfactory system of communications for NGF must be evolved. Occasion may well arise where it will be desirable for individual ships to be assigned to infantry units. The inherent delay in fires controlled through fire support groups will fail to provide NGF support on emergency targets."

Gen Holland M. Smith called FLEX 6 "the turning point in our amphibious outlook, and that we now have a clear picture of our needs despite deficiencies in materiel." In analyzing FLEX 7 he said, "The maneuver was again hampered by a lack of equipment and personnel, especially in the field of communications."

This was the state of amphibious communications preparedness when the 1st MarDiv landed at Guadalcanal. There was no effective shore party communication system to con-

trol the flow of supplies from the transports to the troop units ashore. There was no direct communications between aircraft and troop unit commanders. There were NGF liaison parties but they lacked well trained personnel and dependable radio equipment. From these rather meager beginnings our present efficient shore party, air and NGF communications systems developed.

Although the duties of the shore party as laid down in the *Tentative Manual* were sound, they were not properly exercised during the FLEXs of the late '30s, hence the communications to support these functions was not understood.

The Corps was late in realizing the gigantic problems involved in unloading troops, equipment and supplies over a beach, but the advent of WWII put the organization of an efficient shore party on a "crash" basis. In February 1942 the 1st Pioneer (Shore Party) Battalion was organized. It landed with the 1st Mar Div on Guadalcanal. The handful of Pioneer Bn communicators were divided into 3 teams to provide communications for 3 beaches. The unloading problems at Guadalcanal proved, among other things, that more communications was required for controlling the unloading and getting the supplies where they were needed, when they were needed. The short lived Engineer Regiment, organized in January 1943 and abolished in the spring of 1944, did not materially effect shore party communications except that it did provide more communicators to form a nucleus for shore party consolidation.

One of many recommendations for Tarawa was for more control vessels with better communications

for controlling both the tactical and logistical aspects of future operations. The need for better beach and shore party communications was realized in the early Solomon Islands landings and, as a result, the 1st Beach Signal Co was organized in August 1943, a few months before Tarawa. The company consisted of 10 shore and beach party communication teams. The Marine shore party communicators were to provide communications on the beach, laterally, and inland; the naval beach party communicators were to provide communications seaward to the transports, boats and control vessels. This company was organized to operate with a division, one team being assigned to each infantry battalion, a 10th team provided the nucleus of the division shore party.

In October 1943, 13 Air Liaison Parties (ALPs) and 9 Shore Fire Control Parties (SFCPs) were added to the Beach Signal Co, and it was redesignated the 1st Joint Assault Signal Company (1st JASCO). JASCOs were assigned on the basis of one per division, but were not organic to the divisions. At the end of an operation they were to be withdrawn and reassigned. This means of employment proved impractical principally for 3 reasons; 1) the JASCOs were employed up until the end of an operation; 2) JASCO communicators which did become available, due to consolidation of beaches, were used to replace casualties within the divisions; and 3) JASCOs required as long to rehabilitate and retrain as any other combat unit. For this reason the Marine Corps requested that the JASCOs be released from the cognizance of the JCS and be made organic to the divisions. This request was approved in the spring of 1945 and the Marine Corps JASCOs were redesignated Assault Signal Companies (ASCs).

Throughout the war the situation dictated the employment of the Shore Party Communications teams. Generally there was one team for each numbered beach, one to serve as a nucleus for each colored beach, and one for the division shore party headquarters. Generally the shore and beach party communication teams provided efficient communications throughout the remainder of the war.



Maj J. J. Reber is currently serving as an instructor in the Senior School (communications). His background in communications started with an assignment to radio operator's school after Boot Camp in 1936 and continues unbroken throughout his career in the Corps. He has subsequently served at Quantico, Washington, DC, Guam, Shanghai and Peiping. While serving with the III Phib Corps in 1942, he received a field commission and was integrated as a Regular officer. During WWII he served as III Phib Signal

Officer from 1942 to 1945 and participated in operations at Bougainville, Emirau, Guam, Peleliu and Okinawa. Released from active duty in 1946, he served with the 11th Signal Co. USMCR until recalled to active duty in June 1950. He became OinC of the Radio Technicians School and then went to Korea as CommO of the 11th Marines. Readers of the Gazette will remember Maj Reber's "Planning for Atomic War" (July 1955) and his aid to a current problem "Communications: Our Semidelimma" (Dec 1955).

In 1947 the ASCOs were disbanded and the shore party teams were placed in the Shore Party Regiment. Two years later they were placed in the division Signal Bns. When the Signal Bns were disbanded in the spring of 1953, the teams were again placed in the Shore Party Bn. Current T/Os provide for 3 Shore Party Group Communication Teams and a Division Shore Party Communication Team. Each group may be broken down into teams for numbered beaches and later consolidated for colored beaches. The shifting of the shore party communicators back and forth between shore party and communication units never presented a serious problem in their employment since there had always been sufficient time to train with the troop units being supported.

The present short party communication system, illustrated in Figure 3, has not changed appreciably since the organization of the 1st JASCO. Troop unit commanders request serials via the shore party unit on the beach. The shore party unit passes the request to the TacLog party who in turn gives it to the Naval Control Group representative. The Control Group representative then contacts the ship in which the serial is embarked and has the serial delivered to the beach. The Naval Beach Party communication system partially parallels this system with radio and visual stations on the beach which links it with the transports, control vessels and boats.

Close air support techniques were not developed as rapidly as shore party techniques. The first known instance of an air attack being conducted for, and directed by, ground troops was in Nicaragua on 9 October 1927. In this case ground troops laid out panels indicating the direction and range of the enemy. Panels are still used to mark front lines, but pyrotechnics and direct radio communications between the Forward Air Controller (FAC) or the Tactical Air Co-ordinator (Airborne) (TAC[A]) and the aircraft are used to direct the aircraft onto the target. For all weather missions Air Support Radar Teams (ASRTs) direct the aircraft on the strike.

Even after we entered WWII there were no standard air-ground




Figure 2—Communications according to the Tentative Manual. All troops have landed and transports move in to unload supplies

radio nets for close air support to be found in our doctrine for amphibious operations. As a result of exercises held in 1940-41, it was recommended that aircraft be equipped with dependable radio sets capable of working with ground units on several channels, but not much was done to implement this recommendation. Fortunately, the people doing the fighting did not wait for doctrine but developed their own system for close air support. Throughout the war the communication system for requesting, coordinating and controlling close air support missions varied with the tactical situation and the personality of the senior air commander.

Shortly after Marine aviators landed at Guadalcanal they were conducting close air support. The procedure was very informal. An aviator from Henderson field reported to the troop unit where he was briefed on the target, or sometimes he took a look at it himself. Communication facilities were limited and in some instances messages from front line units had to be relayed to division, to Henderson field and, finally, to the support aircraft.

There were still no organized ALPs a year after Guadalcanal when Marine Raider battalions and Army units landed at New Georgia. However, as a result of Gen Vande-

grift's recommendations, 23 ALPs were being trained in the US and, in October 1943, became a part of the newly organized JASCOs as mentioned earlier. At New Georgia, ALPs were organized composed of 8 officers (6 were aviators) and 8 enlisted radio operators. But front line commanders were reluctant to use these ALPs for close air support because of: 1) poor accuracy, mainly attributable to unreliable maps; 2) excessive delay between the request and execution; and 3) Japanese counter action, in the use of smoke to mark targets, by using smoke of their own to mark our positions.

Application of the lessons learned at New Georgia resulted in the beginning of modern close air support. In August 1943, 3 months before the landing, an air liaison group from the 1st MAF reported to the 3d Mar Div to form 3 ALPs. An ALP school, attended by an officer from the "3" section of each infantry battalion and regiment in the division, was organized to teach the capabilities and limitations of close air support, the procedures for requesting such support, and details of air-ground communications. Communications at Bougainville was very good chiefly because radio operators had sufficient time to train with the air liaison officer and infantry units being supported. Also the use of colored smoke to mark targets,




Figure 3—Logistic communications during ship-to-shore movement




Figure 4—Close air support communications system

rather than white, caught the Japanese unprepared to counter it as they did at New Georgia. Close air support was very successful in the Bougainville operation and, for the first time, hit targets not capable of being hit by artillery (Hellzapoppin Ridge). But this was the last operation, except for limited employment, in which Marine aviators supported Marine ground troops until the final landing of the war at Okinawa.

The most effective employment of Marine close air support controlled by front line ALPs, was not in support of Marine units, but of the 37th Inf Div and the 1st Cav Div in the Philippines. Three months before Gen MacArthur's "return," MAG 24, and later MAG 32, was given the mission of providing close support for the Army. The operations officer of MAG 24 prepared an intensive course of instruction for over 500 officers and gunners of dive bomber squadrons. This was based on the principle that close support is only an additional weapon to be employed at the discretion of ground commanders, and that front line ALPs should control aircraft on their fronts by direct communications with the aircraft. Release of control of aircraft to front line units had been done before, but not as

deliberate policy. Since the Fifth Air Force believed that control of aircraft should be at a higher echelon than front line units, the Marine aviators proposed to furnish their own ALPs even though the T/Os and T/Es did not make such a provision. The results of this all-Marine close air support operation was highly praised by Army commanders.

At Okinawa, the narrow frontages and the great number of units on the line prevented direct control of aircraft by front line ALPs. However, excellent control and co-ordination of support aircraft was obtained through a central control center, the Landing Force Air Support Control Unit.

After WWII the ALPs (TACPs) went through similar administrative changes as the shore party communication teams, i.e., JASCs to ASCOs, to infantry unit communications platoons, to division Signal Bns (ANGLICO) and finally back again to the communication platoons of infantry units.

Our present system for control, co-ordination and direction of close air support embodies the flexibility of the Philippines system, and the co-ordination of the Okinawa system. A Direct Air Support Center (DASC), with aircraft under its operational control, now operates with

a division or major tactical group. This decentralization of control of aircraft did much to reduce the time between the request and execution of a mission, which was one of the major deficiencies previously. For example, at Saipan 41 ALPs, along with carriers, control agencies and aircraft on station operated on one SAR (TAR) net. Furthermore, requests for missions had to be approved by each echelon in the chain of command, another time consuming procedure. Figure 4 illustrates our present CAS communication system. The TACP at battalion sends its request, on the TAR net, directly to the DASC; other TACPs monitor this request, and unless they disapprove, say nothing. Since the DASC has aircraft under its control, there is usually very little delay between the request and execution. If an all-weather mission is requested the ASRT also intercepts the request. The DASC assigns the necessary aircraft which report on the TAD net to the FAC, TAC(A) or ASRT, depending upon who is to direct the mission.

As late as 1940 SFCs were still completely made up of Navy personnel—usually an ensign or lieutenant (jg) and 2 or 3 radiomen. These teams did not understand the organization, tactics or techniques of the troops they were to support. And further, the cumbersome NGF communication system explained earlier was still being used.

In May 1941 it was decided to use artillery personnel and equipment for spotting NGF, and naval personnel and equipment to provide NGF liaison teams to supported troop units. Teams were to be assigned on the basis of one per APA, but this proved unsatisfactory mainly because the Navy absorbed them and it was almost impossible to disentangle them from their secondary shipboard duties. (The same thing has been going on for over 10 years with our communication detachments on AGCs).

The direct support artillery battalions on Guadalcanal usually had 2 NGF-trained ensigns or lieutenants (jg) attached, and one or 2 FO teams trained in SFCs. These improvised SFCs were sent up to front line infantry battalions to provide NGF spotting and liaison. Com-

munications consisted of a separate spotting frequency between the SFCP and one of the destroyers, so the SFCP could call the ship direct when they wanted a fire mission. A second frequency for co-ordinating NGF linked the Assistant D3, NGF and Artillery Co-ordinator, at division, with all firing ships.

Prior to the activation of the JASCOs in October 1943, SFCPs were of necessity improvised units since there were insufficient trained personnel to form permanent teams and, of course, radio equipment was scarce and could not be allocated to teams on a permanent basis. It was not always possible to keep the same artillery and naval personnel together on a team, as a result there was poorer teamwork.

The JASCOs cured many of the SFCP ills, but also introduced new ones. The SFCPs were now provided adequate and uniform personnel, equipment and training; and the NGF officer had the teams readily available for training. However, the SFCPs initially had less experience than the artillery spotters they replaced, and this made the infantry commander a little reluctant to use NGF. Also centralized control kept the SFCPs from taking too active a part in training with the units they were to support.

NGF steadily improved after the JASCOs were formed (credit due in no little part to better communications). Slight changes in the JASCOs were made during WWII. Regimental NGF liaison teams were improvised for Roi-Namur and later added to the JASCO T/Os. Radar beacon teams, to provide a shore reference point, were added to the JASCOs and first used at Iwo Jima. Another innovation at Iwo was the boating of SFCPs in LVTs to call fires prior to establishment of OPs ashore.

The SFCPs and NGF liaison teams went through the same administrative changes as the TACPs, and are now a part of the communication platoons of the infantry battalions and regiments.

Although the designation of NGF communication nets has gone through many changes since Guadalcanal, the purpose of the nets have not changed appreciably. For example, there have always been re-




Figure 5—NGF communications within the Marine division

quirements for: 1) direct communications between the SFCPs and the firing ships; 2) co-ordination of fires; and 3) requesting additional support from higher headquarters. Our present NGF communication system for a Marine Division is illustrated in Figure 5.

In November 1947 the JCS formally acknowledged the eminence of the Marine Corps in the field of NGF, and ruled that the Corps should provide NGF teams for Army and/or Allied divisions in future amphibious operations. To implement this ruling, the Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company, FMF (Force ANGLICO) was organized.

Nothing has been said about communications for co-ordination of air, NGF and artillery simply because there is no separate communication system for this function. Each FSCC representative monitors appropriate communication nets which have to do with requesting and directing missions. Information obtained from these nets is used to co-ordinate all supporting arms. Formal co-ordination ashore was rather slow in developing, the first FSCC being established at Iwo Jima.

No article on amphibious communications would be complete without mention of the Amphibious Force Flagship (AGC). The principal requirement of an amphibious flagship is good communications.

Prior to the Marshalls, BBs were employed but were unsatisfactory for several reasons: 1) limited communication facilities; and 2) the BBs were usually part of the fire support group and every time a salvo was fired the radio sets were jarred off frequency.

There were many other communication refinements, both in techniques and materiel, since the early days of amphibious operations. Multichannel radio relay now replaces many of our long wire lines and provides more reliable ship to short communications. Transistors and printed circuits have made possible smaller and more dependable equipment. Re-organization of our communication nets, to fulfill changing requirements, has provided more efficient service.

Future amphibious operations probably present a greater problem to communicators than to personnel in any other field. Time and space factors prevent our applying WWII solutions to communication problems in future amphibious operations. However, this does not mean that we should throw out our present doctrine. Principles don't change radically. We must temper our thinking on these problems with lessons learned from the past, but at the same time must not be timid about trying entirely new techniques.

USMC

TIME FOR A

By Capt B. H. Murray



✿ IT IS TIME FOR A CHANGE. A doctrinal concept, basic to the outlook of the US armed services, is no longer consistent with realities of the modern world. This concept is expressed in the first sentence of Field Service Regulation 97, FM100-5, page 21: "The ultimate objective of all military operations is the destruction of the enemy's armed forces and his will to fight." The Germans have a word for it—*Vernichtungsstrategie*, the all-out strategy of complete destruction which by its very terms excludes all other theories of the use of force. They have also named the alternative—*Ermattungsstrategie*, the limited war.

Vernichtungsstrategie has dominated the American approach to armed conflict. It represents the basic jumping-off point of the professional officer, just as the germ theory of disease is fundamental to medicine, or field theory underlies the approach of the nuclear physicist, and as the presumption of innocence dominates the thinking of the criminal lawyer. This is lamentable; for as a historical truth *Vernichtungsstrategie* as the exclusive definition of war is simply incorrect, as an abstract philosophical proposition it is misstated, and as a guide to preparation and operation in the here and now it is open to very serious questioning.

The theory of *Vernichtungsstrategie* is usually attributed to Karl von Clausewitz, though in doing so, it seems that his successors in the military world have done him a disservice. Apparently Clausewitz never meant to say that *Vernichtungsstrategie* excluded all alternatives. It is true that his book *On War* concerns itself entirely with the all-out strategy, but he was aware of another form. His death cut off his further investigations in the area. A German military analyst of a later age, Hans Delbruck, however, did develop and expound the alternative form that had been suggested by Clausewitz. Delbruck gave it the name used here—*Ermattungsstrategie*.

It is not surprising that limited war was not, when propounded in the early 1900s, a popular concept. Delbruck was a man of enormous learning in the field of military history, and he was a keen analyst as well. He had the misfortune, however, to expound his ideas in a Germany dominated by the thinking of Erich Ludendorff and others of like viewpoint. In that climate of opinion Delbruck's theories were not destined to gain wide acceptance either at home or, after the German defeat of 1918, abroad.


It must be admitted that *Vernichtungsstrategie* has been the orthodox

view for at least the last 100 years. It was an article of faith for the General Staff Corps of the German Army. It has had the support of such prestigious European soldiers as Helmuth von Moltke and Ferdinand Foch. Both Lee and Grant fought with faithful consistency to its basic precepts. World War I was certainly an all-out affair, and *Vernichtungsstrategie* probably found its ultimate expression—at least to date—in the *Gottterdammerung* strategy of Adolph Hitler and the unconditional surrender slogan of Britain and the United States in WW II.

With such a background of modern conflict and thinking it is not in the least unusual that the all-out strategy should be accepted as an article of faith by the practitioner of the military art. He sees war as the "continuation of political action by means of force," but in his view once the state of belligerency has occurred other means of political action must necessarily have failed, and unrestricted force is then the deciding factor. Politics must retire from the arena, while the soldier pushes the issue to its ultimate conclusion uninhibited by the limiting influence of the diplomat or the statesman. War, in this view, is by definition a resort to the ultimate arbiter of force, and it cannot be stopped short of the complete de-

CHANGE

in our national strategy to meet today's needs



feat of one of the belligerents. There is no substitute for victory—and victory is used in its final meaning where the winner occupies the loser's country, and all the armed forces and the capacity and will to resist of the loser are completely destroyed.

As has been pointed out, this theory has had eminently respectable adherents in the past. It also seems to accord with a certain absolutistic stubbornness in the American national outlook towards problems of foreign policy and potential aggressors. This may be expressed in the idea that if an enemy nation is so nasty that it requires a sacrifice of American life to fight it, it is unquestionably so entirely evil that complete subjugation by American arms is necessary to prevent its ever being an aggressor again. It is certainly not the purpose of this article to propose that *Vernichtungsstrategie* be abandoned entirely. Rather its purpose is to point out the flaws in the exclusiveness of the orthodox view and to propose *Ermattungsstrategie* as an alternative method of using force—an alternative, however, which does not exclude the all-out view, but exists co-equally with it. Our strategic Air Force is a weapon of *Vernichtungsstrategie* and *Vernichtungsstrategie* only, but no one would for a minute propose that it be consigned to the junk

heap. In fact, it is probably the very existence of our strategic Air Force that makes *Ermattungsstrategie* an important concept for the immediate future.

"The ultimate objective of all military operations is the destruction of the enemy's armed forces and his will to fight." If this is a statement taken from historical examples, it is simply untrue. Delbruck maintained that Pericles, Belisarius, Wallenstein, Gustavus Adolphus and Frederick the Great were all believers in *Ermattungsstrategie*. For two centuries—the 17th and 18th—the great states of Europe quarreled incessantly without ever pushing their wars to the ultimate decision of destroying one of the belligerents. In retrospect, the warfare of that era seems very artificial with its fancy uniforms, carefully drawn tactical formations and amazing protocol of the battlefield. But it was, nevertheless, warfare in a very real sense. There were definitely winners and losers in each war. The result turned upon victory in battle, but the use of force was very well regulated, and ultimate objectives were more often than not deliberately avoided.

Vernichtungsstrategie flourished in the Napoleonic era, but in mid-19th Century history there is an instructive episode which represents a re-

turn to limited war. The Minister President of the Prussian State, Otto von Bismarck, wanted to unify the various German speaking principalities of central Europe into a strong centralized German nation. To do so, however, would arouse the jealous opposition of his neighbors, Denmark, Austria and France. Supported as he was by the superb Prussian armies, he had nothing to fear from either of those states so long as they acted singly. With consummate diplomatic skill Bismarck manufactured 3 wars at 3 different times. In each case, shortly after the beginning of hostilities a pitched battle was fought somewhere near the mutual borders of the belligerents and won by the Germans. In each case the Prussian army represented by Moltke wanted to follow up the initial victory by marching on the enemy capital and destroying completely the remaining enemy forces. Though it was necessary in the third of these wars to take Paris in order to bring the French to Bismarck's terms, Moltke, to his magnificent irritation, did not get his way. The limiting influence of the Iron Chancellor prevailed, and in each case Bismarck negotiated a peace which left the defeated nation's armed forces, national pride and territory more or less intact.

It is certain that Bismarck's policy



in these situations was not actuated by any undue sympathy for the Danes or the Austrians or the French. Probably his actions were grounded in his unquestionably correct view of the power ratio prevailing in Europe at the time. His magnificent armies could easily beat one or perhaps any two of the great powers of Europe, but as he well knew, the fleets of the English Queen represented a decisive counter force which could make it possible for a sufficiently aroused England to finance and sustain a coalition that could quickly defeat Germany. Such in fact happened some years later when the limiting influence of Bismarck was abandoned for a more adventurous policy.

It must be concluded, therefore, that all wars have not been all-out wars. The exponent of *Vernichtungsstrategie* cannot find in history proof for his proposition that war is by definition an ultimate trial of strength. A short look at the comparatively narrow field of post-renaissance European history will prove him wrong. By far the larger number of wars during this era were restricted to limited trials of strength either by the design of statesmen and generals or by the equality of the war potential of the belligerents.

As an abstract proposition the absolute definition of war is misstated. It is illogical to assert that

war is an all out affair, for in fact, war has not always been so. The assertion that warfare is all-out can mean only that the writer making such a statement thinks that war *should* be an ultimate trial of strength. The military analysts who have propounded this assertion have not been blind to history. They have simply imposed a definition upon warfare from their own abstract point of view. If left in the realm of philosophy, it might do no harm to allow the statement that war is absolute. However, as the original reason for defining war is to provide a basis for considering various causes of action in the practical sphere, the statement to be true must be couched in the imperative form—war should be an ultimate trial of strength.

So stated, the proposition still has eminent adherents (though it is emphasized that Clausewitz is not among them). Such men as Alexander, Napoleon, Caesar and Lee proved by their actions that they would agree. The authority of their point of view, however, is challenged by the fact that equally great military names, such as Frederick the Great, have not agreed. A contemporary student and practitioner of military affairs, Sir Winston Churchill, seems able to maintain the ambidextrous approach advocated by this article. When he was opposed

by the fanatical strategy of Hitler, Churchill talked and later enforced unconditional surrender, yet during the Korean incident his efforts at restraint showed that he was not unaware of the virtues of limitation when, in his opinion, the situation called for it.

Vernichtungsstrategie does not, therefore, have the absolute authority indicated by the axiomatic statement that the object of all war is complete destruction of the enemy's means and will to resist. Upon analysis it appears only that certain leading soldiers and thinkers thought that this should be so. Their view, however, is challenged by other and equally great military minds. The conclusion is inescapable that *Vernichtungsstrategie* is a mere abstract point of view. Its value is to be determined in terms of its utility when applied to the military realities of today.

In the present state of world affairs any American who truly wishes to follow out the theory of *Vernichtungsstrategie* may face some very cruel choices. If, for instance, the Red Chinese assault one of the Nationalist held off-shore islands, the all out strategist must either retreat and thus avoid the state of belligerency altogether, or if he fights, to be consistent, he must unleash the full power of the US against Red China and, no doubt, the Soviet Union too. Assuming something like a nuclear parity between the Communist and Western Worlds, this second alternative promises to be a veritable orgy of destruction. By its nature, nuclear war between strategic air forces seems to preclude exactly that definitive victory which is the aim of *Vernichtungsstrategie*. The atomic holocaust will simply be too costly for both sides.

As *Ermattungsstrategie*—local involvement of conventional forces with limited objectives—avoids the dilemma of retreat or mutual atomic destruction, it may easily become a part of American policy. It seems to be the best available alternative. It can provide a way of checking Communist expansion at the present limits, and yet avoid a major conflict.

It is time, therefore, to dust off *Ermattungsstrategie* and restore it to a place of honor alongside the orthodox *Vernichtungsstrategie*. It is time to change the fundamental

"I have a mortal fear that someday the Corps will suffer a defeat just because everybody was thinking the same way and all were equally convinced they were right," says **Capt B. H. Murray** in explaining his reasons for writing this article. Capt Murray was graduated from Princeton in 1951 and is presently doing graduate work at the University of Pennsylvania Law School. Commissioned in 1952, he went to Korea with the 26th draft Nov 52, serving first as a mortar section leader and later as platoon leader, (1/3/1). After being wounded in March 1953, he was evacuated to CONUS. Upon recovery he was assigned as an instructor in individual weapons at Basic School where he remained until released from active duty in March 1954. He is an active member of the Marine Corps Reserve in Philadelphia.

dogma that war is by definition all-out, and to realize that the Marine Corps may be facing a long period in which limited warfare best serves our national interest. In doing so, however, it would be well to consider the costs, the risks, and the implications of this new view of warfare.

In the first place, the strategy of limited war is expensive. It presupposes that the US must maintain a fully effective weapon of all-out war in order to stalemate Russian nuclear capabilities and, thus, deter Russia from large scale aggression. This weapon is, of course, the strategic air force. In addition, the US would be required to have large conventional armed forces at instant readiness. The infantryman is going to be the crucial factor in any limited war, and as initial advantages are very important, the US must have the capacity to deploy effective forces instantaneously. This sort of preparedness costs a great deal of money. If used often, *Ermattungsstrategie* will be tragically costly in human life. It requires that the US be prepared to fight the ample manpower reserves of the Communist world in situations where more often than not the enemy will have the initiative. Perhaps this is not the happiest prospect, but it is better, surely, than an all-out nuclear war or slow strangulation by retreat.

Secondly, limited warfare is risky. How can the US be sure that the other side will play the game according to the rules? Is not war so inherently dynamic that, even with quite other intentions, both sides in their attempts to best each other will broaden the scope of the conflict until it becomes total? Will not the tactical use of atomic weapons stimulate this broadening of the war process, and thus make total war unavoidable? These questions illustrate the risks and the unusual problems involved in *Ermattungsstrategie*. The power ratio between the belligerents must be so balanced that neither side dares to enlarge the scope of the conflict. Local defeat must be made preferable to the risks of an enlarged war. It may mean that the belligerents must abstain from the use of tactical atomic weapons. Diplomatic channels must be kept open. Negotiation must be flexible. The enemy must quickly be convinced by the

strength of the American reaction that his venture was ill conceived and will quickly prove very costly in light of the sudden appearance of a decisively superior American force, yet the peace terms must not be too harsh and degrading lest in his extremity the enemy be driven to a more desperate gamble which would enlarge the war.


Lastly, there are certain implications for the Marine Corps in this theory of warfare. The new rules must permeate the thinking of the officer corps and liberate creative ideas now beclouded by the dogma of orthodoxy. *Ermattungsstrategie* will require an ultimate standard of professional excellence. The war will be only a small part of the general national effort. In order to conserve lives and money it must be fought with the barest minimum of forces, yet these forces cannot afford to lose. In WW II the final surrender of the enemy atoned for the initial set backs, but in a limited war the bad performance of one regiment may mean the loss of a province in the concurrent diplomatic bargaining. US forces must be available instantly and at the very highest level of effectiveness, lest as in Korea, we find the disputed area already in enemy hands and face the costly job of recapturing it and the consequent loss of bargaining position until it is recaptured. To perform well in this type of warfare troops must be very well disciplined, but beyond that we must be prepared to introduce an element of political sophistication into the thinking of the average Marine. Trained Americans fight very well under the stimulus of a national crusade such as WW II. In a limited war, however, the individual's morale would be better sustained if he understood something of the complexity of the issues of his little war and why he is being asked to fight an enemy when final victory must be denied.

In order to reduce the number of forces actually needed in the war zone, the effectiveness of each man in the conventional weapons team must be increased. The absolute maximum military performance must be squeezed out of the individual. Constant experimentation and innovation must strive to bring this about. It is typical of the *Ver-*

nichtungsstrategie thinking of the American services that, though millions have been spent developing more and better bombers, the infantryman—the weapon of *Ermattungsstrategie*—is still armed with the rifle of WW II. Nobody seems to recognize any compelling pressure to increase the infantryman's fire power, yet it looks as though the chance of using infantry in the near future is a lot better than the chance of using the B-52.

The times call for a change—a change in the view of the nature of war. Old dogmas must face the test of their efficiency in terms of new realities and, insofar as they fail, they must be discarded to liberate the creative energy of the professional officer. He must be prepared to do something quite different in the future. An outmoded view of war will be of no service to him. His leadership must now meet challenges of a different kind. One thing, however, seems fairly certain—his leadership had better be good, for where *Ver-nichtungsstrategie* was a test of a nation's total war potential in which leadership was but one of many factors, *Ermattungsstrategie* promises to be a pure test of military leadership. The rules of the game impose a rough equality on the strength in terms of numbers and weapons which the two sides will bring to the battlefield. From that point on, victory belongs to the side that is best led.

USMC



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
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LtCol S. A. Smith

SPECIAL
ADVISORY
ASSISTANT
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Mr. N. J. Wilson, Jr.

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OF STAFF
G1



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CHIEF OF
STAFF
G2



CHIEF
(RECH & D)
G3



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OF THE
STAFF
G4

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF

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Gen R. McC. Pate



Col Simpson

stant Commandant and Chief of Staff

ANT COMMANDANT
CHIEF OF STAFF
Gen V. E. Megee

BOARDS

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF (PLANS)


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CHIEF OF STAFF
(RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT)

Gen R. B. Luckey

SECRETARY OF THE GENERAL STAFF

Gen D. Schatzel



STAFF MEDICAL OFFICER
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MajGen E. W. Snedecker



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HOW HITLER MISSED IN THE MIDDLE EAST

By Capt B. H. Liddell Hart



♣ JULY 4TH IS THE AMERICANS' NATIONAL Day, when they celebrate their Declaration of Independence—from British rule. In 1942 the anniversary again became a day of deliverance, and one that gave both peoples, now allies, good cause for rejoicing. But its immense significance in the course of World War II has scarcely been recognized.

One 30 June 1942, Rommel reached Alamein after defeating the British Eighth Army at Gazala-Tobruk, and chasing its tattered remains 350 miles through the desert. That morning he had written home exultantly: "Only 100 more miles to Alexandria!" By evening he was barely 60 miles distant from his goal, and the keys of Egypt seemed within his grasp.

Hitler was telegraphing congratulations and Mussolini had flown

to Africa ready for a triumphal ride into Cairo. On the other side Auchinleck, the C-in-C Middle East, had gone forward from Cairo into the desert to take personal command of what was left of the Eighth Army, in an effort to stem the tide. The situation looked desperately black.

The British Fleet had hastily evacuated Alexandria. Clouds of smoke rose from the chimneys of the military offices in Cairo as their records were hastily burnt. The world outside naturally interpreted the snowstorm of charred paper as a sign that the British were fleeing from Egypt.

But a vital change had now come at the front. On July 4th Rommel, still at Alamein, wrote home: "Things are, unfortunately, not going as we should like. The resistance is too great, and our strength

is exhausted." His thrusts had not only been parried but answered by upsetting ripostes. His troops were too tired as well as too few to be capable of making a fresh effort for the moment. He was forced to break off the attack and give them a breather, even though it meant giving Auchinleck time to bring up reinforcements.

This was the most dangerous moment of the struggle in Africa. It was more truly the turning point than the repulse of Rommel's renewed attack at the end of August or the October battle that ended in Rommel's retreat—the battle which, because of its more obviously dramatic outcome, has come to monopolize the name of "Alamein." Actually, there was a series of "Battles of Alamein," and the first was the most crucial.

Rommel's letters and journal reveal where the turning point lay. At the beginning of July he felt that he was sweeping forward on an irresistible tide. When launching his renewed attack at the end of August he still cherished hopes, but they were mingled with doubts. In October, when Montgomery took the offensive, Rommel fought without hope—in face of the vastly superior strength that the British had assembled by then.

It is time that justice was done to Sir Claude Auchinleck for what he achieved during the fateful days of July, and also to Eric Dorman-Smith, whom he took with him as his principal staff officer in the emergency. For after saving the situation they were sacked by Mr. Churchill when he flew out to Egypt in the lull that followed.

It has been left for Rommel to give them the credit they deserved. His account pays tribute to the "skill and coolheadedness" with which the British forces were handled once Auchinleck took charge. He was particularly impressed by the way that, during this crucial period, Auchinleck "did not let himself be influenced by any of our 'moves' into accepting a 'second best' solution." By contrast, Rommel was scornful about the way that the British commanders had played into his hands in the earlier battles that year, and he is often critical of the way that even Montgomery later—though never making a rash move—could be bluffed into missing an opportunity.

THE REAL STORY of the struggle in Africa is startlingly different from what is still generally imagined. That has become clear in exploring the facts about the enemy's situation and plans—not only in Rommel's papers but other German records, as well as by interrogating the principal officers concerned. Some remarkable evidence has also come from the British side.

Here are the most striking revelations:

Mussolini's jealousy of Hitler, and reluctance to accept more than the minimum of German aid, was of the greatest help to us in preserving Egypt and the Suez Canal.

Hitler was so obsessed with Russia, and his plans there, that he was almost blind to the much easier chances of driving the British out of the Mediterranean, and conquering the Middle East, although these were repeatedly pointed out to him—by his admirals as well as by Rommel.

The older and super-cautious school in the German General Staff helped to discourage him by their extreme land-mindedness, and fears of any overseas "adventure."

Rommel was starved of reinforcements at every stage, fortunately for us. Not a single additional division was sent him from Germany for more than a year after his opening victories.

He routed the Eighth Army in the summer of 1942 with forces that were much smaller than the British had.

Contrary to the impression on the British side, his tanks were then inferior in quality, as well as in quantity.

The British defeat in this disastrous battle, between Gazala and Tobruk, was due partly to tactical blunders and old-fashioned ideas, but also to the way that the Eighth Army was caught in a badly balanced position owing to the Prime Minister's pressing demands for a premature offensive.

The toughest opposition of all that Rommel met during this 3-weeks' battle came from the small French force that held the isolated flank position at Bir Hacheim.

Rommel's pursuit of our beaten forces to Alamein was only made possible by the immense amount of supplies and vehicles that fell into his hands at Tobruk—despite the orders given to destroy them.

The troops of the Eighth Army only managed to escape owing to the way their retreat was shielded by the efforts of the RAF—for the desert route became so jammed with vehicles as to present an appallingly vulnerable target if the Luftwaffe could have bombed it.

The Eighth Army's rally at Alamein in sufficient strength to check Rommel was only made possible by Auchinleck's decision, on Dorman-Smith's advice, to countermand the intended stand at

Mersa Matruh—in the nick of time before the forces there were trapped.

Rommel's forces were not only checked at Alamein, but were on the verge of breaking under Auchinleck's blows.

Mussolini's jealousy of Hitler and his triumphs is clearly shown in Ciano's diary and the accounts of others in his circle. He felt that he was much superior in ability to Hitler, and it was gall to him that his "new Roman" legions should be outshone by their German allies. Hitler, by contrast, had a curiously tender regard for his fellow-dictator, the pioneer of Fascism, and often pandered to Mussolini instead of riding roughshod over him as he did with other heads of state. Gen Westphal said in his account: "Hitler wanted at all costs to avoid matters on which Mussolini was sensitive. The Mediterranean was Italy's *mare nostrum*, and he did not want to poach on those preserves. . . . Hitler had decided that we were to make war only north of the Alps, while the Italians would do so to the south."

With Mussolini's jealousy went anxiety about the risk of becoming merely a satellite of Germany. Those feelings were shared by many of Mussolini's chief assistants and executives. They had a far-reaching effect on Axis strategy, heavily handicapping it—to Britain's advantage.

How that handicap affected the campaign from the outset was vividly revealed in an account given me by Gen von Thoma. He said: "I was sent to North Africa in October 1940, to report on the question whether German forces should be sent there, to help the Italians turn the British out of Egypt. After seeing Marshal Graziani, and studying the situation, I made my report. It emphasized that the supply problem was the decisive factor—not only because of the difficulties of the desert, but because of the British Navy's command of the Mediterranean. I said it would not be possible to maintain a large German Army there as well as the Italian Army.

"My conclusion was that, if a force was sent by us, it should be an

armored force. Nothing less than 4 armored divisions would suffice to ensure success—and this, I calculated, was also near the maximum that could be effectively maintained with supplies in an advance across the desert to the Nile valley. At the same time I said it could only be done by replacing the Italian troops with German. Large numbers could not be supplied, and the vital thing was that every man in the invading force should be of the best possible quality.

"But Marshals Badoglio and Graziani opposed the substitution of Germans for Italians. Indeed, at that time they were against having any German troops sent there. They wanted to keep the glory of conquering Egypt for themselves. Mussolini backed their objections. While, unlike them, he wanted some German help, he did not want a predominantly German force."

The importance of this revelation can be better realized if we remember that Thoma's mission to Africa was made 2 months before O'Connor's brilliant riposte, under Wavell's direction, broke up Graziani's attempted invasion of Egypt. The British forces were capable of smashing the larger but worse-equipped Italian Army. But it is all too likely that a picked force of 4 armored divisions, such as Thoma suggested, would have swept into Egypt—any time that winter. For O'Connor's force then consisted of only one armored and one infantry division, both incompletely equipped.

Now comes another remarkable disclosure, Mussolini got his own way—to defeat—partly because Hitler was not fired by the idea of throwing the British out of Egypt. That was very different to what the British imagined at the time.

Thoma related that: "When I rendered my report, Hitler said he could not spare more than one armored division. At that, I told him that it would be better to give up the idea of sending any force at all. My remark made him angry. His idea in offering to send a German force to Africa was political. He feared Mussolini might change sides unless he had a German stiffening. But he wanted to send as small a force as possible." (It is to be noted

here that Hitler had already suspended the plans for the invasion of England, and was considering plans for the invasion of Russia.)

Thoma went on to say: "Hitler thought that the Italians were capable of holding their own in Africa, with a little German help. He expected too much of them. I had seen them in Spain, 'fighting' on the same side as we were. Hitler seemed to form his idea of their value from the way their commanders talked when he met them at the dinner table. When he asked me what I thought of them, I retorted: 'I've seen them on the battlefield, not merely in the Officers' Mess.' I told Hitler: 'One British soldier is better than 12 Italians.' I added: 'The Italians are good workers, but they are not fighters. They don't like gunfire.'"

The German General Staff was also against sending German forces to Africa, either on a big scale or a small scale. They felt out of their element in planning operations across the sea, a subject which they had never properly studied—as was shown when, after their dramatic 1940 victory in France, they were found to be without any plans for following it up with an invasion of England. Moreover, most of the higher generals had a deep respect for British seapower, and were very apprehensive about venturing to embark their troops on the "deep blue sea." Their reluctance about attempting to cross the Channel in 1940, when England was at her weakest, was repeated in their attitude to operations on the African side of the Mediterranean in 1941-42, great though the prizes were.

It was only after the Italians' crushing defeat in Cyrenaica that, on Mussolini's appeal for help, the Germans sent a small detachment under Rommel's command to save the situation. But even this was intended to be merely for the defence of Tripolitania (the Western half of Libya).

Rommel's dynamism changed that policy. When he arrived on the scene in February 1941, part of the British forces there had been diverted on Churchill's orders to take part in the ill-starred expedition to Greece. Although only one of Rommel's 2 panzer divisions had arrived,

he struck like a whirlwind and—more by fright than by force—swept the British out of Cyrenaica, except for a portion who were shut up in the fortress-port of Tobruk.

Even after that sensational success, no further German divisions were despatched to reinforce him, and all he could manage was to improvise a motor-infantry division from odd units. All 3 divisions were smaller than normal, and British, scale. But under Rommel's leadership they sufficed to throw back successively 2 big British efforts to conquer Libya during the next 9 months, and then shatteringly defeated the superior British forces in the spring of 1942.

The first of these battles was in June 1941—when the British Command, spurred on by Mr. Churchill, launched a big attack intended to "destroy" Rommel, relieve Tobruk, and sweep North Africa clear of the enemy. It was christened "Battle-axe." After a 3-day battle on the frontier, near Sollum, Rommel succeeded in driving back the attacking forces, they were rather larger than his own contrary to what the British public were told.

In November, a bigger British offensive was launched—called "Crusader." This time Mr. Churchill's efforts had provided the British forces (now entitled the Eighth Army) with more than twice as many tanks as Rommel had—and a third of his were poorly armed Italian tanks. But his German tanks were much better handled tactically than the British, and a proportion of them had a heavier gun. Moreover he skilfully maneuvered to bait the British into bull-like charges where they were trapped by his concealed antitank guns. In consequence, he was able to turn the tables on his opponents in the first few days of the battle, despite their 4 to 1 superiority in the air (and the fact that two-thirds of his meagre number of aircraft were Italian).

The way that he hit back threw the attackers into such confusion that the Commander of the Eighth Army, Gen Cunningham, thought of breaking off the battle. In the crisis Auchinleck flew up from Cairo to take a personal grip on the situation, and persisted in pressing the offensive. The Eighth Army was

given a new commander, Gen Ritchie, and a larger number of reinforcing tanks and troops were brought up. Eventually, after 2 more weeks of hard struggle, superior weight prevailed and Rommel's depleted forces were pushed out of Cyrenaica.

Now at last, in Christmas week, Rommel received the first small batch of reinforcements—2 tank companies and a few batteries of artillery—that had reached him since the battle had begun; a month before. With this aid he repulsed a British attempt, launched on Boxing Day, to storm the position near Agedabia where he had halted his retreat.

Then, on January 21, he suddenly sprang like a tiger upon opponents who had assumed him to be badly lamed and too weak to move. His unexpected pounce and swift series of blows threw the Eighth Army into disorder, and drove it to abandon most of the ground it had gained. It managed to halt on the Gazala-Bir Hacheim line, just west of Tobruk.

The British Government again built up the strength of the Eighth Army for a renewed offensive. Rommel, too, received fresh reinforcements, although these were not on the same scale and did not include any further German divisions. Mr. Churchill urged early action, pointing out that the British had 635,000 men standing idle in the Middle East theater while the Russians were fighting desperately, and Malta, closer at hand, was being reduced to an extremity by Kesselring's sustained air attack. But Auchinleck, who had a shrewd sense of the technical and tactical defects of the British forces, wished to wait until Ritchie's strength was raised to a level sufficient to make sure of nullifying Rommel's superiority in quality. Finally Mr. Churchill, overruling his arguments, decided to send him definite orders to attack which he "must obey or be relieved."

But Rommel struck first. On the moonlight night of May 26 he passed round the flank of the British position with his 3 German divisions, followed by the one Italian armored and one Italian motorized division, leaving the 4 Italian un-

motorized divisions to "make faces" at the Gazala line, and the divisions holding it. His flank stroke caught the British armor ill-positioned, and it came into action piecemeal, and was badly knocked about. The faults in the British dispositions had been perceived by Dorman-Smith and, following his criticisms, Auchinleck had written to Ritchie suggesting a closer concentration. Unfortunately, these suggestions were not carried out by the men on the spot.

But despite Rommel's opening success he did not succeed in cutting through to the sea, and thus cutting off the divisions in the Gazala line, as he had hoped. His Panzer divisions had a shock on encountering, for the first time, the Grant tanks with 75 mm guns that America had provided—200 of them had already reached the Eighth Army and Rommel had been unaware of that when launching his attack. He himself says: "The advent of the new American tank had torn great holes in our ranks . . . far more than a third of the German tanks had been lost inside of one day."

His renewed effort to reach the sea on the second day brought little progress and more loss. He himself had a narrow escape from capture when he went forward in his car—and was the more lucky on his return to his Battle Headquarters he found that "during our absence the British had overrun my Staff." After another abortive day he ordered his striking force to take up a defensive position. That was a precarious position. For it lay beyond the fortified British Gazala Line, and left him separated from the rest of his forces by the British garrison and their far-reaching belt of minefields. To fight "with backs to the wall" is grim, but to fight with backs to a mined barrier is worse.

During the days that followed, the British air force rained bombs on this position, which was aptly christened "The Cauldron," while the Eighth Army attacked it on the ground. The Press was filled with triumphant reports that Rommel was now trapped, while in military headquarters there was a comfortable assurance that he could be

dealt with at leisure, and was bound to surrender.

Yet by the night of June 13 the whole outlook had changed. On the 14th Ritchie abandoned the Gazala line, and started a rapid retreat to the frontier which left the troops in Tobruk isolated. By the 21st, Rommel had captured that fortress and 33,000 men in it, together with an immense amount of stores. It was the worst British disaster of the war except for the fall of Singapore. Next day the remainder of the Eighth Army abandoned its position on the frontier near Sollum, and beat a hasty retreat eastward through the desert with Rommel on its heels.

What had caused such a dramatic turn-about? Rarely has there been such a tangled battle, and the threads have never been properly unravelled. The "mystery of the Cauldron" has continued to baffle those who have tried to write its story from the British side, and been made more puzzling by myths that sprang up.

It was said that Rommel's force was superior in numbers, and had more powerful tanks. In reality the Eighth Army had 6 brigades of armor compared with Rommel's 3—one of which was Italian. There were 700 British tanks, with a further 200 in immediate reserve. Rommel had 525, but nearly half of these were Italian tanks—which the troops called "mobile coffins." Only 270 of Rommel's tanks really counted, his Panzer IIIs and IVs.

It is also a delusion that the German tanks were better armed, as British tankmen commonly imagined at the time. Technical investigation has revealed that the much despised British 2-pounder tank gun had a greater penetration than the short-barrelled 50 mm gun that most of the German tanks carried—it could pierce 44 mm of armor at 1,000 yards whereas the German tank gun could pierce only 40 mm. The new long-barrelled 50 mm was superior to either with its 61 mm penetration—but a mere 18 of Rommel's tanks were equipped with this new gun. Moreover it was in turn inferior to the 75 mm in the new Grant tank—and Ritchie had over 200 of these. So the advantage both in tank numbers and power was

very heavily on the British side.

The British also had a large number of 6-pounder antitank guns which, with their 80 mm penetration at 1,000 yards, were superior to all the German ones except the much-feared "88," and Rommel had barely 40 of these. In field artillery, too, he was inferior. In air strength he was, for once, nearly equal to the British in numbers, but a large proportion of his were Italian.

In the light of these comparative figures, the British performance in this disastrous battle is seen to be even worse than it appeared at the time.

Besides the myth that Rommel possessed superiority in tanks, another myth is that the scales were turned and the bulk of the British tanks lost in one fatal day, June 13. In reality that was only the culmination of a series of disastrous days.

The basis clue to the "mystery of the Cauldron" is to be found in Rommel's notes:

"On the evening of May 27, in spite of the precarious situation, I was full of hope about the future course of the battle. For Ritchie had thrown his armor into the battle piecemeal and at different times, and had thus given us the chance of engaging them on each occasion with just enough of our own tanks. . . . The British should never have let themselves be misled into splitting up their forces."

He then records that he took up what seemed his perilously exposed defensive position . . .

"on the certain assumption that the overcautious British command would not dare to use any major part of their armor to attack the Italians in the Gazala line while strong German Panzer forces stood in a position to threaten the (British) rear. . . . Thus I foresaw that the British mechanized brigades would continue to run their heads against our well organized defensive front, and use up their strength in the process."

Rommel's calculation worked out all too well. The British persisted in a series of piecemeal assaults on his position, at heavy cost. Such direct assaults proved the worst form of caution. While beating

them off, he overwhelmed the isolated "box" at Sidi Muftah held by 150th Infantry Brigade, which lay behind his back, and cleared a passage through the minefield for his supplies.

He also tackled the still more isolated "box" at Bir Hacheim on the southern flank that was held by the 1st Free French Brigade under Gen Koenig. It proved so tough that Rommel was compelled to go down and take personal command of the assault forces, and he says: "Nowhere in Africa was I given a stiffer fight." It was only on the tenth day that he penetrated the defenses—and most of the French got away under cover of night.

He was now free to pounce afresh. Meanwhile the British tank strength had melted from 700 to 170, and most of the reserve tanks had been used up. In one of his sudden ripostes Rommel had also captured 4 regiments of artillery—a very important bag. He now struck eastward, on June 11, and cornered most of the remaining British armor between his 2 Panzer divisions, forcing it to fight in a cramped area where he could batter it with converging fire. By nightfall on the 13th it had shrank to barely 70 tanks. While he had lost many himself in the 3 weeks' battle, he now had an advantage of more than 2 to 1 in tanks fit for action—and, being in possession of the battlefield, he could recover and repair many of his damaged tanks, unlike the British.

Next day, as the British were falling back, Mr. Churchill sent an emphatic message saying: "Presume there is no question in any case of giving up Tobruk." He repeated this admonition in telegrams on the 15th and 16th. That long distance advice from London conduced to the crowning blunder. For the hasty step of leaving part of the Eighth Army in Tobruk, while the rest withdrew to the frontier, gave Rommel the chance to overwhelm the isolated force in Tobruk before its defense was properly organized.

The consequence of that disaster was the headlong retreat into Egypt of Ritchie's surviving force, with Rommel in hot chase. In maintaining this pursuit, Rommel was greatly helped by the huge haul of stores

he had made at Tobruk. Gen Bayerlein, the Chief of Staff of Afrika Korps, told me that 80 percent of Rommel's transport at this time were captured British vehicles!

Ritchie's intention was to make a stand at Mersa Matruh, and fight out the issue there with all the forces he had left, reinforced by the New Zealand Division which was just arriving from Syria. But on the evening of June 25 Auchinleck took over direct command from Ritchie. After reviewing the problem with Dorman-Smith, he cancelled the order to hold the fortified position at Matruh, and decided to fight a more mobile battle in the Alamein area. It was a hard decision, for not only did it mean many difficulties in getting away troops and stores, but it was bound to cause fresh alarm at home, particularly in Whitehall. In taking the decision, Auchinleck showed the cool head and strong nerve of a great soldier. It proved fortunate, for Rommel was racing forward so fast that his spearhead burst through the front south of Matruh on the 26th and reached the coast-road behind. But the withdrawal had been ordered just in time, and the bulk of the encircled troops were able to force their way through before the ring was firmly welded.

A final revelation concerns the battle around Alamein that followed. "Here Auchinleck was not content with stopping Rommel, but sought to turn the tables decisively. How near he came to succeeding is shown by a letter that Rommel wrote on July 18—"Yesterday was a particularly hard and critical day. We pulled through again. But it must not go on like that for long, otherwise the front will crack. Militarily, this is the most difficult period I have been through."

Fortunately for Rommel, the British troops were as exhausted as his own, and soon afterward Auchinleck in turn had to suspend his attacks. But Rommel's closing reflection was: "Although the British losses were higher than ours, yet the price which Auchinleck had had to pay was not excessive. What mattered to him was to hold up our advance and that, unfortunately, he had done."

USMC

in brief

ON 12 SEPTEMBER the Secretary of the Navy extended his "heartiest congratulations" to the Marine shooters who were the first team ever to take all 5 National Trophy Matches. The Secretary stated that the Marine performance at Camp Perry "further indicates the necessity for the caliber of training and physical fitness conducted by the Marine Corps." See pages 56 and 57.

THE MARINE CORPS recently adopted a new portable, diesel powered, 20 watt generator to be used in radar installations and FMF units as a general utility machine (below). It is manufactured by Consolidated Diesel Electric.



MARINE LIEUTENANTS D. B. Waldron and J. K. Donaldson set a new unofficial helicopter endurance flight record, 13 hours and 2 minutes, without refueling (below). The record was set in an HRS, of Korean fame, from Marine Helicopter Squadron 1, MCAS, Quantico, Va. The results of the test will be studied and evaluated for possible future use by the Marine Corps. Maj V. D. Olson, right, commands HMX-1, the parent unit.



A NEW, LIGHT-WEIGHT high-altitude research missile was announced by the University of Maryland and Republic Aviation Corp. The missile has flown at 3,800 mph and reached an altitude of 80 miles. The 2-stage rocket, called *Terrapin*, is less than 15 feet long, 6¼ inches in diameter at its thickest point and weighs only 224 lbs. Preliminary designs for a third stage, capable of raising the rocket to an altitude of 200 miles, have been completed. The missile was designed for upper atmosphere research, making it a potential weather and research vehicle.

The bulky instruments of earlier models have been replaced by an almost completely new system weighing only 6 lbs. and so simple that those of the first models were built and assembled by university and high school students.

FOR THE FIRST TIME in history the Marine Corps saluted a National Guard unit with a Sunset Parade. The parade was in honor of the famous "Old Guard" of New York and took place at Marine Barracks, Washington, DC. The 2 units exchanged gifts, the Marines received an old print of the Old Guard (107th Infantry) who, in turn, were given a Marine Corps snare drum.

THE ARMED FORCES have adopted a uniform plan for the storage of household goods. The Department of the Army has been assigned responsibility for the administration of the plan, which was developed by the Defense Department with the aid of an advisory group from the furniture storage industry. The regulation provides a uniform contract and schedule of services, previously lacking. Local administration of the regulation will be conducted from 18 field offices located at military installations throughout the US.




2D LT RICHARD B. TAYLOR was named the honor graduate of the 2-56 Basic Course and was presented the Marine Corps Association sword by Lt Gen M. B. Twining at the graduation exercises of his class (above).

Lt Taylor entered the Marine Corps in 1949. After attaining the grade of technical sergeant, he entered the Officer Candidate Course in January 1956.



A FULLY DEVELOPED navigation and potential air traffic control system has been announced by the Bendix Aviation Corps (above). It is of the area coverage type and operates on low frequency radio waves, permitting use behind hills, in valleys, beyond line of sight and below the curvature of the earth. The system, now being used in Europe, covers over 2 million square miles of territory. Good reception from ground level to the highest altitude makes the system applicable to both helicopters and fixed wing craft. Transmissions from a master station and two slave stations are received by a plotting device in the cockpit of the plane. This device, by means of triangulation, plots the position of the plane on a chart, thus allowing the pilot, at all times, to know his position, direction of flight and track. The system is accurate to within 25 yards at 50 miles. Another system is available for long range use.



CAMP PERRY CLOSURE


If shooters in the United States have a Valhalla it must be Camp Perry, Ohio. The Marine shooters reached their Valhalla when the Corps' "Big Team" made a clean sweep of all 5 Congressionally-authorized National Trophy matches. This was the first time in the history of the "Nationals" that a single service had made such a sweep.

The "Rose Bowl" of shooting also saw new records set by the Marine Corps teams and individuals, the Marine Corps Blue Team set a new record in the National Trophy Team Match (Rifle) with 1428x1500 breaking the old record of 1407x1500.

The Marine Corps Western team placed second with 1426x1500, the Eastern Team was third with 1424x1500, for a clean sweep of the match. The Marine Corps Reserve team (Gold) came through for their share of the glory taking the high Reserve and Rattlesnake Trophies.

The Individual Pistol Match was won by 1stLt W. W. McMillan (Parris Is-

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1) The Daniel Boone Trophy. 2) The Marine Corps Gray Team, winner of the Infantry Trophy Match. 3) 1stLt. McMillan, top service pistol shot.



4) Blue
5) The
Service
Trophy.



RYCLEAN SWEEP

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land) with a 291x300 for another record.
He walked off with the Gen Custer
Trophy to boot.

SSgt J. E. Hill (MCS, Quantico) won
the Service Rifle Championship hands
down with a 634—60V outpointing 1,005
shooters in the aggregate. The National
Trophy Individual Rifle (Daniel Boone)
went to SSgt "V" "D" Mitchell (3dMar
Div) with a score of 246x250—19V to
set a new record. The historic 1,000-yd
Leech Cup Rifle Match went to CWO
C. H. Gebhardt (3dMarDiv) with a per-
fect score—16 of his 20 bulls were in the
"V" ring.

The Marine Corps Gray Team under
Maj E. A. Harwood, took dead aim on
the first place in the Pistol Team Match
and outshot 63 other teams for the Gold
Cup.

In addition to the National Trophy
Matches during the Camp Perry meet,
Marines won 12 first places, 9 seconds,
13 thirds and 3 divisional and special
awards.



4) Blue Team and the National Trophy (rifle).
5) The Big Team and the Trophies. 6) The
Service Rifle Trophy winner. 7) The Leech
Trophy.





MAJON-NI

By Lynn Montross

✦ NOT ONLY IS THE PERIMETER ONE of the oldest tactical formations of history, it is also one of the most modern in its adaptability to new weapons. Some excellent examples may be found in the Korean conflict and World War II as well as the combats of the ancient Greeks and Egyptians.

Even skin-clad barbarians fighting with spears and arrows had enough tactical perception to see the advantages on occasion of an all-around defense. At the battle of Adrianople, dating the downfall of the Roman Empire in 378 AD, the Goths fought behind a perimeter formed of their wagons until the arrival of mounted reinforcements enabled them to seize the initiative and swarm out to win a battle of annihilation. Sixteen centuries later, during Hitler's invasion of Soviet Russia, both sides relied frequently upon a 360-degree "hedgehog," bristling with artillery and armor and manned by as many as 10 divisions of troops.

Little evidence can be found to support the idea that the perimeter is invariably the resort of hard-pressed troops reduced to a passive defensive. On the contrary, there are perimeters of expediency as

well as necessity, of strategic offense as well as defense.

For the purposes of this survey, a study will be made of both types. It would be hard to find more instructive examples than 2 operations conducted in the same campaign by the same Marine unit in Korea—the perimeters held at Majon-ni and Hagaru in the late autumn of 1950 by the 3d Bn, 1st Marines, 1st Mar Div.

Majon-ni, a perimeter deep in enemy territory, might be compared to a spear thrust into an opponent's side. In this operation the tactical defensive was merely the means to the strategic offensive, just as the shield is the complement of the sword. And the result at Majon-ni, gained at an astonishingly low cost in Marine casualties, was the taking of Red Korean prisoners at an average of 82 per day during the 17 days of the operation.

The situation developed immediately after the administrative landing of the 1st MarDiv at Wonsan on 26 October 1950. X Corps, OI 13, received that day by the commanding general, Maj Gen O. P. Smith, assigned missions which would disperse Marine units from Kojo in the south to the Manchu-

rian border in the north (see Map #1). Thus a division zone more than 300 road miles long and 50 in width was created.

Theoretically, of course, the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) was on its last legs. Organized resistance had presumably been destroyed by the joint Eighth Army and X Corps offensives of the past 6 weeks. An end-of-the-war atmosphere prevailed in the CP as well as the foxhole, but the command of the 1st MarDiv took the realistic attitude that the remnants of the NKPA would bear watching. Thus, as one of the provisions of 1stMar Div OpOrder 18-50, the 3d Bn of RCT 1 was sent out on the end of a strategic limb as represented by the 28 miles of mountain road winding from Wonsan to Majon-ni.

The mission was to establish "... a defensive position at Majon-ni, destroying enemy forces and denying them the use of this road net. In addition ... to patrol roads to the north, south and west, and keep the road open between Majon-ni and Wonsan ...," though the latter responsibility had to be cancelled.

The task organization consisted of 3/1, D Btry of the 11th Marines, the 3d Plat, C Co, 1st Eng Bn and detachments of these units: 75mm Recoilless Plat; AT Co, 1st Marines; ANGLICO, 1st Sig Bn; D Co, 1st Med Bn; and H&S Co, 1st Marines. Other units, which will be mentioned as they appeared, took part for brief periods at a later date.

The strategic importance of Majon-ni, at the headwaters of the Imjin river, owed to its location at the junction of 3 roads leading to Wonsan on the east, Pyongyang on the north and west, and Seoul on the south. These routes were being

perimeter of expediency

The flexibility of the perimeter concept proves itself in meeting unforeseen circumstances

used by NKPA remnants shunning the well-traveled coastal roads and escaping through the mountains of central Korea.

Moving out by motor from a bivouac on the outskirts of Wonsan, the two echelons of 3/1 reached their objective on the afternoon of 28 October. And though the Marines were not tourists, interested in the scenery, they could not help remarking the natural beauty of this Y-shaped valley crossed by two swift, clear branches of the Imjin and surrounded by steep mountains.

The landscape might have made more of an impression if the newcomers had not been confronted, upon entering the village, by the spectacle of recently killed Koreans along the road. The victims had been shot without much of a trial by ROKs of the battalion the Marines were to relieve. Elements of the battalion had been ambushed while on patrol, and the ROKs were executing suspects on scant evidence when the Marines arrived to put a stop to the proceedings. This demonstration of Korean civil-war antagonism indicated that a political as well as military situation of unknown complexities awaited at Majon-ni.


The first decision of the CO, 3/1, was that independent company or similar outposts should not be set up because of the nature of the mountainous terrain coupled with the proved enemy aptitude in the conduct of night infiltrating tactics. A perimeter defense being indicated, he went over the area with his S3 to establish the trace. And here it may be noted that the dimensions of a perimeter are more dependent on the nature of the terrain than the number of available troops. In this case, to make the best use of

the ground, it was necessary to take in more territory than 3 rifle companies could handle. A solution was found by forming provisional platoons of men from H&S Co, the engineers and the artillery. Even so, the rifle companies had a combined

frontage of 1,530 yards, or 41 percent of a perimeter measuring a little more than 2 miles. All positions were tied in.


Weapons Co had the responsibility for defending the 3 road blocks (see Map #2). Each of these posi-

Map #1



NORTHEAST KOREA

Miles
Scale 1:1,000,000



Map #2


tions was manned by a section of heavy machine guns, 75mm recoilless rifles and 3.5-inch rocket launchers.

The rifle companies were given the mission not only of defending their assigned sectors, but also of patrolling the 3 roads in the battalion zone. This responsibility was divided as follows: G Co—the road to Wonsan; H Co—the road to Seoul; I Co—the road to Pyongyang.

A new Russian-style schoolhouse, built by the Red Koreans for the purpose of indoctrinating adults as well as educating children, made an ideal battalion CP. It was such an obvious choice, however, that CO 3/1 set up an alternate in case of emergency. Telephone wire was laid to road blocks, company CPs, artillery and mortar positions, but radio communication with friendly units in the Wonsan area was uncertain except for a few hours at night on most occasions, owing to the intervening mountain mass. And since problems of supply and communications were of unusual urgency, the engineers were given

the task of constructing an OY landing strip.

Operations began at 0730 on the morning of 29 October after Marine air came on station. All 3 rifle companies sent out patrols with negative results, but 24 prisoners were taken that day at the 3 road blocks. Supposed Korean civilians approaching these ports of entry were searched for weapons and briefly interrogated by the 181st Counter Intelligence team composed of native Koreans and attached to 3/1 under the control of the S2. As soon as a group of 20 to 30 accumulated, they were taken under guard to the stockade for a more thorough screening by the CIC team and the Civil



published. He is best known for his historical military books, "War Through the Ages," "Cavalry of the Sky" and "Rag, Tag and Bobtail."

Lynn Montross has probably written as many articles for the Gazette as any contributor in recent years. In his present capacity as a historian with the Historical Branch, G3, HQMC, he often rediscovers incidents which bear retelling. This presentation came as a result of some of the research work he had to do in writing the official Marine Corps history of the Korean war. That project, a projected 5-volume series, is being written at this time. Volumes I and II, which Mr. Montross co-authored, have already been

Affairs Section.

The great question was whether a Korean in civilian garments should be adjudged an escaping NKPA soldier or merely a harmless peasant uprooted by the war. Time did not permit a lengthy examination, but 3 tests were found to be reasonably accurate for arriving at a quick decision. If a Korean's head was close-cropped in a military fashion, if his neck was tanned in a V-line from recent wearing of a uniform, and if his feet showed the tell-tale callouses made by army shoes as distinguished from civilian footgear—then the suspect was placed in the prison stockade. If he could pass the tests, he was fed and sent on his way. In any event, no transients were allowed to remain in the overcrowded village.

This mission took on a new significance at the end of the first week, when helicopter pilots brought the news of the fight of the 7th Marines with the 12th CCF Div which began near Sudong on the night of 2-3 November. Now that Red China had come to the rescue of the vanquished, it was all the more essential that escaping NKPA soldiers be prevented from infiltrating northward to join their new allies or preparing to aid them in an attack from that direction.

The command of 3/1 also pointed out the desirability of establishing a reputation for justice and fairness as well as firmness with the inhabitants. It was emphasized that Koreans who had been under Communist rule the last 5 years would form their impressions of Western democracy from the personal conduct of the Marines. Strict discipline was to be enforced, therefore, and every effort made to gain the confidence of people who were promised protection if they gave information.

Thanks to such intelligence, it was learned that the Marines were opposed by the 15th NKPA Div, commanded by MajGen Pak Sun Chol, which had kept its organization while withdrawing from the south to the Majon-ni area after the Red Korean collapse. The 45th Regt was nearest to the village, with the 48th and 50th farther south. Total numbers were estimated at 11,000, apparently with the usual exaggeration. The mission of this Division was to occupy the upper Imjin valley for conducting guerrilla operations, and Majon-ni was said to be one of the immediate objectives.

Counting guerrillas and stragglers from other NKPA divisions, enemy numbers were estimated as high as 15,000 during the battalion's tour of duty. No such total ever opposed the Marines at any one time, of course, but it is likely that the figure is not too large when applied to the constant movement of Koreans through the area.

On 29 October a supply convoy arrived by road from Wonsan without incident. So many Red Koreans were giving up voluntarily that CO 3/1 requested an air-drop of surrender leaflets. He also put into effect a system of harassing and interdiction fires on locations reported to be enemy assembly areas. Cannoneers were almost literally "firing out of a barrel" in this bowl-like mountain valley, so that it was impossible to deliver close-in support. But even though the 6 howitzers were limited by near-by high ground, they could be swung to fire on any given point of attack, especially toward the 3 road blocks.

The surrounding heights also limited air activities. When the OY strip was finished, planes had to come in at a dangerous angle because of a parallel cliff. Yet the pilots overcame this risk and made life-saving evacuations of casualties when the road to Wonsan was blocked.

Each of the 3 rifle companies conducted regular motor or foot patrols without meeting any opposition during the first 4 days. On the morning of 2 November, however, there could be no doubt that well-led NKPA troops were in the area. A motorized patrol of How Company, comprising a rifle platoon re-

inforced with 60mm mortars, machine guns, an artillery FO team and a FAC team, was ambushed in a gorge. Enemy fire from the high ground hit the Marines who could not deploy effectively on a narrow, winding road blocked by stalled vehicles.

Failure of radio contact added to their difficulties. At last an officer and PFC got through the hail of bullets in a jeep to summon help. How Company's other 2 platoons, reinforced with 81mm mortars and heavy machine guns, extricated the patrol with the support of air and artillery. All arms, equipment and vehicles were recovered after the enemy took to flight, but the platoon had lost 16 men killed and 26 wounded.

NKPA equipment did not include anything heavier than small arms and automatic weapons during the Majon-ni operation. But the enemy appeared to have stockpiles of explosives which he used to create road blocks by blasting craters or starting rock slides.

Most of these barricades were undefended, but traffic could not be restored in some instances without the aid of engineers with heavy equipment. By 3 November the supply problem had become so pressing that the battalion called for air drops. These were fairly successful, but there was the usual waste and damage. Medicines and delicate instruments were flown in by the OYs and helicopters which evacuated critical casualties.

Air drops had their limitations, and when a truck convoy protected by a rifle platoon failed to get through from Wonsan, the regimental commander decided to employ a reinforced infantry company. The mission was given to Able Co of 1/1, which departed a 1430 on 4 November with a column of 45 trucks.

At first the scheme of placing a platoon of Co C engineers in the lead with their equipment paid off as 4 undefended road blocks were cleared. But the fifth was defended by enemy forces firing from the high ground. The engineers had a hot fire fight on their hands, and the infantry was slow in coming to their aid because of stalled vehicles clogging the narrow road.

A belated departure from Wonsan was the deciding factor. With the early November dusk approaching, the company commander ordered a return. Maneuvering the 45 trucks around was a feat on a road with a cliff on one side and a sheer drop on the other. After it was safely accomplished, and the convoy had started back without lights under enemy fire, a vehicle with 20 Marines missed a hairpin turn and toppled over the edge. By a miracle there were no deaths, and Able Co formed a human chain to bring up men with broken bones and concussions.

The next morning the Marines squared accounts. Departing Wonsan at an early hour, the company commander arranged for the rifle platoons to take turns at leading the way on foot, keeping 1,000 yards ahead of the vehicle column. The result was the complete surprise of an enemy force, in estimated strength of 2 platoons, waiting to hear the sound of approaching trucks. In effect, the ambushers were ambushed, and only a few survived the ensuing Marine turkey shoot. This was the only resistance, if such it may be called, met by a convoy which reached Majon-ni early that afternoon without further incident and without a single casualty.

Able Co itself provided a welcome reinforcement to the perimeter along with the detachment of the 75mm recoilless rifle platoon at a time when the inhabitants warned that an assault could be expected at 0100 on the night of 6-7 November by the 45th NKPA Regt. In order to throw the enemy off balance, CO 3/1 sent out a patrol on the 6th made up of George and Item Cos, reinforced by elements of Weapons Co and commanded by the battalion executive officer. This reconnaissance in force had been ordered by Corps through the chain of command upon receipt of intelligence that several thousand NKPA soldiers were assembling in the area. The patrol, supported by artillery fires to the extreme range of the howitzers, did not encounter any such enemy concentration, but 81 voluntary prisoners were taken.

The enemy turned up at 0130 that night, half an hour late. His

presence was announced by exploding booby traps and trip flares along the Able Co front. A slow-moving fire fight developed, spreading to the George Co sector. Toward dawn, with a fog limiting visibility almost to zero, the Communists could be heard but not seen when they attacked an OP manned by wiremen and artillery and mortar FO teams. These Marines were compelled to withdraw after exhausting their ammunition; but when the fog lifted, a counterattack with an assortment of H&S troops regained the position. At 0730, after Marine air came on station, the enemy hastily withdrew. The losses of the battalion were 2 men wounded.

The prison stockade being full to overflowing, Able Co was given the mission of escorting 619 captives to Wonsan on the return trip. They were packed like sardines into trucks covered with tarpaulins, so that they could not be seen along the route by Red Korean comrades. As an added precaution, CO, 1st Marines sent Easy Co of 2/1 out from Wonsan as an escort. But this company was ambushed with losses of 52 killed and wounded, while Able Co had an uneventful journey.

Increased NKPA aggressiveness in the Majon-ni area lent support to warnings of another impending attack on the perimeter. A brisk fire fight occurred on the morning of the 8th when Communists in company strength tried to cut off a How Co patrol. They were surprised by Marine reinforcements, pounded by air and artillery, and scattered with heavy losses. Friendly casualties amounted to one man killed and 10 wounded.

On 10 November another supply convoy got through from Wonsan, escorted by a KMC battalion. The newcomers, who were assigned the sector recently vacated by Able Co, arrived just in time for the second large-scale Red Korean attack on the perimeter.

This attempt was preceded by a propaganda build-up indicating that the Communists were worried about Marine progress in gaining the confidence of the inhabitants. Not only had strict 3/1 troop discipline been maintained, but efforts were made to ease the burdens of war. The villagers were allowed to have

their own mayor and council as long as they did not violate Marine security or sanitation regulations.

Gen Pak, aware that his movements were being reported to the Marines, resorted to that favorite Communist cure-all, a campaign of terrorization. The villagers were warned to evacuate Majon-ni if they hoped to escape the fate of the Marines, who were to be slain to a man in an assault of extermination. Some of the natives were sufficiently impressed to leave their homes, but the Civil Affairs Section ordered them back.

The "extermination" attack, when it materialized at 0130 on the 12th, proved to be a feeble effort. A desultory fire fight developed along the KMC and How Co fronts. The Communists were repulsed with heavy losses when they tried again to take the OP, only to discover that the approaches had been sown with Bouncing Betty mines. At 0800 a company-strength KMC patrol, supported by mortars and artillery, caught up with the retreating enemy and added to his casualty list. Marine and KMC losses were 2 men killed and 6 wounded.

This was the last Marine action. On the 14th the battalion was formally relieved by the 1st Bn, 15th Infantry, 3d US Inf Div, and returned to Wonsan.

A total of 1,395 prisoners had been taken by 3/1 during the 17 days—a large proportion of them voluntary—and more than 4,000 Korean transients "processed." Enemy battle casualties, estimated at 525 killed and 1,750 wounded, were at least heavy enough to cause Majon-ni to be abandoned as an immediate objective by the 45th NKPA Regt, which withdrew to the south along the Imjin valley.

Battle casualties of 3/1 numbered 65: 20 KIA or DOW and 45 WIA. Non-battle casualties were remarkably low, owing to strict enforcement of sanitary and health regulations.

The perimeter at Majon-ni was as small as could be planned to make the best of the terrain. Yet it was found that the original 3 rifle companies, tied in, could defend less than half of the total of 3,770 linear yards. This situation made converts of the commanding officers of 3/1

and Weapons Co to the desirability of a return to the "square battalion" of four rifle companies. Two articles on this subject were published by Maj Simmons in the *GAZETTE*: *Three Up—None Back* (May, 1951) and *Magic Square* (October, 1954).


The results of Majon-ni also convinced CO 3/1 of the desirability of a supporting arms center at the battalion level. This co-ordination, which CO Weapons Co supplied, proved to be of particular value in an undermanned perimeter where supporting arms had to compensate for the lack of troops in reserve, accurate harrassing and interdiction fires, including air strikes.

Another lesson of Majon-ni was the necessity for command and staff to make the best use of CIC personnel for obtaining local intelligence at the battalion level. It has long been an axiom that guerrilla warfare can not thrive without the support of the inhabitants. The same principle often applies equally to antiguerrilla operations; and thanks to CIC interrogations, 3/1 benefitted from the co-operation of inhabitants who had been indoctrinated by the Communists for 5 years. Thus, it was the enemy who fumbled in tactical darkness while forewarned Marines knew within half an hour when he would launch his first attack on the perimeter.

A long list of additional lessons could doubtless be drawn from the operation. But perimeters differ so widely and lend themselves to such a variety of situations that it is difficult to lay down principles of general application.

Perhaps that in itself is the real lesson of Majon-ni—the flexibility of the perimeter concept and its adaptability to circumstances which can not be foreseen. As a large-scale outpost in enemy territory, providing a base of operations against a materially inferior but elusive and troublesome foe using guerrilla tactics, Majon-ni demonstrated that the offensive perimeter is a thrifty solution for the force that can cope with the supply situation. After all, there is nothing like carrying the war to the enemy if a mere battalion can turn the trick without incurring too many risks. And that is the story of Majon-ni.

USMC



THOSE WHO HAVE HAD OCCASION to stand behind the firing line and observe a requalification record firing of the cal. .45 automatic pistol have probably come to the conclusion that pistol marksmanship in the Marine Corps is not all that it should be. Indeed, the Commandant has called attention to this problem in Marine Corps Memorandum 83-55 and in a subsequent change to the Marine Corps Manual in such a way that seems destined to go a long way toward correction of the situation.

It is not my purpose to defend or defame the .45 automatic here. Forty-odd years of field service have proved its dependability and power as a service sidearm and the remarkable records amassed by this venerable veteran in competition have established its inherent accuracy beyond serious question. The heated arguments which have waxed loud and long over its effectiveness, however, seem to center primarily around this very question of accuracy.

If we acknowledge its serviceabil-

ity and accuracy, why then, is it that the majority of those armed with the weapon find it so difficult to shoot? This question, it would seem, is best answered by the fact that mastering any pistol requires constant training and fairly frequent firing. The peculiarities unique to the "brute,"




make the .45 automatic all the more obstinate. Commissioned officers and master sergeants can reasonably be expected to be able to devote enough additional time to training to come up to the expected standard. However, under present conditions, the remainder of those Marines who must carry the pistol in the field will probably find it extremely difficult to do likewise. Specifically, I refer to the crews of infantry crew served weapons, tracked vehicles and the like. In addition, these Marines in combat must rely to a greater extent than officers and master sergeants upon their sidearms for actual physical defense of their positions.

The accompanying illustrations present a possible solution to the problem. A modification permitting a pistol to be fired from the shoulder is not a startling innovation; the famous German Mauser with its wooden combination holster-shoulder stock is familiar to all students of firearms and almost every pistol extant has, at one time or another, been fitted with some variation of this device. However, the utilization of new high-strength, lightweight alloys and modern quick coupling devices would appear to give the idea new utility and flexibility. In situations where the compactness and speed in handling of the pistol were desirable, the suggested skeleton stock could be detached and the pistol carried as intended. In situations where the delivery of rapid defensive fires at longer ranges than possible with the conventional pistol were required, the stock could be attached. Actual tests of this device have shown that the accepted 25-yard effective range of the pistol can be increased out to as far as 100 yards and slightly beyond.

In conclusion, this suggested modification is not intended to convert the pistol into a carbine. Recent experience has proved the futility of a shoulder weapon, not a rifle nor yet a pistol. Neither is this intended as an easy alternative to high standards of conventional pistol marksmanship. It is intended for those Marines who must use their sidearms effectively at ranges beyond their normal capabilities as marksmen and yet well within the effective range of the weapon itself.

US MC

the NEW and THE OLD



By MSgt C. V. Crumb (FMCR)

MANY OF US WHO HAVE ALREADY ended our active Marine Corps careers feel that we have a right and, even beyond that, a duty to speak our minds about some of the principles which will affect the future efficiency of the Corps. This writer is not an exception. In thoughtful consideration of the long years of service, certain aspects of leadership, supervision and training arise to a firmer and clearer picture of prominence in our minds until they stand out very definitely as factors which will seriously affect the future operation and perhaps even the very existence of the Corps as we know it today.

The writer is not one of those individuals who constantly cries "The Corps is not what it used to be." During my short tour of 20 years I have heard this cry continually, only to see the much blasphemed "new" Corps go into action and come out with new laurels and with a better reputation than ever. However, I

am of the opinion that there are some features of the "Old Corps" (and for the remainder of this article the term "Old Corps" will mean the Marine Corps prior to the buildup for World War II) that we could take and inculcate into our present-day Marine Corps to a very definite advantage. To point up the fine things of our modern day Marine Corps and to mention some of the features of the "Old Corps" which we could revive, is the purpose of this effort.

First, let us dwell upon some of the features of the present-day organization which, I feel, are improvements over the "Old Marine Corps."

Today, Marines are better educated academically. In the old days we depended too much on the catch-as-catch-can school of experience. Consequently, there were wide gaps in a Marine's education in the enlisted ranks. Now the leaders of the Marine Corps seem to be com-

pletely sold on the idea of formal schools; the direction of which has been entrusted to some of the Corps' finest officers who so insist on such outstanding instruction that our Marine Corps schools are generally the envy of civilian, soldier and sailor. The result is a well-rounded Marine academically and, consequently, a wealth of educated Marines who could form a fine nucleus for any future buildup that might be necessary in the event of another world conflict such as that of WW II.

Today, we recognize the Marine as being human and as such he has personal problems. Gone are the days when a man from the ranks with a legitimate reason to see the First Sergeant was denied access to that high personage merely because he did not see eye-to-eye with the company clerk. Gone are the days of the "\$20.80-and-a-horseblanket" Marine. Today's Marines are recognized as individuals with financial

responsibilities as indicated by the recent peace time pay raise, the dislocation allowance and other pay considerations. The lack of adequate housing was, up until very recently, one of the greatest deterrents to the young married Marine's consideration of the Marine Corps as a career. Giant strides have been taken in the last 3 years to cure this ill. The Marine Corps has become public relations conscious and goes to some lengths to make known to the civil populace the activities of Marine Corps units and individuals; other than what they do in combat. This recognition by the public helps give the Marine a standing in the country and community, and also helps when legislation is being considered for the improvement of his lot. All in all, this recognition as being human with some of the ordinary problems of ordinary people has helped make the Marine Corps more attractive to prospective enlistees. At this point some readers are probably saying, "We have already gone too far in this direction, we are sheltering a bunch of liberty hounds and cry babies." The only answer to that statement is the advice to the effect that we must listen to legitimate gripes and requests, be fair and impartial but not over-indulgent.

Today's Marine is more realistically equipped and clothed than the Marine of the "Old Corps." I feel that we are much better off today insofar as clothing and equipment is concerned. Sticking in my mind's eye forever will be the picture of a young private going to his Plan "A" defense position on Soochow Creek in Shanghai during the '37 trouble with pressed khaki, eyelet shined leggings, shined shoes and field scarf. Many an old timer can clearly remember the miseries of the cumbersome heavy marching order, the ever-present leggings, the white-aced belts which always fouled up the blue blouse, the nickel-plated iron kellys, bayonets and mess gear. Other impractical items were the khaki blouse, the undyed shoes and cap visors, the one-piece blue and green barracks caps with a frame only for white and khaki covers and all blouses tailored to restrict movement of arms and shoulders to a point where it was difficult to do the manual of arms. Many Marines can

remember items of years ago that we could re-adopt to an advantage to improve appearance and comfort. Among these items, two which would surely be thought of are the old campaign hat and the fair leather belt.

Today's Marine, for the most part, is better administered. The system of transfer, promotion and assignment from the point of view of the writer seems fairer and more conducive to a well-rounded Marine Corps career. Gone are the days when an individual could stay at his favorite post or station year after year while his counterpart shifted from one FMF billet to another. Also gone are the days when the Sergeant Major's favorite clerk got one promotion after another by virtue of the fact that he was in the right spot all of the time. Now he, and all the rest of the men in his rank, take their tests the same day and their tests compiled by Headquarters Marine Corps. If he does not know what he is supposed to know, he will not be promoted. As a result of these new administrative procedures and the far-reaching Headquarters Marine Corps Training Directives, there is disappearing from our ranks the pot bellied, beer drinking, loud mouthed senior noncommissioned officer whom we used to see holding down the planks in many of the better duty stations. Today we are finding a different breed of senior noncom—leaner, harder, quieter but more forceful and more at home in the varied types of duty assignments that Marines of the present day fill. There are many Marines from the highest to the lowest who are glad to see the demise of this obnoxious individual.

The above listed items are some of the improvements that have come to the writer's attention. There are


undoubtedly many more, some of which are even more important than the ones mentioned, others of less importance which should have been mentioned with one of the above groupings. Now let's have a look at the other side of the ledger for *this* is the important side. This is the side from which we will select the good things that we have let die or fade away. These are the features that we want to revive and place along side the fine things of the present-day outfit to make the Marine Corps an even better organization.

First, and most important, is the fact that we don't have as much spirit as we used to have. Reams and reams have been written about morale. Countless have been the spoken words on *esprit de corps*. All military leaders realize this is the preponderant intangible that means so much, both in the fulfillment of a combat mission or in the everyday accomplishment of a less colorful job. The great captains from Alexander on down to Rommel went to everlasting pains to foster this necessary ingredient to a better military organization. We must write and we must talk about, and we must practice the things that promote *esprit de corps*. This is not a weapon that we can buy with millions of dollars of the taxpayers' money. This means much more but costs much less. The only expenditure that is required to keep this weapon ever shining and ready in the hand, head and heart of the operating Marine is, that every leader from the corporal to the Commandant avail himself of every opportunity to point out to the Marines around him that they are Marines, that they are the best, they must look the best and act the best at all times.



MSgt C. V. Crumb after serving the Corps for 20 years with distinction both as an officer and enlisted man has transferred to the Fleet Marine Corps Reserve. He was commissioned in 1944 after 8 years' enlisted service and resigned in 1946 to re-enlist as a master sergeant. A contributor to the Gazette for many years, MSgt Crumb has had almost every type of duty the Marine Corps has to offer; recruiting, NROTC, China (before and after WWII), MCAS, depot of supplies, HQMC and most FMF type duties. His last tour was NCO in charge of Technique of Military Instruction Section, 1st MarDiv Schools, Camp Pendleton, Calif.

Prior to joining the Corps he taught in the public schools of Freeborn County, Minnesota for 2 years. Now living in Milford, Delaware Mr. Crumb has not given any clue as to what he intends to do as a retired Marine.



This job was, in the "Old Corps," the particular forte of the junior noncommissioned officer. In my early years of service, corporals and sergeants were continually heard to say "Stand up like a Marine," "Hold that rifle like a Marine," "March like a Marine," "Act like a Marine while on leave or liberty," "Shoot like a Marine," "Fight like a Marine." On rare occasions, and probably one of the proudest days of some young Marine's life, you might hear, "By God, lad, I believe you will really be a Marine some day." This was the particular job of the junior noncommissioned officer, let's put it into his hands again. But first we, the senior noncoms and the company grade officer, are going to have to show, by example and conduct, the way.

Earlier we said our present-day Marine was better educated academically. This attests only to the number and excellence of our formal schools. I believe the training schedules of the old days were more realistic and more conducive to the promotion of the squared-away type Marine that we are constantly striv-

ing for. The Marine of the "Old Corps" was generally not required to be in two places at the same time. In the event of a scheduled inspection or formation, the "Old Corps" Marine was given time to get ready and he was expected to be ready and nothing less than his best was accepted. Today we expect him to do too much and as a result we are forced to accept something that is not his best. Forty hours a week of field training week after week for a regular FMF unit is an unrealistic training schedule and does not achieve the desired results. Parades, ceremonies and inspections have been found, after centuries of trial and error, to be necessary elements in the promotion of *esprit de corps* of a unit and maintenance of their equipment.

To get the most out of these activities Marines must be given a reasonable amount of time to prepare. It seems during the years of service this writer spent in the ranks, the company commander would hold a company formation for almost any occasion. The issuing of a Good Conduct Medal, or the delivery of an MCI diploma were reasons to call a man out in front of his company and be pointed out as a Marine who was making headway in his chosen profession. The delivery of a warrant for promotion was always a reason for a formation and the occasion for a congratulatory word or two from the company commander. A tight regimental and battalion field training schedule obviates the possibility of the proper number of company-level and battalion level parades, reviews, ceremonies and inspections which are so vital in producing a squared away unit. Let's work for training schedules that will provide time for these activities.

Earlier we said that generally there has been an improvement in the uniform and equipment normally used by the individual Marine. However, there is a feature of the uniform improvement that will have to be considered on the other side of the ledger. In the "Old Corps" each Marine had set aside on his account a uniform allowance. The allowance for a first enlistment was greater than for succeeding enlistments; however, the Marine did not

draw this money until the end of his enlistment. If he needed to replace an item of uniform clothing that had been lost or worn he had merely to go down and draw it on the day set aside for his unit and the cost of the item or items was debited his allowance. This obviated the cry we now hear when a Marine is directed to replace an item of uniform clothing: "But, Sir, I won't have any money until next pay day." The clothing allowance was of a sufficient amount so that a man who was reasonably careful with his clothing could clothe himself personally and in accordance with requirements and still have a nice lump sum payment at the end of his enlistment. For the reasons pointed out I think the old system was better than the present one. While on the subject of uniform clothing it is felt that there have been too many uniform changes. A reader will say, "How could there be the improvement you mentioned without the changes?" This is very true, however, there have been changes that seem to have occurred just for the sake of change—for example, the adoption of the khaki jacket and its subsequent timely demise; the trial of the jackets, winter service; the indecision of the scarf and a few others. These experiments, which did not seem to occur so often in the "Old Corps" cost the Marine and the Marine Corps much in monetary values alone. The confusion brought about by these changes undoubtedly cost more in the less definable values of loss of *esprit de corps* that resulted from fouled up formations and added housekeeping duties of the individual Marine when he had to maintain 2 items for one purpose and half the time not knowing which was the proper item of clothing at what place.

The "Old Corps" was more economy-minded than our present-day organization. In the past when the existence of the Marine Corps as a combat outfit was threatened, the Commandant has always been able to point out that the Marine Corps has been able to do more with the taxpayer's defense dollar than any other organization. We must keep it so. This means that leaders at all levels must be economy-minded both in the use and maintenance of our

equipment. When the writer entered the Marine Corps in the mid-'30s he found the normal means of transportation for the troops was their own two feet, but when they did ride it was on the old "Wobbly," the hard rubber tired, front wheel chain-drive "Mac" truck of World War I vintage. How many 18-year-old vehicles are in use in the Marine Corps today? It has often been said by the old timers, "We didn't have much, but we took care of what we had." There is more truth than poetry in that. The Marines of the "Old Corps" are the ones who were reared through the lean years. The men in the ranks of today have known no such days as the "\$17.80-a-month Private." The looseness that we find in regard to the care and custody of clothing and equipment is a natural result of the young Marine now in the ranks being reared during a time of plenty and his junior leaders having cut their Marine Corps teeth during the supply-unconscious days of WW II and Korea. We must clamp down on this looseness for 2 reasons; namely, it's expensive and it leads toward careless attitudes in other fields of endeavor. Let's restore the "Old Corps" hard boiled policies on the use, maintenance and custody of personal and public property. It's good for the taxpayers with whom most of us are numbered and its good for discipline.

The men of the "Old Corps" knew their jobs. Admittedly today's Marine Corps is much more complicated, but to compensate for this change we have more formal instruction. There seems to be a lack of the impelling force that used to exist to induce a Marine to know his job. He took an immense amount of pride in the fact that you could not "stump" him when it came to the performance of the particular job he was assigned to. Sergeants Major and First Sergeants took pride in being able to quote chapters from the Marine Corps Manual. Gunnery Sergeants fired the water cooled machine guns using the "tap and turn" system for searching and traverse. During my years of service prior to the buildup for WW II it was not at all unusual to find groups of privates gathered around a machine gun or a BAR

after night chow working on nomenclature, field stripping, disassembly and reassembly blindfolded, etc. How many times will you find these things happening today? Hardly ever, the reason being the fact that some Marines would rather take a chance of not knowing their jobs than to put out a little extra work. The time has come when we must, by conduct and example, show that it is necessary for each Marine to know his job and that it is a matter of personal pride to be able to discharge the various duties which make up his billet with proficiency and expediency.

Last, but not least, Marines of the "Old Corps" seemed to accept responsibility more readily. Many Marines of noncommissioned rank are often heard moaning about their loss of prestige, yet these same individuals are the ones who permit non-rated Marines who work for them to be out of uniform, disregard the rules of military courtesy and generally not perform as they should. The same individuals, when approached for a decision, will pass the question on to the next higher echelon. This shortcoming is not confined to the junior noncommissioned grades but is sometimes found to exist among the Staff NCO grades and even higher. Let's accept responsibility, let's supervise and correct, let's make decisions and our prestige will return automatically.

This concludes the listing of "Old Corps" advantages. Most of the old timers will be able to think of many more, but the above listed are the ones that the writer is reminded of

most frequently.

Another feature of this problem is the fact that we are rapidly approaching the time when the last of the "Old Corps" or the peace-time trained Marines will disappear from the scene. There will remain for another 10 years some of the senior officers, but the NCOs and the temporary officers who have been promoted up from the ranks of that era are fast disappearing and the next 4 years will see the passing of all but a small number who stay for more than their 20. If all these fine aspects of the Old Corps are allowed to die with them it might hurt the Marine Corps more than we now suspect. All of us who are about to leave the active Marine Corps are concerned about the future. The future of the Marine Corps, as we know it, will be assured if each and every leader will study and work unceasingly to put into practice the elements of outstanding leadership. Above all, we must promote and maintain the *esprit de corps* at all levels in all commands and throughout the accomplishment of whatever mission we may be assigned. The spirit of Archibald Henderson, Dan Daley, John Quick, Smedley Butler, "Ches-ty" Puller, John Basilone, "Red Mike" Edson and scores of others whose names have become household words, plus the spirit of all the unheralded Marines who went out and performed their assigned missions with the efficiency and dispatch of a real Marine, must be carried on or the Marine Corps will lose its mark of excellence and relegate itself to mediocrity.

US MC





... it is entirely natural that the Soviet Union, being a great seapower, must devote corresponding attention to its naval fleet. . ."

Zhukov, Soviet Minister of Defense

By Col J. D. Hittle

☛ "THE SOVIET NAVAL BUILD-UP IS the most significant development in the Soviet grand strategy since World War II."

So testified Adm Arleigh A. Burke before the US Senate Armed Services Committee on 28 February 1956. Such a statement by the Chief of Naval Operations certainly provides abundant reason for a closer look at the burgeoning naval strength of the Soviet Union. Although some Western naval leaders have become acutely aware of the new Russian sea power, it is only realistic to recognize that this "most significant development in Soviet postwar strategy" has received little more than a perfunctory recognition by the collective military mind of the Western world.

From time to time there have been some press stories and a few popular magazine accounts concerning the growing Russian Navy. Yet, this highly significant feature of Russian strategy has largely been overshadowed by the more spectacular East-West airpower, missile and thermonuclear claims. These, of course, are of profound importance in the determination of power relationships between the Communist and the Free World.

The narrowness of Western strategic thinking does not stem from the great amount of attention it has devoted to Soviet air, missile and thermonuclear achievements and claims, but rather from the all too small amount of concern that Soviet sea power growth has generated in the Western military mind.

The Western world has focused its strategic attention almost exclusively in the skies and in so doing has largely overlooked the seas. This is

not to say that it is wrong to give keen attention to every aspect of East-West airpower competition. In fact, any Western national or international defense program that did not seek to assure air power supremacy would be inviting disaster for the Free World.

Yet, from the standpoint of sound strategic thought, it must be recognized that no one kind of military power constitutes a guarantee of survival in the world struggle. The Red conquest can, in accordance with Communist doctrine, be waged by all the weapons of war and policy. Thus, the strategic flexibility of Communist methods underlines the hazards inherent in any Free World decision to rely upon any one weapon or kind of military power as the "chosen instrument" of Western defense.

Defense against global Communist aggression requires broad-gauged strategic vision that assures against a kind of military thought that operates within only a specific sector of the strategic spectrum.

What has happened is that while the Free World has since the end of World War II been preoccupied with the dramatic, important and intensely competitive fields of high speed, long-range aircraft and thermonuclear explosives, the men in the Kremlin have deliberately and swiftly built up Russian sea power to the point where today it poses gravest threats to the security of the Free World. The Kremlin's success in creating this new naval threat without disturbing the West's almost complete preoccupation with air power competition may well, when the history of these times is written, stand

as the most extensive and fundamental strategic deception in all history. What the new Soviet sea power has done in a relatively few years to the West's power position is not pleasant to contemplate. Consider, for instance, the following long range historical implication:

From the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588 until WWII—over three centuries—England ruled the seas, holding unquestioned first rank among the world sea powers. By the end of WWII England had passed sea power supremacy to the United States. Yet, in terms of world power relationships, a virtual sea power monopoly was vested in the Free World while the United States was the first, and England was the second, ranking sea power. Russia in WWII was of little consequence as a factor in the world sea power arena. But in the relatively few years since WWII British naval strength has been surpassed by that of the Soviet Union, which has at least numerically become the second ranking naval power.

When it is realized that the rise of the Russian Navy has not only destroyed the West's postwar sea power monopoly, but also now poses a critical challenge even to our control of the seas, the full import of Adm Burke's statement on the significance of Soviet naval power becomes clearly evident.

But, there is much more involved than the basic fact of rapid and continuing growth of the Soviet Navy and the recognition of its numerical position as the second ranking sea power. Because of the vastness of its scope and fundamental influence it has on world strategy, the Soviet sea

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power program presents an intriguing and illuminating subject for analysis. Examination of the reasons behind this new Soviet sea power should give further insight into the policies and objectives of the Soviet leadership which has not forsaken the goal of world domination.

It is only realistic to recognize that the major features of Soviet policy, and particularly military policy, usually are the products of cold calculation and evaluation in terms of Soviet objectives and methods. It is highly unlikely that the present naval program, involving such heavy investment in material and technological skill, would be adopted and followed if it did not further Communist interest in the world power-struggle. Thus, the present Soviet naval program can hardly be the result of a hasty decision or strategic caprice.

What, then, are the strategic implications and Communist policy clues inherent in the new Soviet sea power?

To begin with, the fundamental nature of the Russian naval forces warrants attention. Basically, the Soviet fleet is built around an unprecedented submarine force, plus cruisers, a large proportion of destroyers and a strong shore-based naval air arm.

Soviet submarine strength is authoritatively estimated to total 400. Secretary of the Navy Charles Thomas emphasized the significance of this number of Soviet submarines by pointing out to the Senate Armed Services Committee: "The Nazis at the start of World War II had only 57 submarines and at one time we thought we might lose the war. . . . Today the Soviets have not 57, but 400. They are good ones."

As to cruisers, it is estimated that the Russian Navy has 24 with 6 more *Sverdlov* class under construction. According to recent reports, current Soviet cruiser construction has been temporarily suspended in order to change the main ordnance from guns to missiles. Destroyers total about 150, of which 50 were completed since WWII. Soviet naval aviation is estimated to amount to about 4,000 planes.

These strength estimates of principal Soviet naval types suffice to indicate the basic structure of the Red Fleet. It is readily apparent that the

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sea-going backbone of Russian naval strength is the submarine fleet. Cruisers and destroyers constitute some additional versatility as does the large shore-based naval aviation.

In essence, this is a fleet created for specific purposes. That purpose is to deny the Western World — in the final analysis this means the United States — control of the high seas, and particularly the approaches to USSR.

If it is correct to assume that a prime purpose of Soviet naval power is the *denial* rather than control of the seas, then it follows that the Kremlin policy makers have made an interesting appraisal of the Free World's strategic position. Such Soviet assessment of the Free World's military position indicates a clear recognition of the geographic fact that the common denominator of the nations still outside the Red orbit is their final dependence on the sea for peace-time trade and wartime survival. Indeed, there is sound geographic reasoning behind the assertion that the Free World is economically and militarily an "Oceanic Confederation."

It is precisely against this Free World dependence on the sea that Soviet strategy has pointed its new and still increasing naval power.

Apparently the Kremlin has further reasoned that the maritime character of the non-Communist oceanic confederation poses widely differing wartime naval requirements for the United States and the Soviet Union.

From the standpoint of the United States there is a vital need and obligation to assure the continued use of sea lanes for transport of men and material to our allies, and the import by this country of critical strategic raw materials necessary for wartime industrial consumption. This situation imposes on the United States the naval task of maintaining con-

trol of the seas in order to *use* the seas. This is in direct contrast with the Soviet sea power requirement which would be to *deny* US control and use of the seas. In any warfare, land, sea or air, it is generally a less difficult task to *deny* than it is to *control* and *utilize*.

Denial is a negative act, while the act of control and use is positive in nature. The reason for the unprecedented emphasis on submarines, complemented by fast cruisers and destroyers, in the Soviet scheme of warfare becomes understandable. It is a fleet designed to deny rather than control the seas. It is the kind of fleet that stems from Soviet recognition that it is the sea lanes that bind together the non-Communist nations. It is for the wartime purpose of severing those sea lane sinews of the Free World that the new Soviet sea power has been created.

Closely allied with the denial mission of the Soviet Navy is the mission of helping defend against the projection of United States sea power into the Eurasian land mass. The peculiar composition of Soviet naval power is highly appropriate to the mission of defense. Not only is a submarine fleet especially useful for the defensive role, but the shore-based air arm would contribute to the prosecution of the Navy's defensive mission by providing air action co-ordinated with naval action over the sea approaches.

The peculiar composition of the Soviet fleet, designed for the dual denial-defensive missions, provides also a limited offensive capability in connection with furthering the land advance of Communism. This offensive mission is the protection of the sea-flank of the Soviet armies. Actually such a limited offensive capability is not, in terms of Soviet military thought, a restraining or inadequate contribution, for Russian strategic doctrine has, both under the Tsars

and the Soviets, viewed the protection of the army's sea flank to be a proper role of the navy.

This historic role of Russian sea forces is, of course, not only an expression of Russia's recognition that her power-base is land oriented, but it is also highly appropriate for the seaward protection of Communism's great enveloping sweep of Eurasia. That sweep, beginning in Manchuria in 1946 has proceeded southward and westward around the Pacific rim of Asia and, as such, constitutes the largest scale strategic flanking movement in all history. The development of the present naval force designed to protect that sea flank is from the Communist standpoint conveniently timed, as the advance spearheads of the envelopment have reached Southeast Asia, an area historically sensitive to sea power.

Viewed in terms of Soviet grand strategy, the function of the Red Fleet in protecting the sea flank of the Communist advance around the Western rim of the Pacific is an offensive and yet, in the narrower sense, such a protective naval mission is, operationally, essentially defensive in character. The same kind of a fleet as is designed for the denial-defensive role is appropriate for the job of protecting Communism's sea flank in Asia.

Such a role for the Soviet naval forces in the Pacific presents the problem of bases. Aside from Vladivostok there is no major Soviet naval base on Russia's Pacific littoral. Need of bases for the southward projection of Soviet naval power is apparently being answered through agreement with the Red Chinese government for Soviet use of Chinese Pacific ports. In spite of the highly propagandized Soviet turn-over of Port Arthur to the Mao regime, there is, significantly, no evidence that in relinquishing control of that base the Russian government is being deprived of use of Port Arthur for elements of the Soviet Pacific Fleet.

Also of significance are the reports that Soviet naval units have been accorded use of facilities at Tsingtao and Shanghai.

Such Sino-Soviet accord with respect to exploitation of Russian naval power in the Western Pacific underlines and strengthens the role of the Soviet Navy as the intended protector of Communism's Pacific flank. Also, such utilization of Red Chinese bases is necessary to the Red fleet's functions of denying US use of Western and Southeast Pacific sea lanes and defense of the sea approaches to Eastern Eurasia. The creation of a Communist controlled China, economically, ideologically and militarily aligned with the Soviet Union is the most significant achievement of Red Russia's master plan of Communist expansion and conquest. Sino-Soviet recognition of the strategic fact that mainland China would be particularly vulnerable to Western sea power in event of hostilities provides further incentive for Sino-Soviet co-operation for the use of Russian sea power in Pacific Asia.

This post-WWII emergence of the Soviet Navy in the Far East is already profoundly affecting the Free World's position in the Pacific sea power arena. Indicative of the impact it has made on our strategic position is the statement of Adm Robert B. Carney, just prior to his recent retirement as CNO: "We no longer have a monopoly on strength at sea in the Pacific." This statement deserves the most thoughtful consideration. Its implications are alarming and meaningful in terms of the security of the Free World. The loss of our sea power monopoly in the Pacific Basin is a strategic development of transcendent importance to the United States. Such a development is seen in clearer perspective when it is remembered that a cardinal feature of US policy has been the sea power control of the Pacific. In fact, one of the key underlying rea-

sons for war with Japan was Japan's challenge of US control of the Western Pacific.

Soviet effort to establish arctic sea routes from the White Sea around the northern rim of the Soviet Union to the Pacific is directly related to Russian naval growth. Such arctic routes have limited use, for available information indicates that the Arctic passage can be made during only 2 months each year. Yet, use of the arctic routes for 2 months per year contributes both flexibility and protection to the Soviet naval forces. By using the arctic sea lane, Red Fleet units might be transferred to and from the Pacific without hazarding the longer travel and exposure to Free World sea power that would accompany Soviet use of the conventional Europe to Pacific route via Gibraltar and the Mediterranean, the Suez, the Indian Ocean and finally the Southeast Asian sea power funnels that control the eastern entrances into the Western Pacific.

Thus, it can be readily seen that Soviet emphasis on new and more powerful ice breakers and greater meteorological activity in the North is not all in the interest of pure science. To the extent that Russia can use the arctic sea lane, then to that extent Russia has a "covered route of approach" for her naval units to the Pacific Basin.

Also, it is worth noting that the Russian use of Chinese mainland bases for the southward extension of Soviet sea power has real precedent. The current Sino-Soviet arrangement parallels and, in an historical sense, continues the "secret" provisions of the famous Li-Labanov agreement of 1896. One of the secret clauses of that diplomatic instrument granted Russia's naval units use of Chinese Yellow Sea ports. Parenthetically, it should be observed that the methods and objectives of Soviet expansion in Asia have much in



common with the imperialism of Tsarist Russia.

Just as the composition of the new Soviet Navy provides clues as to its strategic employment in event of war, the simple fact that Russia has, at great effort, created a large Navy casts further light on the nature of Soviet strategic thinking as to the possibility of an all out East-West war and its character if it should happen. Following are possible lines of Soviet strategic thinking regarding all-out war as reflected in the decision to create the new Soviet Navy:

a) That thermonuclear weapons have brought the world to the threshold of atomic stalemate and that long-range missiles with thermonuclear war heads will push the world across that threshold. If this belief should prove correct, then an East-West war would, of necessity, be waged by means less than a thermonuclear exchange. In such an eventuality, sea power would play a major role.

b) That, if through gross miscalculation, an all-out East-West war should break out, the initial thermonuclear exchange would result in a vast exchange of destruction with each side's air bases, missile launching sites and strategic land based aircraft destroyed, neutralized or drastically reduced in a matter of hours. Accordingly, Soviet strategic thought

may well have recognized that the margin of victory may depend on the combat capabilities of fleet units at sea, and hence not pin-pointed and destroyed in the initial thermonuclear exchange. Missile-launching naval vessels, particularly submarines, would, in such a situation, play a critically important, perhaps decisive, role. The huge and still rapidly expanding Soviet submarine fleet reflects Russian awareness of such a possible war development. Also, recent reports that the Soviet Navy has developed equipment and techniques for submerged launching of missiles indicates Soviet attention to such a role for the Red Navy's submarines.

c) That, after the initial and indecisive thermonuclear exchange a war of attrition would follow. Not only would the Red Navy have the missile launching tasks just mentioned, but a war of attrition would be characterized by the Soviet Navy's attempt to execute the dual denial-defensive role discussed above. Free World victory and survival would hinge on Western ability to persevere through a vicious oceanic struggle for control of the seas.

It appears, consequently, that Soviet grand strategy visualizes multiple tasks for the Red Navy in event of a general East-West war. The primary task would be to perform the denial-defensive mission. In addition,

special elements of the submarine fleet would have a missile-firing role. Ancillary missions, all closely related to the denial-defensive role, would include surface and land-based naval air protection for amphibious moves against Free World positions on the Eurasian littoral, and harassing and feinting maneuvers by cruiser and destroyer forces.


➤ **THUS FAR** we have centered our attention on the war-time implications of Soviet naval power. While there can be little doubt as to the importance the Kremlin attaches to the Red Navy's role in the event of general war, it is highly possible, perhaps probable, that Kremlin strategy envisions for the Red Navy a long range "peace time" mission that eclipses even the critically important roles with which it would be charged in war.


It is in connection with the Khrushchev-Zhukov switch from Stalin belligerency to the "new look" of sweetness and co-operation which indicates a belief that the Red aggression will be more effectually continued by means less than general war.

It is evident that the Soviet leadership has concluded that the armed strength of the Free World requires a change in Communist tactics. In keeping with Communist doctrine for prosecuting the world conquest, a new emphasis is currently being placed on trade as the weapon of Red conquest. Soviet trade has very fundamental purposes as an instrument for strengthening and advancing the cause of world domination:

It is being used to bind China and the Asian and European Red satellites to the Soviet Union, thus forming a tight-knit economic bloc, the heart of which is the Soviet Union. Such shrewd employment of trade as an instrument of foreign policy reflects Russian recognition of the oft-repeated historical fact that "the flag follows the trade."

Ever since the end of WWII the Soviet Union has been diligently constructing a Communist economic bloc by means of direct trade agreements between Russia and the other Communist-controlled nations supplemented by trade agreements between the satellites themselves. Not only has this policy provided for ex-





change of goods, but it has been furthered and implemented by an aggressive program for construction of rail lines that tie Chinese communications into the Soviet controlled Trans-Siberian and Turk-Sib lines.

Thus by communications and trade Russia binds together the Communist world and seeks to entice neutrals into it. Nor is it an accident that the commercial and communications center of the Communist world is the Soviet Union.

As a result of the Communist world's commercial and communication focus on the Soviet Union, this vast Red economic, military and political bloc is oriented toward inner Eurasia and away from the seas.

However, the exact opposite strategic orientation occurs when Soviet power tactics place emphasis on trade with nations of the non-Communist

bloc. With the possible exception of some nations of Western Europe, significant Soviet trade with the non-Communist countries could be accomplished only by sea transport. Where this Soviet penetration by trade is attempted, the sea lanes become the line of commercial communication.

In the Far East, for example, the Soviet Union is dangling the bait of Communist trade before a Japan hungry for the continental Asian markets she lost by losing WWII. Because Japan is an island nation, trade with Russia and other nations of the Soviet bloc would be by sea.

So, too, would the sea be the critical factor in Red trade with the Philippines, Indonesia, Southeast

and Southern Asia.

All of which emphasizes the geopolitical fact that while the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc she dominates are land-oriented and have their power based on Red control of the Heartland, the rim land and fringing islands of Eurasia are primarily amenable to the influence of sea power. It was this great strategic truth that formed the basis of Nicholas Spykeman's geopolitical thesis that the rimland of Eurasia is separate and distinct from Heartland Eurasia as a world power factor.

Substantiation of Spykeman's concept is found in an analysis of post-WWII Communist expansion. The postwar surge of Red expansion pushed the Communist realm to the geographical borders of land-power Eurasia. In the East, Manchuria, China and parts of Southeast Asia were engulfed. The vast deserts and mountain ranges in the South blunted the Red expansion. In the West the tier of states comprising Europe's historic "shatter-shield" occupies the European area most remote from the sea and hence most vulnerable to Soviet land power. As for the rest of Europe there were certainly other major factors that strengthened their resistance to Red expansion. Yet, there is far more than a cartographic coincidence in the fact that the portions of Europe preserved from Communist domination were those furthest from the center of Communist land power and, conversely, the closest to the maritime influence.

The present problem of US base facilities in Iceland has a direct relationship to the Soviet Union's current trade and sea power policies.

As WWII so clearly demonstrated, Iceland strategically dominates the North Atlantic sea lanes. Use of Icelandic bases is vitally necessary for the protection of US-European convoys against an enemy possessing a significant air, surface or submarine capability. There can be no doubt but that Allied possession and exploitation of Icelandic bases was of crucial importance in achieving eventual victory over the German wolfpacks, air and surface raiders.

Obviously the Kremlin planners have accurately gauged Iceland's indispensable wartime role in preserving the Free World's use of the North Atlantic convoy routes. To prevent US or NATO use of Icelandic bases would be a victory of first magnitude for the Communist strategy of splitting the Free World by denying it use of the seas in event of war.

The method by which the Communist planners have sought to effect the dislodgement of US forces from Iceland illustrates the current Communist use of trade and economic influence as means of trying to improve the Soviet Union's sea power position.

Five years ago the Communist block was, at best, an insignificant part of Icelandic export market. In 1952 Britain was buying a large portion of Iceland's annual fish catch. Suddenly, the British market was closed to Iceland fish. This posed a grave economic problem for Iceland, as fish is its only significant cash product.

This was a situation which world Communism felt it could exploit by using Red trade as a weapon. The result is that today the Red bloc is a major buyer of Icelandic fish and Russia accounts for almost 40 percent of Iceland's foreign trade.

Again the world has a persuasive example of how cultural and even political relationships are influenced by commerce. It is certainly not by coincidence that, as the *New York Times* recently reported, there are 20 Communist propaganda publications in Iceland (total population 158,000), and they include a wide

range of subject matter "from newspapers to comic books and philosophical treatises," covering every element of the Icelandic population. Nor can it be mere coincidence that the issue of US bases has become acute since the Soviet Union has become such a large factor in Iceland's economy.

Thus the situation in Iceland serves as a potent example of how the Soviet Union is using trade in an attempt to weaken the Free World's sea power potential and, in turn, to enhance the relative position of Russian sea power. It would appear that Soviet strategists have not forgotten that although the Allies in WWII possessed the Icelandic bases, a German Navy that entered the war with a total of 57 submarines came precariously close to severing the sea lanes on which our European allies were dependent for survival.

The Free World must not forget how narrow in WWII was the margin of victory in the North Atlantic. Neither can the Free World forget that the Soviet Navy's submarine fleet today surpasses many times the total of Hitler's undersea craft on the eve of WWII.

Just as the Free World is an oceanic confederation, so, also is NATO, in essence, a maritime alliance. Thus, from Japan in the Pacific around Asia to the Near East, Africa, the Mediterranean world, the North Atlantic and on to Latin America, the influence of Soviet trade can be brought to bear only by the sea.

Western Europe, with its well developed rail net, is not isolated by great geographical barriers from the Soviet Union, and could conceivably trade by land routes with the Communist nations. Yet, Western European orientation has been and still is toward the west and the sea.

Elsewhere the sea, again, has served as a vast moat defending the Australian and American continents against the dynamic overland expansion of Communism.

Thus, the inwardness of the highly propagandized Red switch from cannon and tirade to commerce and trade becomes more logical. It has become clear to the Kremlin that the Red conquest of the world had pretty well expanded to its land-

power limits. In so doing, Communist land power was restrained by the historic barriers dividing the fringing islands and the rimland from Heartland Eurasia.

However, it must be realized that trade as a weapon of Red conquest is not a complete innovation, for Soviet Russia has long used trade as an instrument of her policy. The present significance of Red trade lies in the new emphasis being placed upon it as, apparently, currently the primary weapon of Communist aggression.

With so much gained for Communism in so relatively short a time, it appears that the Soviet leadership, following Red teachings on flexibility of weapons and tactics, has rejected the risks of an all-out war and decided to continue the aggression by the slower yet less risky process of attempted penetration and absorption through trade.

Thus, the long range Kremlin planners could hardly have failed to recognize that the Red "Trojan Horse of Trade" could be delivered within the citadel of the Free World only by sea. Whatever the Soviet leaders may be, they are not blind to history. If history teaches any object lesson it is this: a nation that wishes maritime commerce must have naval power to go with it. Once again, from the viewpoint of Soviet strategy, there is reason rather than caprice behind the sea power rise of the Soviet Union. Whether it is by coincidence or the result of precise long-range calculation the recent tactical switch to conquest by commercial enticement is certainly well attuned to Russia's emergence as the world's second sea power.

However, in regard to protection of trade as it was in connection with combat missions, the Soviet Navy is unbalanced and hence specialized. Such a navy, designed for a war task of denying the US control and use of the high seas and defending the sea approaches to Eurasia, would not have, in general war, the capability of controlling the high seas for Communist overseas trade.

Consequently, it would seem that under conditions short of war the Red Navy would serve as a potent indicator of Russia's interest in maritime affairs and a reminder that her sea commerce is not without

naval back-up. There is no doubt but what a show of the Hammer and Sickle by the new *Sverdlov* cruisers and the fast new Soviet destroyers would make an impression on the peoples of maritime Asia and the Mediterranean littoral who have been thoroughly sensitized to the influence of sea power. The naval showing of the flag is still one of the most formidable weapons in psychological warfare.

The imbalance and specialized capabilities of the Soviet Navy give another clue to Russian strategy and tactics in event of general war. From the Soviet viewpoint the Red Navy, by protecting the Eurasian littoral against approach by Free World naval power, would at the same time be protecting sea transport in Eurasia's peripheral waters. It would therefore appear that Soviet strategy does not plan on automatic relinquishment in war of the rimland trade she hopes to build up in peace.

Because the Soviet Navy is designed to sever US sea lanes to the nations of the Free World, it is only realistic to assume that the Communist trade program will be accompanied by propaganda serving to remind those distant Free World allies as to the alleged Soviet capability of cutting them off from US military and economic support in event of war. Such propaganda, whether blatant or subtle, would seek to dampen enthusiasm for such nations becoming irretrievably and exclusively dependent upon free world trade and US sea power.

The alternative, for such nations, would be readily apparent from the Soviet view: to "hedge" against isolation from the United States by trade with the Communist bloc. Once any Free Nations took the bait, they would, in the Communist scheme of things be "hooked," and the pull of trade coupled with internal Communist pressures, would gradually gravitate them toward the Red orbit.

One thing should be evident. The growth of Soviet sea power will continue to alter drastically East-West power relationships. Without doubt, Soviet naval power confronts the Free World, and therefore the United States, with a most fundamental problem and challenge.

The solution to this new situation is neither small or simple. Among other things, it requires a new awakening in this country to our dependence on sea power. Our naval victories in WWII have lulled too many of our citizens into a complacent belief in continued and unchallenged sea supremacy. There should be some kind of a lesson in the fact that man's history is littered with the wreckage of nations which complacently assumed, rather than alertly assuring, their sea power supremacy.

Too many have forgotten we are, in final analysis, an island nation whose survival depends on the control and use of the seas. The denial of the seas would mean the isolation of America and the death of the Free World.

In meeting this growing challenge there must be no panicked effort to match the Soviet Navy ship-for-ship. This would be as wrong as contending we should match the armies of Communism on a man-for-man basis.

The task of the United States to control and use the seas requires a far different kind of Navy than that which the Soviet Union has created to deny us use of the seas. If general war should come, the US Navy, in establishing control of the seas, will have to move over great distances and come to grips with the adversary. To do this, to persevere through to victory over a specialized—and hence an imbalanced Soviet Navy—would require all the

tools of naval warfare: surface, sub-surface, carriers, naval aviation and amphibious forces.

A general conflict against Communist aggression would demand the conduct of naval campaigns that in scope and diversity would far surpass even the vastness of such naval activities in WWII. The combatant self-sufficiency and versatility required for such a kind of naval warfare could be provided only by well balanced naval power, capable of fighting not only *at sea* but also capable of projecting our national military power *from the sea* against land targets. In short, the answer to *specialized* Red naval power is *balanced* US naval power.

Fortunately US development of and adherence to the "balanced fleet" concept provides precisely the very organizational structure and philosophy on which the necessary naval progress can be based. Effort for greater US naval power must be sizeable and continuing, for the challenge of Soviet sea power is here and the margin of our superiority is narrowing. As a nation we have the basic foundation on which to erect the naval structure that will retain and widen the margin of our sea power supremacy.

The magnitude of the task will make it very expensive. Yet, the expense of not assuring unquestioned sea power supremacy will be incalculably greater.

Sea power has not yet relinquished its historic role as the final arbiter among nations.

US MC



UNIFORM:

THE WHY AND THE WHEREFORE

Text and illustrations
Reginald Hargreaves

A NUMBER OF CONTRIBUTIONS and comments have appeared in the GAZETTE on the ever-controversial subject of uniform; all of them stimulating and many of them constructive. Even so, there are certain aspects of the subject which so far appear to have escaped attention; and on these perhaps it might not be irrelevant to enlarge.

As a preliminary, it is not without value to recall the purposes for which uniform was first designed and adopted. Its original aims were quite explicit — to identify the wearer in close combat and at the same time to afford him protection in action. It was for these reasons that the first attempts to establish a uniform dress were concentrated on body armor (protection) and easily discernible helmet plumes (identification).

The outfit of a Roman Legionary, for example, consisted of a crested metal helmet, cuirass, leather belt with 3 overhanging, metal-studded ends and sometimes a single greave, or shinguard, on the right leg. His weapons consisted of a short sword, dagger and pilum, or heavy javelin, and he carried a convex, protective shield. Under the cuirass he wore a russet-colored tunic differing little in appearance and cut from that affected by mechanics or workmen, while his woolen or leather breeches resembled those in general wear under the flowing civilian toga. His boots, although stronger and heavier, were of similar pattern to those normally seen about the streets. Superior Officers wore an elaborate cuirass moulded to the body, a more generous display of plumes and more richly ornamental weapons. Otherwise they were distinguished by no distinctly military attire that would qualify as uniform. In effect, the Legionary's under-garb closely resembled ordinary civilian



The Roman Legions: identification the basic feature. Legionary (left), Standard bearer (center), Signum of the Legion (above), Tribune (right)

dress, and it was his accoutrements only which stamped him as a fighting-man; unit identification being a matter of the color of the plumes in the helmet crest, or the particular shape of the crest itself.

One of Rome's deadliest enemies, the Carthaginian general, Hannibal, is said to have had several cohorts arrayed in a definite uniform of crimson and white beneath their protective armor. But with his

death all attempts at standardizing the soldier's or sailor's dress, as apart from his equipment, were promptly abandoned.

With the fall of Rome, the motley "robber baron" type of fighting force that sprang up all over medieval Europe made no attempt even at the standardization of equipment, let alone at uniformity of garb. Men came to the fray armed, equipped and dressed as their fancy dictated

or the length of their purses allowed; for each man was responsible for turning himself out for action; there was no official agency for providing him with either clothes or weapons.

Steel helmets and body armor having the effect of rendering their wearers dangerously anonymous in the heat of a fight, the custom arose of adopting some personal device—a beast of the chase, a bird, a spur, a clenched fist and so on—painted on their shields and reproduced on the crests of their helms. A similar badge would be worn by their feudal followers, embroidered on the sleeves of their jerkins. To this was sometimes added what would nowadays be termed a specialist's or tradesman's insignia—a hammer and pincers for the blacksmith-armorers, a wheel and spokeshave for the wheelwright, an arrowhead and feather for the fletcher, or expert in the manufacture and repair of bows and arrows.

Sometimes a body of men from the same district would display a regional or county badge. Such was the red rose of the Hampshire bowmen at the famous battle of Crécy (1346), or the design of "a redde crosse . . . and the halfe-lyon and the halfe-shippe," which was the especial distinction of the shipmen of the English Cinque Ports, which for many centuries provided the nucleus of England's navy. Crusaders, seamen as well as landmen, wore on their white surcoats a badge of "the arms of St. George before, and another behind," which was the red cross now associated principally with the medical and ambulance services.

The emphasis, however, was still on arms and equipment rather than dress. In the Assize of Arms of 1181 it was laid down that every knight should be in possession of a coat of mail, a helmet, sword, shield and lance; while the minimum an ordinary member of "the rabble of foot" could bring to the field—at his own expense—was a wambais, or doublet padded with cotton, wool or hair, to serve as a protection against sword thrusts, a chaplet (or helmet) of iron and a bill or spear. Nothing, however, was said about dress.

There is a hint of something in the nature of uniform in the reign

of England's Edward III (1327-77), when certain poverty-stricken Welsh levies were called up for the Flanders campaign of 1337. Upon reporting for duty, "so horryd was their nakedness" that speedy orders were given for "gownes of blue all alike" to be run up for them, that common decency might be preserved. But this fleeting attempt to get men into uniform did not in any way create a precedent.

In the reign of Edward IV (1461-83) there is mention of an issue to the troops of a certain number of "frocks of redde, all cut shaplie and of apiece"—i.e. to a uniform pattern. The king also provided a number of his shipmen with uniform "jackettes." Charles VII of France (1422-60), who established the first Standing Army in Europe subsequent to the days of the Romans, saw to it that his *bandes*, as they were termed, maintained a certain uniformity of dress and equipment. In the days of England's Bluff King Hal (Henry VIII, 1509-1547) an amphibious expedition set out from the southeast coast port of Sandwich to go to the support of the Duke of Burgundy in his quarrel with the neighboring Duke of Gelderland. So successful was its efforts, that out of gratitude the Duchess of Burgundy "gaffe (gave) to all of the Englishmen coates of white and greene . . . for the Kyng of England's liverye." For at that time green and white were the national colors. From an economical point of view, however, these gift uniforms were found to soil somewhat easily and quickly; so it was hoped that the recipients would reserve them for high days and holidays, or full-dress ceremonial occasions. But the Tudor seaman had got it into his head that a real good battle was about the highest sort of "high day" there was and worthy of the very best clothing in his possession. So the handsome green and white uniforms were soon filthy and in rags; and it was some time before the King could be persuaded to replace them, in somewhat more durable material.

For Queen Elizabeth's Irish expedition of 1579-83, an order was placed for a substantial number of "cassocks of a sad dark colour, as russet and such-like, and not of so



Medieval era: Armorer (left), Knight (center), Man at Arms (right)

light a colour as blue or redde, which heretofore hath commonly been used"—which sounds remarkably like an intelligent anticipation of khaki.

It was Oliver Cromwell's Parliamentary New Model Army, however, which was the first body of troops to be clothed in a proper standardized uniform throughout. For after certain experiments with coats of "dull orange tawny"—another hint at khaki service dress—all the Roundhead soldiers, Horse, Foot and Artillery, "had new red coats given them, for the terrible name thereof." The principle of uniform, apart from arms and equipment, was at last firmly established. But the best that Parliament's Cavalier opponents could contrive was to adopt rank scarves or sashes, very similar to those in use with the Spanish armies throughout the 12th, 13th and 14th Centuries.

BY THE TIME of the restoration of King Charles II to England's throne (1660) the practice of clothing their respective land forces in "sealed pattern" uniforms had become common to all European countries. The officers and men of the several navies, however, went to sea in garments of their own choice; no uniform being considered necessary for individuals whose liability to have their identities confused with those of the enemy was, in the very nature of things, virtually nonexistent.

The exact reverse was true, of course, with regard to the land forces. With fighting controlled by a single man in a position to keep his eye on the whole of the restricted area of conflict, it was essential that the troops should be clothed in readily identifiable uniforms. Thus, the predominant color favored by the forward English troops — the infantry — was red; with the French and Austrians, white; with the Prussians and Dutch, blue and with the Russians, dark green — under a gray greatcoat. Not that this general rule was without its conflicting exceptions. The regiments of Irish expatriates serving under the lilies of France insisted on being garbed in flaming scarlet from head to toe — even the heels of their shoes being of scarlet-dyed leather. Blue-coated British cavalry and red-coated Gallic Horse added considerably to the risk of confusion; which was enhanced by the swirling smoke that obscured so much of the battlefield. It was for this reason that regimental flags — lineal descendants of the Roman eagles and corps' *signum* and the banners and pennants of medieval days — played so important a part in action. Big enough to be clearly seen and individual enough to be instantly identified, they served to indicate the position of a body of troops to a distant commander, while acting as a rallying point upon which the scattered companies could re-assemble.

In eastern countries, where the dust cloud — thicker, even, than that caused by rolling billows of smoke — obscured practically all visual aids to identification, the "band of music," with its echoing drums and brazen trumpets, served a similar purpose to that of the battle flags of the more western nations. Volume of sound was obviously a first consideration, even afloat; for on one occasion the mid-17th Century Parliamentary General-at-Sea, Edward Popham, sent in a request for his ship to be furnished with "a complete noise."

Early uniform differed from contemporary civilian attire — in days when most men went armed, mostly with the sword — only in being of a standard color and cut, and in possessing certain ornamental adjuncts in the way of gold or silver braid,



18th Century: the influence of Frederick the Great

gilt or silver buttons, and epaulettes. The last-named were a relic of the days of armor, when the neck and shoulder were protected by a curved metal plate known as an *epaulière*. Another small reminder of earlier days was the engraved, half-moon shaped metal plate, worn between the throat and breastbone by officers on duty, and known as the gorget. Fashionable from the middle of the 17th Century to the early part of the 19th, George Washington certainly affected one as a Colonel of Virginia Militia, and the Officers of the Ancient and Honorable Artillery Company of Boston wear one to this day.

By mid-18th Century the navies of the world had followed the example set by the armies, and acquired their own characteristic uniform. In this innovation the British were amongst the last to fall into line. For it was not until 1748 that a committee of naval officers forwarded a memorial to the Lords of the Admiralty, submitting that a standardized uniform should be regarded as "useful and necessary, . . . as well as agreeable to the practice of other nations." The suggestion was sympathetically received; although there was a good deal of controversy as to the colors to be adopted. Red and blue, or blue and red, as representing the contemporary national colors, was the most canvassed suggestion; but the final verdict went to blue and white. For it seems that King George II, observing the Duchess of Bedford riding in the Park in a habit of blue

faced with white, was so taken with it that then and there he determined on this combination for the Navy's uniform.

The men of the Lower Deck were still without any standardized official dress; although their practice of rigging themselves out in garments from the slop-chest, cut more or less on the same pattern, lent their garb a certain uniformity of appearance.

The well-known jumper, with its jean collar, the bell-bottomed trousers and the round cap, were adopted by the British Navy as the uniform for the ratings in 1857. With minor variations, it has been reproduced for wear by virtually every country in possession of a fleet.

Where the land forces were concerned, by the turn of the 18th Century most countries — or at any rate their military tailors — had fallen under the influence of Frederick the Great of Prussia. A martinet of the very first order, and a fanatic believer in the beneficial effect on morale of a perfect turn-out, the faintest smear of pipeclay or a single dirty button sent him into a frenzy; and woe betide the officer or man who deviated by a hairsbreadth from the dress regulations laid down. Needless to say his imitators, in trying to go one better than their model, egregiously overdid it. The wretched soldier was crammed into a tight-waisted, throat-constricting uniform, with his legs encased in long pipe-clayed spatterdashes that absorbed moisture like a sponge, made marching a torture, and put a premium on the development of varicose veins. Furthermore, he was forced to adopt a hair style of monstrous side curls, plastered with grease and heavily powdered, which, were he nominated for guard on the following day, made it impossible for him to lie down properly for his night's rest. Even with the limited army maintained by Britain, the annual consumption of flour for hair powder exceeded 6,500 tons.

UNIFORMS for the Continental Army and Militia that fought the American War of Independence, like everything else, had very largely to be improvised; and not every man achieved a standardized dress — or even wanted one. Daniel Morgan and his famous riflemen were more

than content to put their faith in backwoods hunting garb; a field-kit that Washington himself was known to favor. The uniform of the Connecticut Light Horse, on the other hand, so closely resembled that of the English Dragoons as to create a lot of dangerous confusion. Bland's Dragoons favored blue, faced with red; Bayford's 3d Continental Light Dragoons made a brave show in blue, scarlet and buckskin; the South Carolina Horse, like Pulaski's troopers, plumped for blue and white; while the Governor of Connecticut's Foot Guards, in their yellow-winged, yellow-laced scarlet coats and towering, brass-ornamented bearskin caps, might easily have passed for British Guardsmen. In general, uniforms in green and brown were far more in request than the blue and buff of the Continental rank and file from New York and New Jersey. It was not until March 1779, however, that Congress felt itself in a position to direct the Commander-in-Chief to "fix and prescribe" a uniform common to all the troops; and even then the issue being "governed by the supply," was inadequate to clothe all the men under arms.

The British fought out the war with their traditional red-coated infantry and blue-coated artillery; only the troopers of Tarleton's Legion affecting tunics of "woodman green." With the Hessian auxiliaries, however, there was a body of heavy Horse, dressed and equipped on the usual Teutonic model. With their bulging haversacks, long-skirted coats, enormous canteens, fur caps loaded with ponderous brass ornaments, much hair-powder and pomatum, and long swords weighing over 8 pounds. They were about as appropriately garbed for forcing their way through the quaking swamps and thick-set woods that lay across their path as the White Knight in *Alice in Wonderland*.

Some of the cavalry *corps d'elite* of Napoleon's Imperial Army wore uniforms of almost theatrical brilliance. But the mass of the infantry and ancillary arms were fairly plainly dressed, if hampered by long spatterdashes buttoning right up the leg and overweighted with a heavy bell-topped leather shako and a gargantuan pack.



The French influence: Napoleon III's Grenadier of the Guard (left), Hussar (center), Napoleon I's Chasseur à Cheval (right)

A blazing spectacular uniform calls for a lusty, dashing figure to carry it off successfully. Murat, in his bedizened Hussar dress, was something straight out of comic opera, but he had the stature and panache to "get away with it." Napoleon, a small man with a dumpy figure, had the perception to eschew the gaudy and dress himself in the plain, green-coated uniform of the *Chasseurs à Cheval* of the Imperial Guard, with a severe cocked hat ornamented with nothing more than a tri-colored cockade. He was perfectly well aware that by this restraint he would show up all the more effectively against the gilded popinjays of his glittering staff.

Wellington's Peninsular Army, on the other hand, marched in a lightweight felt shako, with a sensible pack and pantaloons loose enough to permit easy freedom of movement. The Iron Duke, indeed, had

little time for frills. "Providing we brought out men into the field well appointed," one of his officers has recorded, "with their 60 rounds of ammunition each, he never looked to see if their trousers were black, blue or grey."

It was a very different story a few years later, when the cockscorn Prince Regent and his tailor-minded crony "Beau" Brummel had the ordering of affairs so far as uniform was concerned. True, his Highness worried little about the infantry; mere "mud-crushers" were beneath his princely consideration. But when it came to the cavalry, he fairly let himself go. Uniforms glittering with gold and silver lace, but so skintight that it was impossible to draw a sabre without splitting a seam, were crowned with monstrous shakos sprouting a mass of waving plumes. So top-heavy was the head-dress of one formation, indeed, that

the commanding officer begged that the orders for them to parade on the breezy Downs above Brighton should be cancelled, and the men permitted to assemble in the shelter of the town; for in anything like a wind, the shakos simply would not stay on their wearers' heads.

In the *Journals* of Wellington's lifelong friend, Mrs. Arbuthnot, there is an entry under the date of 1st June 1829: "The Duke fell from his horse the other day at the review, in consequence of having on his head the extravagant Grenadier cap which the King has thought fit to order, and with which, in a high wind, it is impossible to balance yourself." Yet Wellington was an accomplished, if ugly, horseman, and a famous rider to hounds.

Once a craze for extravagance in uniform sets in, the tendency is for excess to be piled on the spectacular. In the mid-years of the 19th Century the British 11th Hussars were said to cost their commanding officer, the wealthy Lord Cardigan, a cool £10,000 a year, so elaborate was their dress. For those were the days in which a CO was personally responsible for the clothing of his regiment; drawing a fixed sum from the Government to cover the cost. This he could "milk," or supplement as lavishly as he chose. Cardigan was extremely proud of his regiment, he rejoiced in the possession of an exceedingly long purse, begrudging not a single penny of the money he spent on it. At the other end of the scale was the commanding officer, of an earlier generation, who was so eager to make a profit out of the Government grant that he actually clad his unfortunate men in the cast-off uniforms of another regiment!

It was the contemporary obsession with mere display that sent the British, French, Turkish and Sardinian armies to the meteorologically abominable Crimean campaign in full dress—the only uniform they had; and which, in the case of the first-named, included a tight leather stock, which was worn even in the front line trenches.

The Union Armies, at the outset of the War Between the States, made a similar mistake; breaking out into a kaleidoscope of fantastically be-dizened Fire Zouaves in crimson,

blue and yellow, "Polish" Lancers in vari-colored plastrons, Dragoons in blue and orange, Hussars in pale blue, heavily encrusted with gold lace and even "Highlanders" complete with plaid, kilt and diceboard hose. It is true that more sober councils soon prevailed; so the balance of the struggle was fought out in plain, but comely, uniforms of blue that matched in neatness and serviceability the smart and attractive grey of the Confederates.

THE 19TH CENTURY was an era of progressive industrialization; a fact that was reflected in the male civilian's more drab and restrained attire. This in its turn tended to throw the more brightly-hued uniforms of the services into sharper contrast. In a way, this was no bad thing. For the individual who has proudly dedicated himself to the service of his country "is not on the roll of common men." Since the risks he is liable to encounter are greater than those incurred by most other folk, by that much is his prestige and standing enhanced. He is, therefore, entitled to a garb which lends that fact deliberate emphasis.

But even if his own interest—like that of the services generally, and therefore of the country as a whole—is best served by providing him with a handsome parade uniform and, even more important, a smart and attractive "walking out dress," he is equally entitled to a working garb that fulfills all the demands made upon it by active service *while still retaining the dignity of a uniform*.

For over half a century accurate long-range missile weapons have nullified the erstwhile need for a brightly-hued uniform that clearly revealed and identified its wearer. Instead, the demand has arisen for an unobtrusive, subfusc garb that aided in his concealment; identification being a minor matter, sartorially, of badges, shoulder titles, "flashes" and buttons.

Khaki has furnished the requisite uniform for a large number of armies; although it had a hard fight to win the acceptance of the die-hard military "milliners," even for active service purposes.

Khaki, for service dress, was devised by Capt (subsequently Sir) Harry Lunsden who, in 1846, was

entrusted with the recruitment of a corps of Guides (native infantry) for military duties in India. Very early in proceedings he conceived what has ironically been described as "the highly unorthodox notion that a tight scarlet tunic, with a stock, was not the most suitable garment in which to wage war on the plains of the Punjab in hot weather." Casting about for some sort of alternative, the youthful commander thought himself of the method of utilizing dust-colored robes employed by the wild hillmen of the Northwest Frontier Province, of whom it was said that in their drab, inconspicuous draperies, they could "hide behind their own sandals." Procuring a supply of white cotton cloth, Lunsden had it taken down to the river, well soaked, and then rubbed thoroughly in the mud. Dried and ironed, and cut into a loose tunic and "shorts," it became the prototype of a uniform—even-tually of properly dyed khaki cotton—which for many years made no appearance outside India. One or two British regiments tried it out during the Mutiny of 1857-58, only to revert to their traditional red jackets and white topees at the very first opportunity. The Boer War of 1880-81, for example, as the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, were fought by troops who took the field in what virtually amounted to parade uniforms.

It was the second Boer War, of 1899-1902, which finally established khaki, both in cotton and serge, in official favor; and in both the 1914-18 and 1939-45 campaigns it confronted the equally inconspicuous *feldgrau* of the Germans.

Even so, the khaki service dress of both Americans and British differed quite considerably in the latter campaign to that worn in the earlier war; on the whole the changes, though well intentioned, were not for the better.

As a fighting garb, British battle dress had little more in its favor than the 1914 "service" dress, while as a *uniform* it was infinitely inferior—for there was nothing about it in which its wearer could take pride, and that is tremendously important.

A colossal amount of cheap, uninformed derisory comment has been

hurled at the British Army of the 1914-18 years because it insisted that men coming out of the line should immediately get down to the business of cleaning the mud off their uniforms, polishing their boots, and shining up their badges, buttons and shoulder titles. As any experienced campaigner is aware, the effect on morale of these minor concessions to "spit and polish" is tantamount to the tuning-up experienced by a man who returns home after a hard, gruelling day's work, and immediately banishes weariness and low spirits by taking a shower and indulging in a change of linen and a fresh pair of shoes.

In effect, during the 1914-18 war period, the man suffering from battle fatigue and with his "tail down" generally, was subjected to a little healthy discipline designed to restore his morale by insisting on the principle of *mens sana in corpore sano*. And it worked. Compared with the braced-up and morally revived product of this salutary regime, the soldier of the later war did not always shape-up too well. Too often, both in the line and out of it, he was permitted to exist in a state of masochistic squalor — under the entirely erroneous impression that by remaining unshaven and unkempt, and more faithfully resembling a hobo than a decent fighting-man, he was demonstrating his "toughness." But as Gen Patton used to bark, "Who ever saw a dirty soldier with a medal"? Other, of course, than what the British soldier contemptuously describes as "canteen medals, that come up with the rations."

The very first essential of a military uniform is that it should look *military*, even if it comes under the heading of "utilities." A serviceman is not some sort of weird civil servant got up in fancy dress. He is a member of the Fighting Forces, and his garb should reflect the fact, conceding nothing to civilian attire. A "stand and fall" upright collar, for example, with a removable lining that can be washed or cleaned, is just as hygienic and a thousand times more military-looking than a collar and tie — definitely a civilian appurtenance. For it has always to be borne in mind that, although they produce the finest fighters in



Capt Harry Lunsden's contribution

the world, the Americans and British are congenitally an unmilitary people, and they require weaning away from civilian-mindedness, even in the small particulars of their dress.

Head-dress will always offer a knotty problem to solve to everybody's satisfaction; but again the governing consideration should be — does it look essentially military? If not, scrap it. From a strictly military point of view — which should be the only admissible point of view — there is as little to be said for the American "utility cap" as for the abominable British beret. The first suggests nothing so much as a civilian truck driver; and although servicemen drive trucks they should still strive to look like servicemen while they are about it. Equally, the beret inevitably puts one in mind of the sort of furtive *crapaud* whose salacious suggestions, breathed conspiratorially in one's ear, lend their own peculiar quality to the lower type of French *bistro*. Moreover, the foolthing has no peak to shade the eyes, a first consideration in all military headgear.

The real difficulty about active service uniform is, what to do about the legs, the lower part of them in particular. Puttees, anklets, half-boots, have all been tried and found

wanting. Something to keep the leg dry from the knee downwards, light enough to march in and reasonably economical—the man who can think up a real answer to that one will not only reap a handsome fortune, but earn the undying gratitude of whole generations of servicemen yet to come.

Only second to his active service kit in importance is the serviceman's "walking out dress." For that is the attire in which he appears before the great mass of the general public; when in his own single self he embodies not only the reputation of his own formation and the Fighting Forces generally, but all the might and integrity, all the ideals and readiness for toil and sacrifice for which his country stands in the eyes of the world. That is a pretty heavy responsibility for any individual to shoulder, but it is one the serviceman must accept and live up to every time he sets foot outside his barrack gate; and a uniform worthy of it, and of his government's ability to fulfill it, is the least he can demand.

If he has got to misbehave sometimes — and we are all human — it should be in (permitted) mufti, never in uniform; so long as that is on his back, his conduct must be exemplary.

The external appearance of a serviceman is a sure indication of the discipline of the unit to which he belongs, as of his own sense of self-respect. No one would deny that the fighting man who has mastered his job is entitled to a bit of swagger; but the powers-that-be must first make sure that he has got something in which he *can* swagger. He should quite obviously be proud of the uniform he wears; and he should therefore be furnished with a uniform in which he *can* take a pride. Encourage him to think well of himself, and others will think well of him—a fact that will very speedily be reflected in the returns of new recruits.

The great Dr. Johnson once very shrewdly observed that, "Every man thinks the worse of himself for not having been a soldier, or never having been at sea." Of that fundamental fact the man in uniform, wherever he appears, is a very salutary reminder—providing the uniform is worthy of the occasion and the man who wears it. USMC

the unit staff officer

By LtCol J. A. Donovan, Jr.

THE DUTIES OF BATTALION AND regimental staff officers can be found in the pertinent Field Manuals and the functioning of the small unit staff is assumed to be known by the Marine personnel concerned. But experience has demonstrated that, like Capt Queeg in the *Caine Mutiny*, we "can't assume a g— d— thing in this Navy," insofar as expecting the inexperienced young staff officer to be familiar with all the methods and procedures of effective staff functioning.

In addition to the Field Manuals covering battalion and regimental operations and the Marine Corps' own Staff Manual, small unit staff functioning has been well presented in the Marine Corps Schools for some years. Unfortunately, many officers finding themselves on regimental or battalion staffs after some months of troop leading, or perhaps recruiting duty, recall their school instruction in staff work with some difficulty. Even though the general duties and procedures of a new staff assignment may be found in the proper reference manual, the reference is not always available. On expeditionary duty, military reference books seem always to be on short supply or perhaps they are confined to the book-box of a senior officer and are not readily available to the staff novice.


On-the-job education in staff procedures is a normal solution, but it is not always the most desirable or efficient method of starting an officer on the staff duty phase of his career. Unless he is instructed, aided and supervised by a capable and understanding unit executive officer, the neophyte staff officer gropes blindly along for weeks in his strange assignment. Not sure of the scope of his duties, of how his job fits into the co-ordinated workings of his unit, unfamiliar with correct staff techniques and procedures and having some doubt as to the relative importance of the assignment, he is more than happy to just get by and keep out of trouble. Return to "troop duty" becomes his constant goal. A consequence of his vague feeling of inadequacy as a staff officer is that he forever after shuns and scorns staff assignments. As he advances in rank he looks upon his colleagues in some of the staff specialties as members of secret societies for which he does not have the password. He may even look upon them as unfortunate individuals who have been sidetracked from that panacea of a Marine career, "troop duty." Such should not be the situation in a military organization as mature and large as is the present-day Marine Corps. Staff duty is an essential part of a Marine officer's experience and education. Even more important, staff work is a very necessary military activity in which all officers should share some responsibility. Lucky is the officer who can begin his staff experience with a small unit staff that functions

smoothly, happily and in a manner wherein all members of the staff contribute their proper bit to the unit's accomplishments.

The unit executive officer can make or break the unit staff. He is the individual who "rides herd" on the staff members, co-ordinating and supervising the varied staff functions. Thus, properly aided by his executive officer, the unit commander is enable to devote his energies to command, leadership and operations.

The executive officer presents his commander with the results of the co-ordinated staff efforts in the form of "completed staff action," which means completed plans and definite recommendations for the commander's selection and approval. The commander announces policies and concepts. He makes the decisions and issues the orders. The staff executes and supervises the orders. New missions and new problems are studied by the staff which then prepares solutions for the commander's further consideration and decision. This is a simplification of the cycle which is repeated day after day, in combat or in training.

The unit (battalion or regimental) functions according to the efficiency of the unit Executive Staff (termed "Unit Staff" in US Army Field Manuals) and the unit Special Staff. These are the two staff groups co-ordinated by the "chief-of-staff," the Unit Executive Officer. The Unit Executive Staff consists of the Executive Officer, S1, S2, S3 and S4. The Unit Special Staff (in an infantry battalion, for example) con-



sists of: the Weapons Company Commander; the H&S Company Commander, in his capacity as Headquarters (Command Post) Commandant; the Communications Officer, the Medical Officer, the ABC Officer, Liaison Officers, the Battalion Supply Officer, the Artillery Liaison Officer, the Tank Liaison Officer, the Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer, the Air Liaison Officer, the Chaplain and other attached and supporting unit liaison personnel.

In addition to the unit staff, another group which has considerable effect upon command decisions are the subordinate unit commanders. Using the infantry battalion again as an example: the H&S Company Commander, the Weapons Company Commander and the 3 rifle company commanders, when called upon, all act as advisors to the Battalion Commander and aid him in his estimates and decisions. Orders are issued via the "chain of command;" from the battalion commander to his company commanders. The orders should be based upon both the plans and recommendations of the battalion staff and the company commanders.

The executive officer and the staff members do not normally issue orders to the company commanders. They only issue such emergency fragmentary orders as they know to be the desire to the battalion commander or to insure compliance with battalion standard operating procedure. Staff officers issuing orders in the name of the commander

must immediately inform him of the action taken.

The work of these two groups: the unit staff and the unit commanders is *co-ordinated* by means of conferences, briefings and informal meetings.

The unit executive officer should schedule and organize joint conferences of the unit executive staff and the unit special staff. Each staff officer must be prepared to report on his staff activities since the preceding conference, review the current situation as it pertains to his staff function, discuss problems and submit plans or recommendations.

A staff conference should involve discussion and full participation by all members of the staff regardless of rank. However, the executive officer should employ a controlling agenda, and he must not permit the conference to degenerate into a debate between staff officers. The "chief-of-staff" should be ready to make decisions and get on to the next subject. Prolonged staff conferences breed stagnant staff work.

The unit commander should also hold regularly scheduled conferences with his subordinate unit commanders. The unit executive officer should organize and attend these conferences in his capacity as second-in-command and as senior advisor to the commander.

All officers attending conferences must be prepared to take notes, work on maps or operations sketches and make periodic action reports. At the same time, discussion and recommendations must *not* be confined to the individual's own duty, section or unit. Consideration of the welfare of the whole organization and the over-all mission must be of paramount interest.

In order to fully participate in unit conferences and staff functioning, all officers have to develop the habit of thinking in a logical manner. All military operations not covered by published doctrine or SOP present problems which must be solved. Solutions are effected by making estimates of the situation, or staff studies followed by decisions, issuing orders and the subsequent supervision of execution. Conferences should revolve around stated

problems. Participating officers make mental studies of the problems, organize their thoughts so that they can discuss their own conclusions pertaining to the problems, and then make definite concise recommendations for the commander's selection or further consideration.

This, in effect, is the procedure followed on the general staff level and usually takes the form of a written staff study or estimate. However, the officer who early learns the habit of "completed staff action" by following a logical sequence for dealing with staff problems, is well on his way to success in any staff billet.

Policies, procedures, information and orders which result from conferences should be quickly disseminated to the subordinate units and sections, unless security or current policy demand otherwise. Information, the "latest word," as well noted by Gen S. L. A. Marshall, "is the soul of morale in combat and the balancing force in successful tactics." Particularly in combat do the troops thrive on the "straight dope." The alternative to no information from their officers is "scuttlebutt" rumors, and "bum dope"—all of which can foul morale and cause doubt about the wisdom of "they" who command. Pass the "word;" up, back, and to the flanks.

Also following conferences, every effort should be made by unit headquarters to follow up oral orders, policies and procedures issued in conference with written orders and memoranda for verification and file. Rapid turnover of personnel almost make this a requirement, even in



combat, if there is to be any continuity of procedures within the unit.

The staff briefing is usually an activity found at the general staff level. It is a daily or weekly oral presentation by the general staff group and all, or parts of, the special staff to the commanding general and his guests. The situation and operations for the period are presented to the commander and the staff for their information. The general staff briefing rarely assumes the character of a staff conference. It is a more formal presentation and review of staff activities. Staff recommendations may be made if called for. The commander may make decisions and issue orders at a briefing.

Some regiments and battalions employ the techniques of the regular staff briefings to help co-ordinate staff functioning. In an active combat situation where these lower level staffs are working closely in a small command post area 24-hours-a-day, there should be little need of the staff briefing procedure. The commander is then kept constantly informed of such details of the situation as he desires. Staff work sheets maintain a picture of information and action. The staff is continuously informed of the varied aspects of the situation by: the flow of information within the command post,

staff reconnaissance, observation and visits, and by means of conferences as well as the staff co-ordination of the executive officer.

However, where the briefing procedure is employed, the staff officer will find himself called upon to stand up before the commander and other members of the staff and give an oral presentation. Without going into the techniques of public speaking and military instruction, let us say that the staff officer will do well to plan, make notes and even rehearse his initial presentations. Friendly criticism from a brother officer can foster improvement and eventual pleasure in this valuable experience.

Brevity and visual aids are usually desirable features of a staff briefing. The executive officer, as "producer" of the briefing, should insure that staff officers who seem to enjoy the sound of their own voices do not run away with the show. A prolonged boring presentation is not a "briefing" and is often worse than no briefing at all.

In the battalions and regiments much of the staff work is accomplished by informal meetings between members of the staff and the executive officer or commanding officer. During combat situations informal staff procedure and fragmentary orders become normal. There is a constant danger that they will become too informal and too fragmentary. When proper staff procedures, plans, orders and the chain of command begin to deteriorate under the stress of battle, it is usually the direct result of a commander not realizing that by neglecting the correct forms and procedures he is denying himself the assistance of his staff just at the time when he needs it most.

Let us review for a moment the desirable steps of staff functioning taken by a unit in a combat situation: Following the receipt of a regimental order, if detailed planning is required at the battalion level, the battalion commander gives his executive officer the battalion's mission and his (the commander's) concept of how it should be executed. This concept is his plan for developing and phasing the operation and the use of fire support. The

executive officer then confers with the battalion staff members, presents the mission (problem) and the commander's concept. The staff then prepares their preliminary estimates and plans under the executive officer's supervision. The executive officer and the staff officers then present these estimates and plans to the commander. The commander, meanwhile, has been making his own continuous estimate of the situation. The commander makes his decisions. The staff then goes back to work and carries out the procedures or draws up the orders which will execute the decision. The orders are issued. The following step, often neglected, is of great importance; the orders must be supervised in their execution by the commanding officer assisted by his staff who act as his extra eyes.

Even in combat with the rapid flow of fragmentary orders, just as the 5-paragraph operation order should habitually be a form of orderly thought, so should correct staff action be the basis for informal staff functioning.

Staff Techniques and Procedures

The techniques or procedures for the individual conduct of a new staff officer must be just as confusing as his initial effort to understand the workings of the staff portion of the unit team. Troop leading steps for the platoon leader and the company commander have been often taught and well listed. What are some time-tried "staff procedure steps" which contribute to the co-operation of the staff and the command?

Unit staff officers must visit and observe subordinate units regularly. A good rule of thumb is to visit at least two echelons down. A battalion staff officer should visit to platoon level. The visiting officer should never become a burden to the subordinate units. He should not endanger front line units by attracting enemy attention to himself or his party. He should keep off the skyline, conceal his maps and vehicle and attempt to witness the details of front-line operations, but not as a mere sight-seer. Every visit should have a military purpose. Adjacent and higher units must be visited regularly also.



The staff visitor should observe and not meddle. Employ proper command channels and relationships. The visitor should check in and out with the commander of the unit visited.

During offensive operations visit as often as is necessary to get the information required to form judgments and make recommendations. During periods of defensive operations, staff officers should visit at least one subordinate unit each day. Remember the front-line units like to see their officers. (Particularly when they are under fire.)

Visits should not be made on a regular schedule at the same time each day. Visits at odd hours often will reveal new problems or bad habits. Do not return to the staff mess for each meal. Eat with the troops from time to time.

It is a good idea to make notes and to keep some sort of record of staff visits. Check-off lists can be of value. The staff officer should not hesitate to employ pertinent staff references and check lists to insure that he is covering his duties. The manuals have been prepared by experienced officers. It is foolish not to profit from their knowledge.

One of the most loyal and appreciated functions of a commander and his staff is short-stopping the pressure and the excited demands of a higher echelon which can otherwise drive companies and platoons to utter distraction—and sometimes to destruction.

Do not harass units engaged with the enemy by frequent phone calls and requests for information. Even though regiment or division may be demanding reports every few minutes, the results of such pressure are usually exaggeration and distortion of the situation at the lower levels. Go get the information in person. As stated someplace in the old Japanese Army *Field Service Regulations*: "No officer, regardless of his rank, is too valuable or important to go forward and obtain information if he is lacking it."

However, do use the phone and any other means of communication to save time and to expedite normal business. Consider time and space factors in planning your own actions as well as in planning for unit operations. These factors are

often the most difficult for the average inexperienced staff officer to appreciate. The result is usually unreasonable demands upon the troops.

The staff officer should be anticipating future problems and operations at all times. Advance planning often outlines the special features of the various possible operations the unit may be called upon to execute: to attack, defend, relieve, withdraw, counterattack, move by motor or go into reserve. All present the staff member with problems for his solution. "Approximately 50 percent of the art of command is the ability to anticipate; 40 percent of the art of command is the ability to improvise..." says S. E. A. Marshall.

As already mentioned, the staff officer aids the commander in supervising the execution of orders. He corrects mistakes, calls the attention of the appropriate commander to discrepancies, but always in a tactful manner. He reports his observations and action to the commander.

The staff officer should present a neat and military appearance. The men in forward units are not impressed by a dirty, unkempt staff officer. They know he did not spend the night on outpost duty.

The members of a staff should be optimistic, loyal and cheerful. In spite of bad days, casualties and even set-backs, if the staff confidently continue doing their best, it will be reflected throughout the command. Optimism exhibited by the staff is the very least that can be provided to the troop units. The staff should help to focus loyalty upon the unit and upon the commanders. Any gripes can well be directed at the executive officer. His shoulders are broad and the good "Exec" should be more concerned with the efficiency of the command than his popularity with the troops.

Cheerfulness is usually a reflection of personality but it is certain

that many a tight situation has been loosened by the man who can smile when he's pinned down or can reveal a touch of humor when the heat is on.

All staff officers will do well to minimize the reports and paperwork required of their assistants and of the subordinate units. Paperwork seems to increase inversely to the tempo of combat operations. A well trained unit should be able to conduct most of its affairs orally or by field messages.

Details of staff work can be delegated to assistants, but the work should be supervised and checked. Staff officers require some rest. Staff sections should be organized with reliefs prepared for 24 hour operation.

The staff sections must be organized and ready to defend themselves and the command post area, mop up by-passed enemy—and even to counterattack when ordered. Alternate and separated staffs must be planned for the atomic battlefield.

The staff officer must be prepared to operate in combat after his key personnel have become casualties. Training understrength sections or with personnel absent is actually realistic and valuable.

To carry out all of these functions well, the hard-charging staff officer and his section must be physically fit. A staff billet is no excuse for a soft life or soft muscles.

A staff assignment on any level of command is nothing to be ashamed of. The only cause for shame is the realization that the job isn't being done well. If each officer starting his staff experience approaches the job with the knowledge that teamwork is as essential to success in a staff billet as it is in the combat units and that *co-ordination* and *co-operation* are the ingredients of teamwork, then he will have taken a long step forward in his military education. USMC

LtCol J. A. Donovan, Jr., presents his thoughts and experiences concerning tactical-level staff operations. Commissioned via the PLC in 1939, LtCol Donovan is presently serving as CO, 2d Bn, 9th Marines. During most of WWII he served with the 6th Marines (1940-44). Since then he has served at the Basic School (1947-48), Cinc Pac Fleet Staff (1951-53) and at Senior School (1953-56). LtCol Donovan holds the Silver Star, the Bronze Star (V) and the Presidential Unit Citation. He has written this article in the belief that there is a definite need for this type information among the junior officers in the FMF today.

the observation post

THE NEW CORPS

✻ MCS, QUANTICO—Let's stop mentally conjuring up a fantasy, many aspects of which never existed, called the "Old Corps" and using it as a sandbag to beat a lot of fine young Marines into a state of defeatism and poor morale. Healthy griping about things going to heck since the old days has always been an accepted privilege of military men in all ages—but we are overdoing it to the point where it is becoming dangerous. We are like a Captain who runs down the deck yelling "the ship is sinking" and then appears sporadically with a can of bright work polish and orders everyone to shine the bell and the rail. They aren't going to show much enthusiasm for the job. I agree with much of Col Prickett's excellent article on the Old Corps and particularly with the parts that pictured an era of pleasant, highly desirable military way of living—let's bring back a lot of that and we will have more youngsters staying aboard for 30. But, the tenor of some of the *Message Center* letters and comments I have heard in other quarters, indicate that much of our comparisons of the Old versus the New Corps is departing fact for fancy.

As far as efficiency and fighting capabilities are concerned—let's give credit where credit is due. The reason the Old Corps went thataway was because we sat up until the wee hours every night changing it into the New Corps so that we could fight and win a couple of wars. We shipped a considerable amount of the Old Corps back to the States at the beginning of WW II as being unsuited physically, mentally and professionally to do the job at hand. However, we had enough of it left to be the back-bone of the New Corps that carved its glorious place in history. Korea, however, was largely the New Corps and has any era of our existence ever seen a better performance than that? No! We are better than ever and anyone who wants to think objectively can recite chapter and verse to prove it. NCOs have to know more, work harder and prove their capabilities daily more than they ever did in the Old Corps. The demands on junior officers and NCOs in those days were comparatively simple and uninvolved, and many simple and unin-

involved people, who couldn't get to first base today, were able to stay abreast of the swim quite successfully until finally tested and eliminated in the crucible of war. If anyone wants to be reminded that the Corps is standing on a firmer foundation than it ever did in the Old Days—walk down the ranks, of the tall, trim, rammed and jammed youngsters who are the survivors of the screening program of the Training and Test Regiment. There was no such demanding, physically vigorous program for determining a man's qualifications for commissioning in the Old Corps. Being commissioned they go to a Basic School course which provides them with a professional background that many a captain and major would have done well to have in the old days. So some of our younger officers don't sparkle with a high degree of professional enthusiasm, so that's only natural. Our being "Big" requires us to use as Regulars young lieutenants who in the Old Corps would have been commissioned and assigned to the filing system as inactive Reserves. Fire a shot, get them riled with all the emotional turbulence that caused the inactive Reserves to come aboard and fight like wildcats in WWII and Korea and they will perform like professionals—until the war is over that is, and no later. Keeping that thought in mind let's stop crying that the young junior officers aren't what they used to be. Many of them are, in fact they are better. They are just lumped together for judgment with a huge number of officers who are aboard only to fulfill a military obligation, and even they do an excellent job. So, let's get out of the vale of tears—particularly in our publications, before we build a wailing wall out of old campaign hats of such height that we can't scale it without our own ladders. Let's move quietly behind the scenes and bring back a very few of the things that made the Old Corps so comfortable, and above all let us be honest and tell the newer generation how good they are—and they are damned good.

Col L. E. Haffner

Ed: With this piece by Col Haffner and the article by MSgt Crumb on page 64, we feel the subject has been adequately covered and the curtain should be rung down on the "Old Corps."

CAREER INCENTIVES AND HARD WORK

✻ FMF LANT.—Recently the CMC convoked a symposium of Staff NCOs at Quantico to obtain their ideas and recommendations regarding career incentives and other personnel matters.

Some of the recommendations were sound, but like other lists of recommendations, some were nothing apparently but sour grapes. One of the disturbing motives behind some of these recommendations was the desire to obtain somehow, somehow, more money or prestige, but especially money, for nothing. I am referring to the recommendations to create pay grades E7-1, E7-2, etc., through E7-4, with these pay grades drawing the pay of W1, 2, 3, 4, respectively. Reasons behind such recommendations include, among other things, the feeling among many master sergeants that they can't get ahead but do, nevertheless, want more money. Failing to achieve the rank and the pay, some have struck on the idea of abolishing the rank and bringing the pay equivalents down to the enlisted ranks (thereby eliminating the annoying and disconcerting requirement for higher standards, selections approved by Sec Nav, Senate, etc.).

On close examination, the idea that deserving E7s cannot get ahead will not stand up, for the simple facts are that deserving master sergeants can and do get ahead. Let's face it. Is a consistently average, above average, or even excellent master sergeant deserving of promotion to officer rank? The answer is emphatically no. Only the consistently outstanding are. And these make up no greater than 5 percent of the group at the most, and may be as few as 1 percent. Does that percentage of master sergeants acquire officer rank? I think the answer is yes. Whether those who are promoted are only those who are outstanding is another matter, and whether the answer is yes or no, it has no bearing on the subject at hand.

When drawing up a list of so-called "incentives," too many people are prone to overlook completely the incentive the CMC passes out twice a month on pay days and once a month by allotment check. These were incentives when E7s were E6s but by some mysterious process they are no longer incentives once the technical sergeant has become a master sergeant. Incentive has been assigned a future tense. An E7 who achieves that rank in less than 12-14 years (and there were and are many) has been more adequately compensated for his services, experience, knowledge and potential and should consider his incentive as having been realized well in advance of

his having earned it. As for less-than-outstanding master sergeants having nothing to look forward to but fogies till they get their 20 in, why should they? Doing a job satisfactorily is the way one earns one's pay, not the way one gets promoted. Moreover, ranks and promotions to those ranks are created solely for the benefit of the Marine Corps and not for the benefit of aspiring individuals.

The answer to the whole "problem" is that those concerned should face up to the fact that the Marine Corps is only going to pay persons more than E7 pay who in the Marine Corps opinion can guarantee the assumption of greater responsibility and performance and give those persons the rank and authority to carry out the same. The purpose of WO and LDO ranks is to permit the CMC to obtain the services of people in billets of officer level and who are of officer quality, who for reasons of age or statutory limitations quantity-wise cannot be promoted to the Regular commissioned ranks. And in the case of specialists, to obtain their superior knowledge coupled with greater supervisory and management abilities. With this realization firmly in mind, it should be apparent that no one except the outstanding can or should be promoted. It therefore behooves the E7s with ambition to qualify themselves to the highest degree possible in all respects. Most will never qualify themselves thusly, but those who do have every chance for ultimate promotion. The recent WO/LDO program required an exhaustive and comprehensive written professional examination. In the Marine Gunner category, about 390 out of approximately 1,290 achieved a score sufficiently high to be considered passing. The results of the test were not announced to the field, but the CMC did send a letter to those who passed but were not selected. If you didn't get a letter, you didn't pass the test. Whom have you to blame? The most overworked excuse is that persons have been assigned duties primarily in one occupational field and "through no fault of their own" have become unfamiliar with the other fields. However, there is not now, nor never has been to my knowledge, a regulation prohibiting people from studying on their own. The answers could be found in the assortment of LFM's and other manuals no farther away than the training aids library. Similar publications are available for the specialists.

The day the Marine Corps accepts the philosophy that WO/LDO pay and/or ranks are something that one can grow old into like longevity pay, is the day that the Marine Corps can strike its tents and go home, for it will have

been transformed from a fighting force into a relief agency.

ChMarGun J. L. Ritter

OFFSET AZIMUTH

➤ MCS, QUANTICO. — An instrument can be very accurate and the readings taken from it can be very assiduous, but there are certain elements which can be present which make even the most accurate of readings subject to error. The compass is such an instrument.

Most lensatic compasses are accurate within $1\frac{1}{2}$ degrees and can be used to a great degree of accuracy under certain conditions. But what about those factors which can cause a person to stray from his original direction and miss hitting his objective? Some of these factors are:

- 1) because we are human;
- 2) moving at night when an accurate reading is hard to take;
- 3) moving over flat, or thickly wooded terrain;
- 4) the instrument itself may be off a degree or two.

If we set out on a patrol and wish to reach a given objective, without too much fumbling around, how can we eliminate some of those weaknesses mentioned above?

One solution to this problem is by the use of an "Offset Azimuth." By deliberately adding, or subtracting, from our original azimuth, 3 or 4 degrees. By making this change in our original readings, we know in what direction our degree of error is taking place.

The application of the "Offset Azimuth" can best be illustrated by the Illustrative Problem, Parts I and II, below.

Illustrative Problem, Part I:

1) A patrol from C Company, 5th Marines, located on Hill 702, has the mission of reconnoitering RJ 502 (see diagram), where enemy activity is reported.

2) The patrol leader, by map calculations, planned to follow an azimuth of 30 degrees (Line-A).

3) Notice that the patrol route follows some very heavy terrain.

4) Question: How many persons could hit Point A right on the nose, after crossing this type of terrain?

In Illustrative Problem Part I, using Line-A, in what direction did the degree of error take place? The patrol leader knew that if he went far enough he was going to hit a road. But after hitting the road, in what direction did the degree of error take place? In what direction would the patrol turn to reach RJ 502?

The patrol leader, by map study, saw the type of terrain he had to cross and decided to make use of an "Offset Azimuth."

Illustrative Problem, Part II:

1) The patrol leader subtracted 5 degrees from his original azimuth and would follow an azimuth of 25 degrees — Line C — to his objective.

2) By subtracting 5 degrees, he knew in what direction his degree of error would take place; it would be to his left because he subtracted from his original azimuth.

3) He knew, also, that he would contact the road somewhere within the vicinity of Point C.

4) After hitting the road, the patrol would just do a right flank and continue on to its objective.

5) The patrol leader could just as easily have added 5 to 30 degrees and followed Line-B. When he made contact with the road, his patrol would do a left flank and continue on to its objective.

By the Illustrative Problem it can be seen that the patrol leader knew in what direction to go when he reached the road. He knew in what direction his degree of error took place, because of his pre-patrol calculations.


Several factors are needed to make use of the "Offset Azimuth."


1) The objective must lie on, or near, a road, fence line, power line, stream or some other terrain feature which can be followed to the objective;

2) An experienced person with the compass is needed because he must be ever conscious of the direction he has compensated for his degree of error.

The "Offset Azimuth" is only one of the many tricks a person learns through experience and study which enables him to complete his mission fast and efficiently.

SSgt J. B. Brown





DRILL TO PERFECTION

PEORIA, ILL. — I give here my recommendation for teaching the 13-man squad drill. I do not claim that it is the only method the Marine Corps could utilize in obtaining ultimate perfection in instructing this drill, but it is merely my opinion and I would like to voice it in the event someone may read it and give it a try. One thing is for sure though, and that is all hands are going to have to set upon learning this drill in an energetic manner, coupled with competent instruction, and copy the book word for word.

I recommend that a school be set up by all Marine Corps units to instruct the noncommissioned officers of its command in the 13-man squad drill. The instructors for this school should be officers or enlisted men who know the 13-man squad drill thoroughly and can teach it effectively. The NCO students would learn this drill from the ranks by doing the drill, not sitting down to a lecture and watching some one make so many figures on a blackboard. By being members of a squad physically doing the drill at the hands of a competent instructor and changing off to every position within the squad, every NCO could learn every move made within the squad. After this has been accomplished to the satisfaction of the instructor the students would be sent back to their parent organizations to instruct their units. Under no circumstances, though, would a man be allowed to instruct this drill if first he didn't know it himself, for the "blind leading the blind" cannot lead to Marine Corps standards in drill.

Now for the unit instruction. There are quite a number of Marines today who are familiar with the 8-man squad drill for it has been taught in the Recruit Depots for two years. However, many of these men have been in organizations which did not use this drill and consequently they have forgotten much of it—temporarily that is. For this reason, I suggest that the instruction of the drill be started from scratch and on the squad level.

The squad leader who now thoroughly understands the drill would now take over the task of instructing his squad. He would be given the full responsibility of teaching his men. Of course, the platoon leader and platoon sergeant would be on hand to assist if necessary

and also to make sure that the squad leaders were accepting nothing short in the movement of every man. After and I repeat only "after" the squads are perfect in the opinion of the platoon leader, the squads would then be formed together and instruction would be taken up on platoon drill. Since the platoon is the most common drill unit and platoon drill is the hardest to learn and perfect, platoon competition would be instituted with a reward for the best platoon. This competition would be graduated from company through battalion and regiment to division level. I haven't forgotten the intense interest the members of the 1st Mar Div took in the drill competition while in corps reserve in 1953. The D/2/7 platoon had some rough competition in winning the Division's title.

Success in the adoption of the 13-man squad drill lies solely with competent instruction and the keen interest of every Marine in mastering this fine military drill. Every Marine must know how to do his part in mastering this drill. The sharpest platoon can be made to look like Coxey's Army if one man makes the wrong move at the right time. *Let's learn this drill and learn it right.*

SSgt George L. Saxton

DON'T DO IT, DUNN!

MCEB, QUANTICO — Can the Marine Corps use an antipersonnel rocket of the type proposed by 2dLt D. J. Dunn in his article *Another Use for the 3.5*? It is my opinion that we cannot.

The 3.5-inch rocket launcher and rocket are a special purpose weapon and ammunition combination for the defeat of enemy armor. This is the only justification for its existence and the injection of another special purpose would detract from the weapon's primary mission. The addition of an antipersonnel rocket to the basic load of the launcher crew would necessitate the carrying of 2 different types of rounds. This would reduce the already limited number of HEAT rounds available and reduce the potential effectiveness of the weapon against armored attacks.

Any mass attack in which an antipersonnel rocket could be effectively used would undoubtedly be accompanied by armored forces. The launcher crew must be readily available to meet this armored threat from all directions

and not become engaged with the attacking infantry thereby neglecting its primary mission. If the launcher crew becomes engaged in firing at personnel targets, its position would be revealed and all possibility of surprise fire against any enemy armor in the vicinity would be lost. The launcher position would probably be taken under fire and destroyed before it could begin its primary mission.

The injection of such an antipersonnel rocket would be ineffectively duplicating the performance of other infantry weapons whose primary mission is the destruction of personnel. Advancements that are being made with these weapons at the present time will increase the firepower and destructive capabilities of the individual infantry unit. Also, any mass attack would immediately bring all these weapons into action and the contribution made by an antipersonnel rocket would be insignificant.

Weightwise, any antipersonnel rocket for use with the 3.5-inch rocket launcher would be wasteful. The rocket would have to weigh approximately 9 lbs., be similar in configuration to, and be ballistically matched with the standard HEAT round. This would result in a warhead weighing approximately the same as a 60mm mortar shell. It stands to reason that three 60mm mortar shells would be more profitable than one antipersonnel rocket.

A rocket of the type proposed by Lt Dunn would fall far short of the fragmentation and lethal patterns produced by light and medium mortar shells. Because of the small size of the rocket's warhead, any fragmentation obtained would be inefficient in bursting and lethal effects, for the following reasons:

1) Only one side of the rocket would project its fragments to the earth while the remainder would travel into space. This immediately reduces the effectiveness of the warhead by 50 percent.

2) Approximately 15 percent more of the warhead would be lost because of the nose and base sprays. Most of the nose spray would be lost into space and the remainder would be nearly parallel to the ground. The base spray, which is normally the most effective portion of a ricochet burst, would be partially lost because of the presence of the rocket motor.

3) Of the remainder of the warhead, the side spray fragments would normally be driven downward in a zone roughly 15 to 20 degrees in thickness normal to the trajectory of the rocket with the direction somewhat modified by the forward motion of the rocket.

4) Calculations based on the diagram contained in the article show that the

majority of the effective fragments from the side spray would be concentrated in a band approximately 7 yards long and 30 yards wide. However, the density of the fragmentation pattern would be insufficient to ensure coverage of the area as it would contain approximately 20 percent of the total fragmentation of the warhead.

5) A projectile that explodes after rebounding into the air does not give a circular pattern. It gives an oblong pattern similar to a kidney bean with the long axis perpendicular to the flight axis of the projectile.

The following comments concerning the behavior of ricochet projectiles are pertinent to the proposed rocket and should also be considered. Statistical studies indicate that the path and distance traveled by a projectile after it strikes the ground are affected by the following factors:

1) The height of burst increases with the angle of impact to a limit of between approximately 8 to 14 degrees and then decreases to a point where no ricochets are obtained (25 degree angle of impact).

2) The height of burst increases with the velocity of impact. As the range increases, the terminal velocity of the projectile decreases thereby decreasing the height of burst.

3) The effects of irregularities in ground surfaces cannot always be predicted. In soft ground, a projectile tends to penetrate and rebound at a high angle. Also, fewer ricochets are obtained from soft ground than from hard ground.

4) Longer delays are needed in ricochets obtained from soft ground, snow and underbrush, than from hard ground to obtain optimum heights of bursts. The height of burst increases with fuze delay to a point where the projectile begins to fall again after ricochet. In addition, the optimum delay times for ricochet fire at all ground conditions are indeterminable.

The accuracy to be obtained is dependent upon the angle of rebound which in turn is dependent upon the angle of impact. The desired accuracy can be obtained; but only in flat or gentle open rolling terrain. Hilly terrain that is covered with heavy vegeta-

tion, rocks, or many irregularities in its surface will not give accurate ricochets as these terrain features will affect the angle of impact.

The need for a close support weapon that will give an effective air burst over the heads of attacking infantry has been recognized. At the present time, studies are being conducted in the development of proximity fuzes for fin-stabilized mortar projectiles. A projectile of this type will be more efficient than the proposed rocket.

Small unit antitank weapons, such as the 3.5-inch rocket launcher, are for antitank use and not antipersonnel use. These weapons will normally be the only antitank defense available to the small unit commander and their primary mission cannot be jeopardized by the addition of a special purpose antipersonnel rocket. If additional missions can be assigned the launcher crew without endangering the weapon's mission, and by using the standard HEAT round, then the weapon can and should be used. However, it is strongly felt that the only justified reply to any proposal for a special purpose antipersonnel rocket is *don't do it!*

Capt T. C. Edwards

ATOMIC ARMOR

1ST MAR BRIG, FMF.—The Army now has a helicopter-mounted 155mm recoilless rifle, capable of firing an atomic shell. The mobility and shock power of such a combination are obvious. However, it has 2 drawbacks: 1) inability to make good use of cover and concealment, and 2) lack of crew protection. To complement the "atomiccopter," a ground vehicle is needed which can overcome these deficiencies. A turreted medium tank mounting the same gun would be the answer. This would provide a weapon comparable, but vastly superior, to Russia's turretless tanks (SPs), since it would be considerably lighter than their biggest vehicles, yet would deliver more firepower, even with conventional ammunition.

For tank mounting, the recoilless rifle would have to be modified to load from in front of the chamber, instead of end loading. This would necessitate a rimless cartridge and a lock-on barrel, using the interrupted screw device now used to close the breech. A sleeve containing one element of the screw mechanism would extend from the forward end of the chamber. The barrel would fit into this sleeve, locking into position by means of grooves on its outer surface, as the present breech locks in place. The position of the crack where the barrel and the chamber, or the barrel and the sleeve joined, would be so

placed that the cartridge would cover it when the round was in place. This would prevent gas from escaping at this point when the round was fired. Because the barrel would be rigidly supported, a few feet from the muzzle, by the turret bow plate, the loosening of the threads of the breech mechanism, due to the vibration of firing, would be minimized. Perhaps the effects of this loosening could be overcome with a rubber or plastic sealant.

A tank so equipped would have a low silhouette because the gun could be near the top of the turret, using the bustle area for a chamber. To some extent it would hide its own blast, by firing over the engine, or across the hull. It could have an hydraulic loader, like the "Monster."

A new type of separate-loading ammunition could be used. The shell with its holed structure would be a permanent part of the weapon. Charges encased in cardboard would be loaded into it, then the projectile would be attached and the breech closed. This type of ammunition would occupy less space, could be stowed more economically and would eliminate the need to toss out brass. Or perhaps metal could be powdered, then pressed to form a shell which would evaporate in the explosion of the charge, and be passed out of the recoilless rifle with the other gases.

Changes in elevation would be accomplished in this manner: the turret would be balanced fore and aft on 2 bearings or pivots, one at each side of the turret, like an upside-down cup balanced on a horizontal pencil. An hydraulic mechanism would raise the front of the turret or lower it to make range changes. The turret would have a "skirt" fore and aft, extending into the hull about a foot, so that armor protection would still be complete at extremes of elevation or depression.

For deflection changes, the pivots on which the turret bobs for elevation would in turn be mounted on a toothed ring deep inside the turret well, the ring being driven in the same way as its counterpart in a conventional turret.

Like "Ontos," this vehicle would hit and run, but being self-contained, would provide better crew protection and easier loading. With an automatic loader, it would require a crew of 3 (driver, gunner, commander) and could carry at least 20 rounds. As a close-support weapon for infantry, even with conventional ammunition it could reduce strong field fortifications, blast holes in trench lines, annihilate gun positions. As an overwatching support for tanks, it could destroy enemy armor without revealing its position before firing, and could break up formations of infantry



advancing with enemy tanks. With atomic warheads, its capabilities are tremendous.

Like all weapons, this vehicle and gun would represent a compromise between various desirable characteristics. It would have less range than a 155mm howitzer, but would be more mobile. As an antitank weapon it would pack tremendous wallop and be very mobile, but the number of rounds available would be low. As a tank, it would be very light for the size of the weapon, but would be limited in available rounds. As an answer to the Russian SPs, it would be somewhat limited in range, but would be more accurate, throw more explosive and still be extremely light and mobile. In number of rounds, it would match the Russian vehicles closely.

1stLt H. P. McLoughlin

RECON REBUTTS

NAVY YARD, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.—I have just finished reading Capt Bradley's article on *Sea Going Marines as Recon Troops* in the Sept issue which presented the pro argument of training sea-going Marines in amphibious reconnaissance. Having spent 2 years as a reconnaissance officer, an instructor in amphibious and land reconnaissance for an additional 3 years and attending a number of Army, Navy and Marine reconnaissance and intelligence schools, I would like to present the con of the very same subject.

It is my opinion that reconnaissance personnel are only qualified to obtain combat intelligence rather than strategic intelligence information. This would preclude their being used to obtain information on ports or harbors of the world during peace times, which could more adequately be obtained by other sources.

In order to have a qualified reconnaissance group, personnel would have to possess an excellent background in squad and platoon tactics, map reading, scouting and patrolling, swimming, and handling rubber boats in surf. The basic indoctrination in these subjects could be given in a classroom aboard ship. However, for every hour spent in a classroom, at least 10 hours are needed in the field and surf. Since reconnaissance troops are most effectively employed at night, the above training would have to be repeated during hours of darkness requiring 2 hours for every

hour of daylight training. With care, cleaning and maintenance of equipment and having no other assigned mission it would require at least 4 months of a normal training schedule to become proficient in these subjects. At the end of this training, our personnel would be only amphibious infantrymen and not reconnaissance troops.

To qualify our amphibious infantrymen as amphibious reconnaissance personnel specialized training would be needed in road, bridge, stream and beach reconnaissance, sketching, report writing, observing and reporting, air photo reading, communication, transporting vessels, hydrographic surveys, oceanography, landing and withdrawals and ship to shore movement. These are just some of the techniques employed by amphibious reconnaissance patrols and do not include any UDT or intelligence training.

If there is sufficient time and qualified instructors aboard ship for personnel to become proficient in all of the above subjects, I am not one to slow down the wheels of progress, and wholeheartedly agree with Capt Bradley that we are "missing the boat." If on the other hand this is to be used to promote *esprit de corps* or glory for a limited number, if one could call glory spending days "hot bunking" on a submarine, debarking on a pitch dark night in 40 degree temperatures and 15 foot swells, setting off for a beach you can't see in a rubber boat, going through 6 or 8 foot surf, landing on rocks or coral where there should be smooth beach and then staying all night half wet and frozen and then reverse the procedure to rejoin the task force and land late in the evening of D day to guard or reconnoiter an exposed flank of the beach; then I recommend some other method be used to build moral or increase *esprit de corps* and the reconnaissance missions be left to those whose primary mission is reconnaissance.

Capt D. F. Swanda

ANTARCTICA GETS A FACE LIFTING

WASHINGTON, D. C.—A Marine master sergeant is testing a new instrument in Antarctic Operation Deepfreeze which might revolutionize military map making.

The instrument is a ground survey camera.

It is so small and so compact that any member of a raiding party (rifleman, cook or radioman) can pack it on his back in the cover of darkness, take his pictures, return with his outfit and a resulting map can be made by rear echelon specialists thousands of miles behind the lines.

Best of all, the operator needs only about 2 weeks' training to master the camera.

Complete field photographic laboratory facilities, always at a premium, are not needed.

Nor will it employ complicated electronics or any other surveyor's gear besides a steel tape.

MSgt R. B. Solomon is "test NCO" for the Antarctic trial of the radical new camera.

In the time American scientists are in Antarctica for the first phase of Operation Deepfreeze, Solomon will work with Navy and civilian specialists from the Navy's Hydrographic Office in Washington. While they take surveys with conventional equipment he will make parallel studies with his camera. On his return, the Marine Corps Equipment Board in Quantico will evaluate his results.

If successful, it will mean one man can do the work of a conventional survey party.

From different points of the 6 million square miles of the ice-covered Antarctic continent, Solomon will attempt to establish accurate position by latitude and longitude; establish true directions by Azimuths; and conduct triangulation photo mapping.

For position determination he will place the camera in a fixed spot, then tilt the camera straight up and photograph the stars. By photographing the stars (and recording his exposure time to the exact second) he will establish the pin-point accuracy of the camera's position.

Azimuth determination sets the true directions, or azimuths, of lines passing through the camera position (thus any object or area photographed is relative to a known point.) Comparisons of the true directions of two lines meeting under the camera will result in the angles between the 2 lines, from which additional surveying data may be compiled. This is based on measurements of star positions on the negatives.

Azimuth exposures are made at night. Because of the absence of darkness in Antarctica, during the season he will attempt daytime star sights by using infrared film.

The camera is sighted along the line for which the azimuth must be determined—say a mountain in the distance. When this sighting line has been established, the camera is aimed upward at





the stars. Its computed intercept among the known positions of the stars establishes the direction of the line along which the camera was first sighted on the ground.

Once the new camera has been used to establish its own position and the true azimuths required for surveying, the third step, triangulation, comes into play.

Triangulation is a form of surveying by trigonometry which substitutes computations for direct measurements of distances and angles when possible. Two ends of a line of known distance constitute the points and one side of a triangle. The third point and the lengths of the other 2 sides of the triangle can be computed when the angle is measured to the third point from each end of the measured "base line."

In this type of surveying with the camera, the base line between two inter-visible points is first measured. The camera is then set up at one end of the line in daylight, sighted toward the other end, and successive overlapping pictures are made with the camera aimed horizontally until the camera has covered all points in a complete circle. A panoramic exposure results.

The camera is then set up at the other end of the base line and aimed back at the first point. Again, successive overlapping photographs are made until the camera has covered all horizontal points in a complete circle around the camera position.

From this data, 2 angles (computable from the camera photographs) and the enclosed side (measured beforehand) provide the essentials for the solution of triangles or for the surveying problem of triangulation.

The "third point" of the triangle will be any point selected from any of the photographs made at one end of the measured line that may be found on any of the photographs made on the other end of the measured line.

Thus, if the tests prove successful, one man with slight training in the camera's operation can take the entire equipment

required—and it's small enough to fit a field pack if short wave radio is not counted—insert drugstore film, make his exposures, air mail his exposed film back to the rear echelon, and enable the experts to draft the skeleton framework of an accurate map, complete in distances, land contours—including ridges and depressions, and apply grids as necessary to make a map sufficient for combat needs.

J. E. Ogelsby, JOC, USN

LIGHT AAA—IN OR OUT?

✿ TWENTY NINE PALMS, CALIF. — It wasn't very many years ago that the armed forces in general, and the Marine Corps in particular, placed heavy emphasis on antiaircraft defense. But in the half-decade between World War II and the hostilities in Korea, the anti-aircraft approach underwent a drastic change. The advent of supersonic airplanes and, the then imminent but now factual, guided missiles caused an abrupt swing away from our conventional air defense weapons. It almost seemed that the adage often used in antimechanized defense was to be the answer for air defense "that the best defense against an enemy plane or missile is a friendly plane or missile."

But let's take a look at the light anti-aircraft weapons we have left over from the other wars, and re-evaluate them once more before relegating them to the junk yard.

These weapons we will consider are currently employed in the Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion, Self-Propelled, in both Force Troops Units, Atlantic and Pacific, Fleet Marine Forces. The prime weapons are the M42, which is a dual 40mm mounted in a full tracked vehicle of tank-type construction, and the M16, which is a quad 50 caliber machine gun turret, mounted in a half-track. Consensus is that substitution of M42s in lieu of the M16s is an eventual step in the Marine Corps.

But what about the M42? Should we throw it away? The air defense mission

of this weapon is to: 1) attack, and destroy hostile targets in the air; 2) nullify their effectiveness or; 3) cause them to abandon their mission. In addition, the ground support mission includes direct support of the infantry to include convoy protection, thicken artillery fires and to provide overhead fire in the attack. In regard to the air mission, it would be futile to argue the effectiveness of the weapon against medium high or high altitude targets.

It is strictly a short range weapon with maximum range of 4,000 or 6,000 yards, but only an effective range of 1,800 yards. Thus we quite rapidly eliminate supersonic missiles and high flying planes from its capability list. But what about the low altitude bombers possessing the special weapons capability, and what about the enemy helicopter? This weapon is by no means a sure-fire cinch to knock out a hostile low altitude plane, but apparently it is the best we have.

Not only can it handle the anti-aircraft task, but it could be an extremely valuable asset to the infantry. It has excellent cross-country maneuverability which will allow it to follow the infantry almost anywhere. It can throw out, at maximum rate of fire, 240 rounds per weapon, per minute. It is capable of firing both direct and indirect fire, as do the field artillery weapons.

We must evaluate the place of the AAA AW Battalion in the FMF. Units of this type are needed in Corps artillery, but more to the point they are essential in division artillery. Providing the artillery regimental commander with a fifth battalion would give him at best a limited light anti-aircraft artillery capability. But it is certainly better than no anti-aircraft artillery capability at all!

In addition there are many tactical assignments that this weapon can handle. This weapon is extremely accurate in direct fire. Machine gun emplacements, embrasures in pillboxes and other pinpoint targets can be destroyed or neutralized in short order. In addition, the range and deflection probable error is very small even with indirect fire. If the target presents any appreciable vertical surface, this weapon can lay them in the black on all targets within ranges. There are few weapons that can excel the M42 for area neutralization.

Its high rate of fire and its unlimited traverse make it a particularly deadly weapon against infantry in the open. The artillery regimental commander who could have this battalion in his organization would find his offensive and defensive capabilities greatly increased. Adding the self-propelled battalion to division artillery and increasing the units in corps artillery is the only answer.

Maj R. L. Valente

passing in review

BOOKS OF
INTEREST TO
OUR READERS

Inchon . . .

US MARINE OPERATIONS IN KOREA 1950-1953, Vol. II, The Inchon-Seoul Operation—Lynn Montross and Captain Nicholas A. Canzona, USMC. Historical Branch, G3, HQ MC, Washington, DC. 361 pages. With maps and photographs. \$2.50

This is the Inchon book. The second in the series which memorializes Marine Corps operations in Korea, its substance is drawn from the great amphibious exploit of 1950 and the penetrations which collapsed fighting operations in South Korea.

The ship-to-shore movement is described halfway through the narrative. So the first half of the book necessarily is devoted to planning and preparation. Therefore, the pace of the writing accelerates as the story begins to deal more exclusively with the problems of fire and movement.

As to formula, therefore, the book resembles Vol I in which the drama of the Brigade's fight within the Pusan Perimeter was somewhat outflanked by the attention given staff conferences.

The treatment has its virtues. There are offsetting marked disadvantages. Which ponderates depends on what the reader seeks and what audience these histories are intended to satisfy.

If the object is to educate studious Marines about myriad field problems, their solutions and the hypothetical alternatives, the unexpected contingencies which ever arise and the disappointments when things do not work out as planned, the book has done a solid job. It is a 7-course banquet for technicians, and besides that, the bright flags of tradition and esprit are fervently waved.

But if the aim was to charm average readers, and thrill them with a tale well-told of corps heroism and command genius, it signally misses.

Inchon is generally acclaimed one of the most brilliantly and daringly planned and staged enterprises in our military past. Yet this story about it must provide tedious going for almost anyone. The potentially high moments are dulled by a persistent tendency to cram the narrative with every fact collected, however trivial or distracting. There is a contrived effort to build up suspense prior to the sequel which too frequently drizzles off.

To salute the scholarliness of the labor of Mr. Montross and Capt Canzona cannot lessen regret that it doesn't sing. The fault is not all theirs. Whoever set the style for our military histories need not have insisted that they read like alphabet soup. Take one quote from this book: "MAG-33 was designated from the forward echelon, 1st MAW, to serve as TAC X Corps, with VMFs 212 and 312 in addition to VMF(N)-542 and the rear echelon of VMF(N)-513." Even for the cryptographer who can avoid becoming lost in that jungle, it's a mark of devotion above and beyond the call if he reads on.

To put it another way, authorship in this work is gravely handicapped by the shortcomings of the system. The authors have wrung the records dry and diligently gathered much supplementary information by letter. But the records do not, on balance, reflect what the Marine Corps means to the United States—an organization straining above all others to serve its forces along the fire front. What comes out but reflects that imbalance which exists in a reports and records requirement which is designed more to preserve the staff and command process than to honor the line and ennoble its tradition. However diligent, research done too long afterward does not supply the need. There are too many glaring gaps and the dynamism of mortal combat is too often missed.

To read this work, to note the labyrinthine detail with which the operational windup is described, then to follow troops into battle and find that at the climax a company action is summarized with the words "7 killed and 20 wounded" with nothing about the reason why, is wholly frustrating. In contrast, there may be full detail on a company which charged hard but hit nothing.

Plan and preparation are always essential and interesting background. But in battle history, they can not profitably be made more than that. Once the curtain rises, what happens is the all-important theme.

This book is handsomely turned out. Its maps are many and excellent. The other graphic materials were well chosen. It is rich in meaningful statistics.

Both as a staff study and as a commentary on the main personalities in Korea, in higher command, in Marine service or in any way identified with the effort, it is worthy of praise. By this writing, many great heroisms, such as that of Lt Eugene F. Clark, USN, who went ashore below Inchon on 1 Sept. 1950, to serve as pathfinder, are given overdue acknowledgement. There is also high value in its revelation of how the unexpected invariably dogs operations, necessitating on-the-spot re-evaluation and decision.

But one would regret seeing the Reservoir story given this same treatment, with its very distinct limitations. For there, above all others, is a tale of battle calculated equally to instruct tacticians and thrill the American heart, if properly organized.

Reviewed by S. L. A. Marshall

Ed: The reviewer is well-known as the military analyst for the Detroit News.

Soldiering With The Arabs . . .

BEDOUIN COMMAND: The Arab Legion, 1953-1956 — LtCol Peter Young. 202 pages, illustrated. London: William Kimber & Co., Ltd. \$4.00

LtCol Peter Young is a WWII Commando veteran of many raids including Vaagso and Dieppe. He fought in Sicily, Italy, Normandy and later in Burma before reaching the temporary rank of Brigadier. While fighting during that conflict he collected a chest full of ribbons including the Military Cross with two bars and the Distinguished Service Order.

At present he is the senior Army instructor at the Joint Services Amphibious Warfare Center at Poole, Dorset, England.

From 1953 until he was ousted along with LtGen Sir John Glubb, in 1956, Young commanded 9 Regiment of the Arab Legion and this book is an account of his tour with the Bedouin Arabs that mainly made up his command. Easily the highlight of the book is his vivid account of the 1954 "Jerusalem Incident" written by one who was in the thick of it. For 3 days and nights small arms fire at ranges of 50 yards between Old and New Jerusalem looked like the end of the truce and beginning of another full scale conflict.

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Young's Regiment was on the receiving end of most of the rifle and mortar fire. During this incident Young busied himself mainly with restraining his Arabs. "I had given order that no Bren was to have a magazine on the gun, and no rifleman was to have a round up the spout. I went along the wall from man to man, and saw that my orders were obeyed. In this way I was able to make certain that if there was firing it came from the other side."

LtCol Young's accounts of everyday soldiering with the wiry, tough, Bedouin that made up 9 Regiment are tremendously interesting to the Marine reader. His accounts of the havoc that the 30-day feast of Ramadan played with his soldiers is a unique experience for a troop leader.

Problems with discipline, oddly enough, were very rare. Like many Marine organizations his biggest problem was AWOL, primarily a result of an Arab not allowing himself sufficient travelling time (how familiar). The problem of re-enlistment did not exist. Arabs consider raiding or soldiering, "to be the only occupation worthy of a man."

Young's re-enlistment procedures also sound familiar: "When a soldier's contract expired the CO could refuse to renew it, or if he felt doubtful, he could renew it for one year only. I used to interview all time-expired men, and look through their personal files, before signing them on again, for it was the exception for a soldier to wish to leave the Jeish (Army)."

Next to the Jerusalem Incident the most exciting time for Young was in quelling the December 1955 riots. Rioters, mainly the idlers in the large displaced persons camps in Jordan, were incited to riot and demonstrate against Jordan joining the Bagdad Pact. These riots caused Young and his Bedouins many tense moments especially when Young found that some of the camps contained the wives of his soldiers. His handling of rioters, local police, and Arab intrigue is indeed a lesson for any troop leader who should ever find himself in comparable surroundings.

Some of the names of the Arab officers and men that made up the 9 Regiment are real tongue twisters. Muhammad Awwad el Harbi, one of his officers, would not be exactly an easy or familiar name to an American. However, Young discusses them all with a real and sincere affection. That he had his likes and dislikes he leaves no doubt. One he would describe as a "weak sister" whereas another was termed a first class soldier. The author never quite made up his mind about the fighting qualities of the Bedouin, however. In

one place he says, "They have not yet had to put up with bombing or shelling such as commonly fell to the lot of the British soldier in the last war, and I personally would do anything I could to avoid committing them to a slugging match. That is not to say that I think they will fail under those conditions, but their temperament, tradition and previous experience does not fit them for that style of warfare." In another place the author says, "... the best of them can hold their own with any soldiers in the world."

The author has a keen awareness of history for as he takes you over the dusty, rocky lands of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan he stops occasionally to point out the historical significance of a hill, or a tomb, or a castle in ruins.

The book is written mainly in a chronological order and the last chapter deals with the consequences of the departure of British officers of the Arab Legion.

The book is well illustrated with photos of Bedouin soldiers that the author speaks of and contains three appendices containing more factual information on the Arab Legion.

To readers wishing to know more about the Middle East, or to get acquainted with how the Arab thinks, lives, plays and soldiers, or to be entertained with a lively account of one British officer's experience with a "native" command, or indeed to compare troop leading experiences with those of a present-day British soldier, the book is highly recommended.

Reviewed by LtCol L. E. Hudgins, Jr.

Ed: The reviewer is presently the Marine Corps representative at the Joint Services Amphibious Warfare Center, Poole, Dorset, England.

To Fill a Need . . .

MILITARY HERITAGE OF AMERICA
—Cols R. Ernest and Trevor N. Dupuy. 752 pages, maps and index. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1956. \$10.00


Like most college textbooks, and this book is certainly intended to be a textbook, *Military Heritage of America* can not be classified as casual reading matter. The authors obviously set out to produce a work that would fill the definite need for a standard reference in ROTC courses in American military history. They have in large part been successful in this task and they are to be applauded for bringing the essence of West Point's textbooks on military history, including some of the clearest military maps extant, to the general student.

While it is not generally known, the Department of Military Art and Engineering at the US Military Academy has produced a number of faculty-written texts covering American participation in major wars. These books are models of concise reporting of military history in all its many facets. Although they have been printed in limited editions primarily intended for cadet use, enough of these West Point texts have filtered out to service libraries and enterprising individuals to permit an enthusiastic evaluation of their worth. The Colonels Dupuy have drawn very heavily upon these books and upon such classics as Steele's *American Campaigns* to piece together their analysis.

The words "to piece together" are used quite knowingly, for *Military Heritage* is an amalgamation of excellent secondary works. The authors make no bones about this, realizing that an entirely original work would be next to impossible to achieve and so time-consuming as to lose any immediate value. And unquestionably there is a present need for a book which will give prospective Reserve officers, who form the bulk of our officer cadre in both peace and war, a solid grounding in the martial history of our country.

The limitations of the book are inherent in its concept. A one-volume military history of the US, with even a minimal background on western military thought and action, must of necessity neglect many pet battles and campaigns. It can touch only lightly on the aspects of social, political and economic history interwoven in our military heritage. It can not do full justice to any particular field of military study; the reader will not find a complete or even partially complete story of developments in logistics, strategy, tactics, intelligence, leadership, or any of a host of other subjects. Since the book can not be all things to all people, it does not attempt to be so. *Military Heritage of America* is a general survey which adequately keys in the principles of war with the actions of war.

Very few people will be satisfied that this book is the best effort that can be made in the field of a one-volume study of American



military history. At times, especially in the analytical sequences, the text reads like an abstract from the *Field Service Regulations*, a source not notable for being written in simple, lucid and concise language. Military English should be avoided like the plague in a book aimed at undergraduate students and a good case can be made for its sparing use on almost any other occasion. Many people will not agree with the authors' selection or treatment of subject matter; many more will be able to find errors of fact in campaign summaries. In the long view, however, the questions raised are minor, and the book is competently written for the purpose for which it was intended. It should be of considerable value as a basic textbook to accompany informed and intelligent instruction and elaboration.

Reviewed by H. I. Shaw, Jr.

ED: Mr. Shaw is a civilian historian working in the Historical Branch, G3, HQMC.

Election Year Reading . . .

THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY—Clinton Rossiter. Harcourt, Brace, & Co., New York, 1956. 175 pages, indexed, \$2.95.

THE PRESIDENCY TODAY—Edwin S. Corwin and Louis W. Koenig, New York University Press, New York, 1956. 138 pages, indexed, \$3.00.

"... in the presidential office, as it has been constituted since Jackson's time, American democracy has revived the oldest political institution of the race, the elective kingship." With these challenging words (quoted from another historian) Clinton Rossiter brings to conclusion his lively *The American Presidency*, a book which is in some contrast to the *The Presidency Today*, by Messrs. Edwin Corwin and Louis Koenig. As all 3 of our authors are professors (Cornell, Princeton, NYU, in that order) we have, between the 2 books, an abundance of expertise and scholarship.

Both books are naturals for a presidential year.

Professor Rossiter's *The American Presidency* is, in my opinion, the better book. It is better organized, more informative, more complete and it is written with real dash and enthusiasm. He has the sort of style and turn of phrase which readily make you imagine that it might be fun to be one of his students in Government 216, to whom he has dedicated this work. All this enthusiasm focuses on his subject; the author admires the institution of the Presidency and zestfully relishes its incumbents and associated lore. The book is fairly

festooned with delightful and extremely pointed quotations from and about Presidents and Vice Presidents. Here, for example, is Woodrow Wilson on the subject: "The chief embarrassment in discussing his office is, that in explaining how little there is to be said about it, one has evidently said all there is to say." Wilson's own Vice President, the witty and able T. R. Marshall, described himself as "a man in a cataleptic fit, who is conscious of all that goes on but has no part in it." And Prof. Rossiter himself uneasily dismisses the Vice Presidency as a "hollow shell of an office. . . sought by practically no-one we should like to see as President."

But to turn away from "the most insignificant office that ever the invention of man contrived or his imagination conceived" (John Adams' comment on the Vice Presidency), let us see what Prof. Rossiter thinks might be done to improve or ease the Presidency itself.

Foremost among his suggestions Dr. Rossiter proposes that the President "be granted full and permanent statutory power . . . to reorganize the internal structure of the executive branch . . . and to reduce the pockets of obstinate independence." Such an executive blunderbuss could blow our heads off. Strangely enough, only a few pages later, the ordinarily astute professor, unmindful of mere inconsistency, comments with concern on the constitutional inversion of today, that while the President "is busy asserting leadership in making laws, Congress is busy asserting control over their execution." This is the same constitutional inversion, or perversion, which gives the President the reorganization powers he now possesses, whereby (as in Reorganization Plan 6, which we all recall) he in effect legislates, and Congress, if it can, accepts whole hog, or rejects. Anyone who (with Congress) fears the possibility of a national general staff and single chief of staff, should beware that these, and perhaps even more ominous objects in armed forces organization, are not attained some day by a deft flick of the President's power to reorganize.

The Presidency Today, by Corwin and Koenig, is, I am afraid, far less tasty fare than that presented by Dr. Rossiter. The style is a little flat, the organization strikes one as somewhat haphazard, and the book's frequently admitted dependence on earlier works by the same authors, leads me to suspect (perhaps an unworthy suspicion) that it is really a highbrow pot-boiler launched on the market because 1956 is an election year. On the other hand, *The Presidency Today* does present a valuable contrast to *The American*

Presidency because Messrs. Corwin and Koenig sometimes view the office and its evolution with somewhat greater detachment than the energetic Mr. Rossiter. And in one salient point of difference between the 2 books, I find myself wholeheartedly with the Corwin-Koenig camp, which opposes a national Presidential primary, or state presidential preference primaries (both of which Dr. Rossiter somewhat favors). We have had good examples this very year of the power of such indecisive contests to sap the strength both of candidates and parties, and to prolong even further the already too long and too arduous election-year struggle.

The back-breaking severity of this struggle, and the burden of the office itself, remind one of a warning from Woodrow Wilson, "Men of ordinary physique and discretion cannot be presidents and live. If the strain be not somehow relieved, we shall be obliged always to be picking our chief magistrates from among wise and prudent athletes—a small class."

Reviewed by Col R. D. Heinl, Jr.

ED: The reviewer, presently on duty in Washington, DC, has a continuing interest in historical matters.

A "New" Weapon . . .

THE SOVIET SECRET SERVICES—Dr. Otto Heilbrunn. 216 pages. New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1956. \$4.50

Dr. Heilbrunn, who co-authored the recent *Communist Guerrilla Warfare*, could well have titled his new study, "War Without a Battlefield" for it reveals the past history and future possibilities of just such a phenomenon.

We are used to the idea of war without a formal declaration by the aggressor. "Yet," the author believes, "we still cling to the notion that battles and wars are necessarily fought or decided on the battlefield." By way of explanation he postulates, "... a new conception of warfare seems to be in the making in which campaigns are fought by civilians far away from the front line. Subversion, espionage by infiltration, sabotage and partisan warfare are the weapons they will use in a future hot war, and the theatres of operations are the home front and the enemy's lines of communication. This is war without a battlefield, a war in which the outcome of a battle or campaign may be decided before battle is joined. Before it commences the opponent is softened up or eliminated."

For example, from a study of Soviet past performances, doctrine, and present posture he believes its conventional defense against atomic attack to be

weak. Instead of conventional defense the following is the Soviet answer to our atomic capability. The Soviet's imminent attack will be signalled not by a ground force build-up opposite NATO forces but by a clandestine partisan build-up in NATO rear areas. This is much harder to detect. Then partisan activity will hamper mobilization of NATO reserves and logistics of NATO forces in being. Finally, NATO's atomic capability cannot readily be employed against these partisans in its own rear areas which are friendly territory.

Dr. Heilbrunn sums up with a proposed three point program: 1) The Soviet capability for this clandestine warfare must be recognized and evaluated, 2) means of dealing with this menace must be worked out, and 3) we too have a requirement for the capability to wage war without a battlefield and must develop that capability.

The Soviet Secret Services is recommended reading for those who would understand all Communist capabilities.

Reviewed by LtCol F. B. Nihart

Ed: LtCol Nihart is a student, Senior School, MCS.

Mass Movements . . .

THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS: MOVEMENTS, TRAINING AND SUPPLY—C. Wardlow for the Office of Military History, Dept. of Army. \$3.50

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The author was involved in maritime transportation problems during World War I, served for 20 years with commercial shipping organizations, and at the outset of WWII became Co-ordinator of Transportation for the War Department. With this background he is eminently qualified to chronicle the activities of the Army Transportation Corps during World War II.

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Reviewed by LtCol T. M. Burton
Ed: Presently CO 1/5, LtCol Burton has much experience as a logistics instructor and Division G4.

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
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
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
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COMMANDANT'S BIRTHDAY MESSAGE

10 NOVEMBER 1956



Today marks the 181st birthday of the United States Marine Corps. For Marines throughout the world it is at once a day of celebration and reflection.

In the nearly 200 years since that intrepid group of fighting men was recruited at Tun Tavern in Philadelphia there have been almost unbelievable changes in our Corps. In numbers, we have grown from a few score to more than 200,000 — with every Marine now, as then, a volunteer. Our arsenal of new and fantastically complex weapons is a far cry from the muskets and cannon of Revolutionary days. The tactics we have devised to meet the challenge of the nuclear age, the outstanding development of Marine aviation, the introduction of the Marine concept of vertical envelopment, the countless and complicated items of equipment required for our forces today — these are indeed changes which could not have been envisaged by the founders of our Corps. But the basic ingredient which has always made the Marine Corps unique and unsurpassed remains unchanged — the superbly trained, highly motivated, self-confident and intensely loyal Marine. Whether it be with muskets or M1s, the United States Marine for 181 years has been ready on a moment's notice to fight our country's battles against any form of tyranny.

Let us never forget that weapons alone do not make a formidable fighting force; even our most modern and deadly weapon is only as effective as the Marine who mans it. And the effectiveness of every Marine is now — as it has been throughout our long and illustrious history — the result of rigorous and relentless training, selfless and undeviating loyalty, unquestioned and uncommon valor.

Ours is indeed a heritage in which we may justly take pride. It is a heritage which should inspire each of us to even greater efforts today and in the years ahead. On this and every birthday of the United States Marines we must rededicate ourselves to Country and Corps. We must strive constantly to add luster to the glorious record of those Marines who have gone before us. Only by so doing can we prove ourselves worthy of our heritage. Only thus can we proudly bear the title of United States Marines.

With special trust and confidence that each of us will so discharge his responsibilities that the ensuing year will be one of solid and heartening achievement, I extend my personal congratulations and best wishes to all Marines — men and women, Regulars and Reserves — and to their families on this, the 181st birthday of our beloved Corps.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "R. McC. Pate".

R. McC. PATE
General, US Marine Corps
Commandant of the Marine Corps

